Wade Curtis Brandl, Individually and as Next Friend for H.C.B. vs. Adria Sophia Anderson

WADE CURTIS BRANDL, INDIVIDUALLY) AND AS NEXT FRIEND FOR H.C.B., ) ) Appellant, ) WD88111 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) MARCH 10, 2026 ADRIA SOPHIA ANDERSON, ) ) Respondent. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Callaway County, Missouri The Honorable Sue Murvin Crane, Judge

Before Division One: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Thomas N. Chapman, Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge

Wade Brandl ("Father") appeals the trial court's judgment determining the parentage, support, and custody of a son ("Child") he had with Adria Anderson ("Mother"). Father asserts that the trial court erred in ordering Child to attend a different private school than Child was already attending by agreement of the parties; in ordering him to pay fifty percent of Child's tuition costs at a private school he had not agreed to Child attending; and in failing to designate one of the parents' residences as Child's address for education and mailing purposes. We remand this matter with instructions to the trial court to amend its judgment to designate either Father or Mother's residence as the Child's address for education and mailing purposes as required by section

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452.375.5(1), after making best interest findings as required by 452.375.2. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Factual and Procedural Background 1

Child was born in 2019. Father and Mother were not married, but voluntarily shared custody of Child after his birth. In June of 2023, Father filed a petition for determination of parentage, custody, and support. At the time that Father filed his petition, both he and Mother lived in Fulton, Missouri. Father filed a proposed parenting plan with his petition, requesting joint legal and physical custody of Child. He asked that both parents' addresses be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes, and that Child attend public school in Fulton, Missouri. Father and Mother were discussing, but not in agreement about, where Child should go to school. In August of 2023, Mother filed her answer to the petition, a cross petition, and a proposed parenting plan. Mother also requested joint legal and physical custody of Child. Mother alleged that she lived in Fulton, Missouri, and asked that her address be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes. Mother asked that Child attend St. Peter Catholic School ("St. Peter") in Fulton, or a school mutually agreed to by Mother and Father.

1 In the appeal of a bench-tried case, we view "the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment" and disregard all contrary evidence. O'Connor v. Miroslaw, 388 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (citing Owsley v. Brittain, 186 S.W.3d 810, 814 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006)).

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In August of 2024, Mother filed an amended proposed parenting plan. Relevant to this case, Mother again asked that her address be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes, and asked that Child attend St. Peter until eighth grade and South Callaway Public Schools thereafter. Mother asked that Father be ordered to pay St. Peter's tuition costs. By the time that this amended proposed parenting plan was filed, Mother was living some of the time in Wellsville, Missouri with her boyfriend and four other children, although she still maintained a home in Fulton, Missouri. In August of 2024, Father also filed an amended proposed parenting plan. Relevant to this case, the amended plan requested that both Father's and Mother's addresses be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes. Father asked that Child attend St. Peter, and that Mother and Father split the cost of tuition. By the time that Father filed this amended proposed parenting plan, he and Mother had reached an agreement to send Child to school at St. Peter. Child started preschool in the fall of 2024 at St. Peter, and the parties were equally sharing the cost of tuition. On September 13, 2024, Father filed an affidavit and motion for a temporary custody and child support order. The motion alleged that Mother was now residing in Wellsville, Missouri, and that Child had started school at St. Peter. On November 15, 2024, Father and Mother consented to a temporary custody order that was entered by the trial court. The temporary order directed that the parties would share joint legal and physical custody, and would exercise a 2-2-3 parenting time schedule subject to

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provisions for parenting time on certain holidays. 2 The temporary order directed that each party would ensure that Child was in school, on time, during the parent's custodial time. When this temporary custody order was entered, Child was attending St. Peter. Father's petition and Mother's cross-petition were set for trial in January of 2025. The day before trial, Mother filed another amended proposed parenting plan. Relevant to this case, Mother's amended proposed parenting plan stated that "[t]he parties agree the [Child] will continue to go to private school. The [Child] shall attend Immaculate Conception Catholic School ["Immaculate Conception"] in Montgomery City. Father and Mother shall each pay 50% of all tuition costs." Father did not agree with sending Child to Immaculate Conception. Mother's amended proposed parenting plan did not discuss whose residence should be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes. At trial, the trial court heard the testimony of Father, Child's paternal grandfather ("Grandfather"), and Mother. Father testified that he and Mother made the decision together to send Child to St. Peter. Father testified that Mother was the "driving force" behind Child attending St. Peter because Father wanted Child to attend public school in Fulton, Missouri. However, Father agreed with Mother to send Child to a private school so long as it was St. Peter. Father testified that Child had been on the waitlist for several

2 The temporary order characterized the temporary parenting schedule as a 2-2-3 schedule. Without commenting on this characterization, the record is clear that Father was to have Child on Monday and Tuesday; Mother was to have Child on Wednesday and Thursday; and weekends (Friday through Sunday) were to alternate between the parents.

