| Issued by THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION |
| FINAL AWARD DENYING COMPENSATION |
| (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge) |
| Injury No.: 03-107640 |
| Employee: | Gary McCurter |
| Employer: | Cassens Transport Company |
| Insurer: | Self c/o Crawford \& Co. |
| Date of Accident: | Alleged July 15, 2003 |
| Place and County of Accident: | Contract of hire in St. Louis County |
| The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided bysection 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record, the Commissionfinds that the award of the administrative law judge is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Pursuant to section 286.090 RSMo, the Commission affirms the award and decision of the administrative law judge dated January 20, 2005, and awards no compensation in the above-captioned case.The Commission finds that the administrative law judge correctly weighed and evaluated the lay and medical testimony in reaching his conclusions as to the issues presented. The Commission finds that the administrative law judge correctly determined that employee's employment was not a substantial factor in the development of his medical condition.Reese v. Gary & Roger Link, Inc., 5 S.W.3d 522 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002), Sullivan v. Masters Jackson Paving Co., 35 S.W.3d 879 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001), Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240 (Mo. banc 2003).The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Joseph E. Denigan, is attached and incorporated by this reference.Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 23rd day of August 2005.LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION |
| William F. Ringer, Chairman |
| Alice A. Bartlett, Member |
| DISSENTING OPINION FILED |
| Attest: | John J. Hickey, Member |
| Secretary |
| DISSENTING OPINION |
| I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority of the Commission. I would find the claim compensable and reverse the administrative law judge. |
The administrative law judge and the majority rely on the opinions of Dr. Coin in determining that employee's employment did not involve sufficient repetitive actions to be causative of the condition of carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Coin, in fact, agreed with that diagnosis and recommended surgery to cure and relieve. Dr. Coin testified that employee did have continuous, heavy repetitive use of his hands. Dr. Coin maintained his opinion that employee's job was not hand intensive enough to be causative even as he testified that he did not measure the vibration to which employee was exposed. Dr. Coin did no research into the question of truck driving as a cause of carpal tunnel. Employee presented publications from Rehabilitation Medicine, the May Clinic health letter, the National Institute of Medicine and the Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Newsletter all containing articles linking truck driving to the development of carpal tunnel syndrome.
I would not accept the conclusions of Dr. Coin. To me, the opinions of Dr. Shaefer and Dr. Swango are the more persuasive. These physicians testified that Employee's job, which was hand intensive and exposed him to the vibration risk of truck driving, was a significant factor in the development of his carpal tunnel syndrome. Accordingly, the condition would be compensable under Sec. 287.067.7 RSMo.
In his rulings of law, the administrative law judge provides us with a bold medical conclusion involving the medical condition resulting from repetitive trauma. We are informed that that condition is tenosynovitis, not carpal tunnel syndrome. The source of this conclusion is not indicated and is nowhere to be found in the record. Obviously, the administrative law judge is taking the opportunity of this award to share his own views and conclusions. I consider this to be improper.
The administrative law judge makes mention of "the three month rule." This rule has no bearing on this case and allusions to the rule have no place in this decision.
The administrative law judge enlightens us further with a definition of ergonomics. It is one thing to interject material which is not in the case but quite another to interject material which is incorrect. Mr. Webster's dictionary advises that ergonomics is the "applied science of equipment design intended to reduce operator fatigue and discomfort." The administrative law judge, however, seems to equate exposure with ergonomics. A conclusion without foundation.
The administrative law judge advises that because employee "endured the exposures" of repetitive trauma for years before the manifestation of symptoms the condition does not meet the statutory requirement. What statute requires sudden onset of repetitive motion injury?
The administrative law judge advised that no expert has identified the period of "latency", during which employee is exposed to repetitive trauma and before the development of symptoms, as being medically recognized. Apparently, the administrative law judge did not notice the testimony of his adopted expert, Dr. Coin. Dr. Coin testified that a reasonable medical assessment of repetitive trauma, viewed on a gross basis, would be a "small insult or trauma to the hands on a daily basis over a lengthy period of time until the patient becomes symptomatic." To the extent that the administrative law judge's denial is based on his contrary conclusion, it is plainly wrong.
John J. Hickey, Member