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years for St. Peter and finally enrolled in August of 2024. Father requested that Child continue attending St. Peter. Father testified that Mother had lived in Fulton and worked near Fulton when he filed his petition in 2023. Father testified that Mother now lived in Wellsville and worked in St. Louis. Father testified that it is a fifty-minute commute from Wellsville to St. Peter. Father stated that St. Peter is only ten minutes from his home, and that Child was well-adjusted to St. Peter and was enjoying going there. Father testified that he worked as a heavy equipment operator from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. He testified that the earliest Child can be dropped off at St. Peter is 7:00 a.m., such that on the days he has Child, Father is late to work. Father also testified that on the days he has Child, he leaves work early at 3:00 p.m. to pick up Child at 3:15 p.m. Father testified that Mother had to leave her work in St. Louis by 2:00 p.m. to pick up Child at St. Peter on time. Father stated that Mother sometimes called Grandfather to pick up Child from St. Peter because she could not make it on time. Father explained that St. Peter allows parents to name two people who can pick up a child from school, and that he had included Grandfather on that list. Grandfather testified that he had picked up Child from St. Peter about five to six times in the last few months at Mother's request. Grandfather stated that he had no problem with picking up Child from school for Mother. He testified that he had also helped Father with school drop off and pick up. Mother testified that she moved to Wellsville in April 2024, and she started her new job in St. Louis in July 2024. Mother testified that she rents a house in Fulton,

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where she stays about once a month, depending on Child's schedule. Mother equivocated when asked where she resides, and gave testimony suggesting she resides in both Fulton and Wellsville. Mother acknowledged, however, that she spends most of her time in Wellsville. Mother testified that in Wellsville, she lives with her boyfriend, his two daughters, and her four other biological children. Mother stated that because she had custody of her four other children based on a week-on, week-off schedule, she wanted the same custody schedule for Child. Mother testified that she had agreed with Father that Child would go to St. Peter. Mother stated that she had been asking Father to let Child go to Immaculate Conception since they first began discussing Child's schooling, but Father had never consented. However, since Father agreed that Child could attend St. Peter, Mother had placed Child on the waitlist, and enrolled him in the fall of 2024 once he was eligible. Mother testified that it was a forty-minute commute from Wellsville to St. Peter. She testified that it took her about an hour and a half to drive to work in St. Louis from Wellsville, and about the same amount of time to drive to St. Peter from work in St. Louis. Mother testified that she had experienced only one day with bad weather that made it difficult to get Child to St. Peter from Wellsville. Mother stated that there had been only a few days that Child had been tardy to school by a few minutes and that Child had been absent from school only when he had been sick. Though Child was attending St. Peter by the parties' agreement, Mother testified that she still wanted Child to attend Immaculate Conception in Montgomery City, Missouri, so that he could go to school with her other children. Mother testified that

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Child and her other children had a close relationship. Mother testified that her other children had been attending Immaculate Conception for six years. Mother explained that she did not drive her other children to Immaculate Conception because her oldest child could now drive. Immaculate Conception in Montgomery City, Missouri is approximately 32 miles north and east of Fulton, Missouri, and approximately 8 miles south and east of Wellsville, Missouri. 3 Mother testified that if Child remained at St. Peter, she could still get Child to and from St. Peter as needed. At the close of evidence, the trial court took the case under submission. On February 6, 2025, the trial court issued written rulings as follows ("February rulings"): The Court finds the existence of the father-child relationship and declares [Father] to be the father of the [C]hild named herein. The parties have agreed to joint legal and physical custody. [Father] proposes a plan that, during the school year, gives him physical custody during the week and one weekend a month with Respondent receiving 3 weekends a month. The plan then flips this schedule for the summer. [Mother's] plan is a week to week schedule with the exchanges occurring on Thursday of each week. Currently the parties are exercising a 2.2.3 temporary schedule as ordered by the Court, pursuant to a Consent to Ruling. Both parties announced they could live with this schedule continuing, if the Court so ordered. Clearly both parties love their [C]hild and have their reasons why they prefer their proposed schedule. The evidence suggests nothing is tilted in favor of one over the other pursuant to the considerations of section 452.375 RSMo. 4 For these reasons the Court orders the parties to share joint legal and physical custody with the parenting time schedule in place under the temporary order by the Court. Neither party to pay child support as agreed. [Mother] shall maintain health insurance.

3 "We take judicial notice of the geographical location of cities in the State and the approximate distance between them." Goforth v. Dir. of Revenue, 593 S.W.3d 124, 130 n.4 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (quoting Maxwell v. City of Hayti, 985 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999)). 4 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as supplemented through June 23, 2023, when Father filed his petition for determination of paternity, custody, and child support, unless otherwise noted.

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The parties may each designate up to 2 people who are able to transport/pick up [C]hild to and from school and provide that list to the other parent. Neither parent shall interfere with after school plans of the other parent.

The Court adopts [Mother's] parenting plan with the exception of Part B (a) and (b) which are replaced with the temporary order schedule. [Mother] is directed to prepare a proposed judgment along with an amended parenting plan consistent with these orders. sc 5

The February rulings did not state which school Child should attend. But the February rulings expressed the trial court's intent to adopt Mother's proposed parenting plan. The directive to replace "Part B (a) and (b)" with the temporary parenting time schedule aligns with the amended parenting plan Mother filed the day before trial. In that proposed parenting plan, Child was directed to attend school at Immaculate Conception.

On March 5, 2025, Father filed a motion to amend, vacate, or correct the judgment, a motion to reopen the evidence, and a motion for new trial ("March motion"). 6

Father asserted that there was no evidence that he "could live with [the 2-2-3 parenting] schedule continuing, if the Court so ordered" and that Mother had only testified that this schedule worked for her "for the most part." He also argued that he had not waived child support.

5 The February rulings were characterized as a "judgment" when entered in Casenet. However, although the written rulings bore the trial judge's initials, they were not designated as a judgment. Even had they been, the February rulings indicated the trial court's intent to enter judgment in a separate document. The February rulings were not, therefore, a "judgment" from which an appeal would lie. See Rule 74.01(a) (stating that a docket sheet entry that is designated as a "judgment" or "decree," and that is signed by the judge is a judgment from which an appeal will lie "unless the docket sheet entry indicates that the court will enter the judgment in a separate document[,]" in which case "[t]he separate document shall be the judgment when entered"). 6 Because the February rulings were not a judgment pursuant to Rule 74.01(a), Father's motion was not a post-trial motion.

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On April 10, 2025, Mother filed a proposed judgment as directed by the trial court's February rulings. Mother's proposed judgment stated that both Father and Mother resided in Fulton, Missouri, and required each parent to abide by required procedures to relocate. Mother's proposed judgment summarily stated that "[a]fter considering all relevant factors in RSMo 452.375[,] the Court finds it is in the best interest of the [C]hild that [Father] and [Mother] be awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of the minor [C]hild." Mother's proposed judgment was silent on the contested issue of whether Father or Mother's residence address would be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes. Mother's proposed judgment referred to an attached parenting plan, and submitted a proposed parenting plan that was identical to the one that Mother had filed the day before trial, with the exception of modifying part B(a) and (b) to change the parenting time to that set forth in the temporary custody order. Mother's proposed judgment summarily stated that the parenting plan was in Child's best interest. Mother's proposed parenting plan provided the following with respect to Child's school: The parties agree the minor child will continue to go to private school. The minor child shall attend Immaculate Conception Catholic School in Montgomery City. Father and Mother shall each pay 50% of all tuition costs. Any change to the childs [sic] school shall be a joint decision of the parents.

On April 11, 2025, the trial court issued written rulings on Father's March motion ("April rulings"). The April rulings did not change the 2-2-3 parenting time schedule, but did direct that Mother would be ordered to pay Father child support based on a Form 14 prepared by the trial court.

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On May 2, 2025, the trial court entered its written judgment and decree of parentage, custody, and child support ("Judgment"). The Judgment adopted, verbatim, Mother's proposed judgment and proposed parenting plan, except for the inclusion of child support as calculated pursuant to the trial court's April rulings. As a result, the Judgment found that Mother and Father reside in Fulton, Missouri. The Judgment awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of Child to Father and Mother as both parties had requested. The Judgment included a summary statement that after reviewing statutory best interest factors, this custodial arrangement was in Child's best interest. The Judgment failed to address the contested issue of which parent's residence would be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes. The Judgment adopted and incorporated Mother's proposed parenting plan, and thus included only a summarily stated best interest finding that the parenting plan was in Child's best interests. 7

7 This case highlights the danger of adopting proposed judgments verbatim, a practice that "has been routinely criticized by Missouri courts." Neal v. Neal, 281 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (citing Nolte v. Wittmaier, 977 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998)). "While it is not per se error for a trial court to adopt a proposed judgment verbatim, the practice is not encouraged." Interest of P.S.A., 697 S.W.3d 846, 849 n.6 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024). "[T]rial judges are well advised to approach a party's proposed order with the sharp eye of a skeptic and the sharp pencil of an editor." State ex rel. S.F.F. v. S.C.G., 554 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (quoting Nolte, 977 S.W.2d at 58). That did not happen here. The burden is on the trial court to issue a judgment impacting custody that includes all required statutory determinations or components, and that includes sufficient best interest findings to support the trial court's resolution of contested issues or sub-issues of custody. See Hall v. Hall, 336 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011); Davis v. Schmidt, 210 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (holding that the burden is upon the trial to issue proper best interest findings).

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On May 9, 2025, Father filed a motion to amend, vacate, or correct the Judgment, a motion to reopen the evidence, and a motion for new trial. Although Father argued that sufficient evidence did not support ordering Child to attend Immaculate Conception instead of St. Peter, Father did not mention the Judgment's failure to designate which parent's residence would be Child's address for education or mailing purposes. And Father did not raise the trial court's failure to make statutorily required best interest findings on any of the contested custodial issues in the case, including the contested issue of where Child should go to school. The trial court denied Father's motion.

Father filed this timely appeal. Standard of Review In reviewing a bench-tried case, we will affirm the trial court's judgment unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). A trial court's judgment is "unsupported by substantial evidence when there is no evidence in the record tending to prove a fact that is necessary to sustain the judgment as a matter of law." Sendlein v. Sendlein, 655 S.W.3d 422, 427 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (citing Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 199 (Mo. banc 2014)). Regarding custody issues, the trial court has broad discretion, and we will affirm its award of custody unless we are firmly convinced that the welfare and best interest of the child require otherwise. Thornburg v. Thornburg, 705 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). We defer to the trial court's credibility determinations and view all facts and

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reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision. O'Connor, 388 S.W.3d at 547. Analysis Father raises three points on appeal. In his first point, Father asserts that no substantial evidence supported the trial court's order requiring him to pay half of Child's tuition costs for Immaculate Conception. Father's second point contends that the trial court misapplied the law by failing to designate Father or Mother's residence as Child's address for education and mailing purposes. In his third point, Father argues that no substantial evidence supports the trial court's order requiring Child to attend Immaculate Conception. For ease of analysis, we first address Father's third point on appeal. Point Three: Father's contention that no substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that Child should attend Immaculate Conception is without merit

In his third point relied on, Father asserts that no substantial evidence supports the Judgment's adoption of a parenting plan that required Child to attend Immaculate Conception because the only evidence favoring this determination was Mother's expressed preference for Child to go to the same school as her other children. Father argues that this evidence "does not logically tend to prove that Child's best interest would be served by attending [Immaculate Conception], especially when there is also no evidence of the cost of [Immaculate Conception]." Father is correct that the determination of where a child should attend school is driven by what is in the best interest of the child. "The choice of a child's school is one of the myriad 'sub-issues of custody' that a [trial] court may address when joint legal

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custodians cannot agree." Sendlein, 655 S.W.3d at 431. "Like all other disputed issues of custody, the [trial] court is required to make written findings of the best interests of the child in accordance with [section] 452.375 8 when exercising its discretion to select the child's school." Id. (emphasis added); see also Buchanan, 167 S.W.3d at 702 ("So long as any issue or sub-issue of custody is subject to contest between the parties and resolution by the court, written findings that include discussion of the applicable factors from section 452.375.2 are required"); O'Connor, 388 S.W.3d at 549 (holding that when joint legal custodians disagree on where their child should go to school, the trial court has discretion to participate in school selection in order to protect a child's best interests); section 452.375.6 (if the parties do not agree to a custodial arrangement or the court

8 The best interest factors are described in section 452.375.2 as follows: (1) The wishes of the child's parents as to custody and the proposed parenting plan submitted by both parties; (2) The needs of the child for a frequent, continuing and meaningful relationship with both parents and the ability and willingness of parents to actively perform their functions as mother and father for the needs of the child; (3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests; (4) Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with the other parent; (5) The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community. . . .; (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved, including any history of abuse of any individuals involved. . . .; (7) The intention of either parent to relocate the principal residence of the child; and (8) The unobstructed input of a child, free of coercion and manipulation, as to the child's custodial arrangement. Section 452.375.2(1)-(8); see Buchanan v. Buchanan, 167 S.W.3d 698, 701 n.3 (Mo. banc 2005) (in custody cases, the court has the burden to issue written findings). "However, the statute does not require that the court make written findings on each of the factors, but only those relevant to the case." Erickson v. Blackburn, 169 S.W.3d 69, 75 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005) (citing Speer v. Colon, 155 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Mo. banc 2005)).

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rejects a proposed custodial arrangement, the judgment must include the trial court's written findings based on the public policy in section 452.375.4 and the specific relevant factors in section 452.375.2 detailing the reasons for which a particular arrangement is in the child's best interest). Here, the uncontroverted evidence established that although Father and Mother agreed to send Child to St. Peter, a private school, they did not agree that Child should attend Immaculate Conception. Because Father and Mother were joint legal custodians who did not agree about whether Child should stay at St. Peter or change schools to Immaculate Conception, the trial court was required to determine this custodial issue in the best interest of Child. In doing so, the trial court was required to make written findings regarding the best interest factors enumerated in section 452.375.2. See section 452.375.6. The Judgment incorporated a parenting plan that resolved the contested issue about where Child would go to school by directing Child to attend Immaculate Conception. The Judgment summarily stated that the incorporated parenting plan was in Child's best interest without addressing any of the best interest factors at all, and certainly without doing so in the context of resolving the contested school choice issue. 9

9 Though the degree of specificity required to ensure that a trial court's best interest findings are statutorily sufficient is not expressly addressed in section 452.375.6 (which requires a judgment impacting custody to "detail" the specific relevant factors that made the trial court's custodial determination in the best interest of the child), it is clear that broad, conclusory statements about a determination being in a child's best interest are not sufficient. See Tipton v. Joseph-Tipton, 173 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) (holding that trial court's bare conclusion that a custodial determination is "in the best interests of the minor children" did not comply with statutory requirements). In addition,

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Rule 78.07(b) 10 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Rule 78.07(c), in cases tried without a jury or with an advisory jury, neither a motion for a new trial nor a motion to amend the judgment or opinion is necessary to preserve any matter for appellate review if the matter was previously presented to the trial court." Rule 78.07(c) provides the exception that "[i]n all cases, allegations of error relating to the form or language of the judgment, including the failure to make statutorily required findings, must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment in order to be preserved for appellate review." "The failure to make [best interest] findings required by section 452.375.2 must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment." Pickering v. Pickering, 314 S.W.3d 822, 839 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (citing Rule 78.07(c); In re Marriage of Bottorff, 221 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007)). Father's post-Judgment motion did not raise the trial court's failure to make required statutory best interest findings essential to determining the contested issue of where Child should go to school. Father acknowledges Rule 78.07(c) in his brief. But Father asserts that Rule 78.07(c) does not apply to his third point on appeal because he claims that no substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination about where Child should attend school. We agree. "Substantial evidence is evidence that, if believed, has some probative force on each fact that is necessary to sustain the [trial] court's judgment." Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at

a mere laundry list of the best interest factors with a notation as to which favor father, mother, or are neutral, without meaningful discussion or explanation of the evidence, is statutorily deficient. See Hall, 336 S.W.3d at 190-93; Alberswerth v. Alberswerth, 184 S.W.3d 81, 90-93 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). 10 All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume I - State, 2025, unless otherwise noted.

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199 (citation omitted). To prevail on a substantial evidence challenge, Father "must demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record tending to prove a fact that is necessary to sustain the [trial] court's judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 200 (citations omitted). Because Father argues that no evidence supports the trial court's resolution of the contested school choice issue, his failure to raise the lack of sufficient best interest findings in a Rule 78.07(c) motion does not impede our ability to review Father's claim. 11

We nonetheless disagree with Father's view of the evidence. Mother and Father testified that as of the time of trial, they primarily resided in locations that were relatively far apart. That was not the case when they agreed to send Child to St. Peter. As a result, whichever school Child attends, Child will be required to travel further to and from school during one parent's custodial time. Though Father appeared from the evidence to have less flexibility in his work schedule than Mother, Grandfather had been assisting both parents in getting Child to and from school prior to trial, and expressed a willingness to continue to do so. Mother testified to the close relationship Child had with her other

11 We would reach a different conclusion as to whether the issue was preserved for our review had Father claimed that the trial court's determination of the contested school choice issue was against the weight of the evidence. Unlike a "no substantial evidence" challenge, a "weight-of-the-evidence" challenge presupposes that a judgment is supported by substantial evidence, but argues that an appellate court should weigh the probative value of the evidence supporting a judgment against the non-supporting evidence to reach a different outcome. Weeks v. City of St. Louis, 721 S.W.3d 873, 876 (Mo. banc 2025). The failure to raise insufficient best interest findings in a Rule 78.07(c) motion would render an "against-the-weight-of-the-evidence" challenge unpreserved for appellate review. Schlotman v. Costa, 193 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (holding that insufficient best interest findings which did not explain why the trial court's resolution of a contested custodial issue was in child's best interest impeded the ability to determine whether the decision was against the weight of the evidence).

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children (Child's half-siblings), and to the desire that all of her children attend the same school. The evidence either Mother or Father could have presented that would have been probative of Child's best interests with respect to the choice of school could have been more complete or compelling. See, e.g., Sendlein, 655 S.W.3d at 431-32. But we cannot say that no evidence in the record tended to prove that it was in Child's best interest to attend Immaculate Conception. Point Three is denied. Point One: Substantial evidence supports the trial court's order that Father pay 50% of Child's tuition to attend private school

In his second point on appeal, Father argues that the trial court's determination that he should pay 50% of the cost of Child's tuition and expenses at Immaculate Conception was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Father complains that the trial court heard no evidence about whether attending Immaculate Conception would meet any particular need for Child, no evidence as to the cost of tuition and expenses to attend Immaculate Conception, and no evidence that Father was able to pay the ordered costs. As previously noted, [t]o prevail on a substantial evidence challenge, Father "must demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record tending to prove a fact that is necessary to sustain the [trial] court's judgment as a matter of law." Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at 200 (citations omitted). Father has not sustained this burden. Father correctly observes that when a parent does not agree to pay the cost of private education, he may only be ordered to do so if a private school meets a "particular

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educational need" of the child, and if the costs are within the financial means of the parent. Shiflett v. Shiflett, 954 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). The "particular educational needs" test does not apply to resolving custody determinations, including disputes about whether a child should attend private school. Sendlein, 655 S.W.3d at

1. Instead, the "particular educational needs" test is only relevant to the Form 14

calculation of whether a parent can be required to pay private school tuition as an "extraordinary child-rearing cost." Id. Here, before the Judgment was entered, Father and Mother had already agreed to send Child to a private school and were already splitting the cost for Child to do so. In fact, Father's amended proposed parenting plan submitted in August of 2024 asked the trial court to order that Child attend St. Peter (a private school) and that he and Mother split the cost to do so equally. The "particular educational needs" standard addressed in Shiflett has no application here because Father was not opposed to paying 50% of Child's tuition to attend private school and submitted a proposed parenting plan that required him to do so. Substantial evidence thus supported the trial court's determination that Father should pay 50% of Child's tuition to attend private school. Father's real complaint is that he was ordered to pay 50% for Child to attend Immaculate Conception when he wanted Child to attend St. Peter. But Father's complaint about which private school Child should attend is not a child support determination issue. It is instead a sub-issue of custody, as addressed in our discussion of Father's third point on appeal. Point One is denied.

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Point Two: The Judgment's failure to designate a parent's residence as Child's address for education and mailing purposes requires remand

In his second point on appeal, Father argues that the trial court "misapplied the law in entering a Judgment without designating Father's or Mother's address as the [C]hild's address for education and mailing purposes," as required by section 452.375.5. When joint physical custody is awarded to both parents, along with either an award of joint legal custody or an award of sole legal custody to one parent, section 452.375.5(1) and (2) require the trial court to designate the residence of one of the parents as the address of the child for education and mailing purposes. The designation of a parent's address as a child's residence is considered a "sub-issue of custody." Buchanan, 167 S.W.3d at 702. As a result, when joint physical custodians do not agree about whose residence should be designated as the child's address for education and mailing purposes, the trial court must determine the issue in accordance with the child's best interest, considering all relevant factors and entering written findings of facts and conclusion of law on the factors enumerated in section 452.375.2. Id.; section 452.375.6 The trial court's Judgment awarded joint physical and legal custody of Child to Father and Mother pursuant to section 452.375.5(1), and noted that both parties resided in Fulton, Missouri. However, the Judgment did not designate an address for Child as required by section 452.375.5(1). Though Father and Mother agreed that joint physical and legal custody should be awarded, they did not agree about whose residence should be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes. The Judgment thus left

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unresolved a sub-issue of custody that was in dispute, requiring remand. 12 See Simon- Harris v. Harris, 138 S.W.3d 170, 181 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (trial court's failure to designate a child's address pursuant to section 452.375.5(1) required remand). Because Father and Mother do not agree which parent's residence should be designated as Child's address, the trial court will not be able to make this contested custodial determination on

12 Though Father did not raise the omitted custodial determination in a Rule 78.07(c) motion, his claim of error is nonetheless preserved for our review. See, e.g., Wills v. Wills, 197 S.W.3d 187, 196 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (holding that parenting plan incorporated into decree that omitted a statutorily required component required remand so that the trial court could "prepare a complete parenting plan consistent with the statutory requirements," even though the parenting plan deficiencies were not raised by either party). Our courts routinely remand to permit a trial court to amend a decree or parenting plan to include all required statutory components. See, e.g., Taylor v. Francis, 620 S.W.3d 308, 311-12 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (remanding judgment to permit trial court to modify parenting plan to assign custody, visitation, and residential time for child on all major holidays, school holidays, and vacation periods); Wennihan v. Wennihan, 452 S.W.3d 723, 737 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (remanding with directions to trial court to address all statutory enumerated events in parenting time schedule); Williams v. Williams, 223 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007) (holding that parenting plan that did not include statutorily required provisions such as a specific parenting time schedule was not complete, requiring remand "for the trial court to prepare a complete parenting plan consistent" with statutorily required provisions); In re Marriage of Goodman, 267 S.W.3d 783, 789 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008) (holding that trial court's failure to include statutorily required provision in parenting plan that assigned all parenting time to one or the other parent required remand to permit completion of parenting plan that includes all statutorily required provisions). We do so even where the omission is not raised in a Rule 78.07(c) motion because the omission of a statutorily required custodial determination or parenting plan provision creates uncertainty about custodial status, and fosters repeated custody and visitation disputes. In re Marriage of Goodman, 267 S.W.3d at 789. In contrast, omitted best interest findings do not create uncertainty about custodial status, but may in their absence impede effective appellate review. See Davis, 210 S.W.3d at 503 ("The purpose for the statutory requirement to detail the [best interest] factors is to allow for more meaningful appellate review") (quotation omitted).

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remand without making sufficient, written, best interest findings as required by section 452.375.2. 13

Point Two is granted. Conclusion The Judgment is remanded with instructions to the trial court to amend the Judgment to designate one of the parents' residences identified in the Judgment as Child's address for education and mailing purposes as required by section 452.375.5(1), supported by best interest findings as required by section 452.375.2. In all other respects, the Judgment is affirmed. __________________________________ Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge

All concur

13 This Opinion should not be read to suggest that separate section 452.375 best interest findings are required for each discrete custodial issue determined by a trial court. However, in this case, the only "best interest" references in the Judgment and incorporated parenting plan were mere conclusory statements that are not compliant with statutory requirements, leaving us no choice but to require compliant statutory best interest findings on remand in connection with the trial court's determination of which parents' residence should be designated as Child's address for education and mailing purposes.