I respectfully dissent from the Commission majority's decision to deny employee workers' compensation benefits for her knee injuries. I believe employee has met her burden of proving the knee injuries are compensable.
The claimant has the burden of proving all the essential elements of the claim and must establish a causal connection between the accident and the injury. Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis-Cardinal Ritter Institute, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo.App. E.D.1990). The claimant does not, however, have to establish the elements of his case on the basis of absolute certainty. Id. It is sufficient if he shows them by reasonable probability. Id. "Probability means founded on reason and experience which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room for doubt." Id. at 198-99; Ellis v. Western Elec. Co., 664 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.App.1984).
Cook v. Sunnen Products Corp., 937 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo. App. 1996).
"[A]ll doubts should be resolved in favor of the employee and in favor of coverage, but a claim will not be validated where some essential element is lacking." Id. at 223.
"[A]n injury is compensable when it is an unexpected result of the performance of the usual and customary duties of an employee which leads to physical breakdown or a change in pathology. Wolfgeher, 646 S.W.2d at 784; See also § 287.020.3." Smith v. Climate Engineering, 939 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Mo. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Mo. banc 2003) (citing Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781 (Mo.banc 1983)).
It has long been the rule in Missouri that an inherent weakness or bodily defect, such as degenerative joint disease, occurring in conjunction with an abnormal strain will support a claim for compensation. See Johnson v. General Motors Assembly Division G.M.C., 605 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Mo. App. 1980). (citations omitted) (overturned on other grounds). To prove a compensable injury, employee must prove she experienced a change in pathology as a result of the fall. "The worsening of a preexisting condition, i.e., an increase in the severity of the condition, or an intensification or aggravation thereof, is a 'change in pathology.'" Winsor v. Lee Johnson Constr. Co., 950 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Mo. App. 1997), citing Rector v. City of Springfield, 820 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Mo. App. 1991).
Employee testified credibly that she had no knee complaints before the fall. Employee testified credibly that she suffered right knee and right calf complaints within two weeks of the fall, which complaints she reported to Dr. Kleier. The right calf complaint appears in Dr. Kleier's records while the knee complaint does not.
Employee produced the expert medical testimony of Dr. Levy, offered within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that employee's fall on July 31, 2000, was a substantial factor in causing her right knee condition. This opinion was supported by the reports of Dr. Volarich and Dr. Berkin. Dr. Levy credibly explained that chondromalacia generally develops after a trauma such as the one claimant suffered. Dr. Levy testified that employee's left knee condition was caused by employee favoring her right knee after the right knee became symptomatic. Again, this opinion was supported by the reports of Dr. Volarich and Dr. Berlin, who both attribute the left knee problems to abnormal weight-bearing. Employer/insurer produced no expert testimony to refute Dr. Levy's opinion. Employer/insurer produced no expert testimony at all.
The Commission may not substitute an administrative law judge's personal opinion on the question of medical causation for the uncontradicted testimony of a qualified medical expert. See Wright v. Sports Associated, 887 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. banc 1994). That is exactly what the Commission has done in this case by disregarding the uncontradicted opinion of Dr. Levy, which is bolstered by other medical reports, in favor of the administrative law judge's opinion.
The administrative law judge seems unduly persuaded by the absence of knee complaints in the medical records of Dr. Kleier during the brief period from July 31, 2000, through September 29, 2000. The Commission is not bound to accept as true matters asserted in medical records.
The Missouri Supreme Court has noted that entries in medical records should not be considered to be conclusive evidence. Baugh v. Life \& Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 307 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Mo.1957). Rather, the Baugh court held the evidentiary value of medical records is to be weighed by the finder of fact, along with the other facts and circumstances, who may either believe or disbelieve the facts disclosed in the medical records. Id.
Schneider v. Ashburn/Schneider Painting, 849 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Mo. App. 1993). Certainly, then, the Commission is not bound to conclude the non-existence of matters simply because they are not referred to in the medical records. The other facts and circumstances in this case, specifically employee's credible testimony that she informed Dr. Kleier of her knee complaints on August 10, 2000, at the same time she reported her calf pain, convinces me that Dr. Kleier's records do not accurately and completely reflect the history employee provided to him.
I must comment on the deposition of Dr. Levy, which has come to the Commission for review with permanent marks throughout. (Claimant's Exhibit Q.) I reiterate my previously expressed opinion that the addition of any permanent markings or annotations to documents, records, or depositions after their entry in the official record is completely inappropriate. If this case is appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals or the Missouri Supreme Court, I want the appellate judges to know that the markings were not made by any member of this Commission.
John J. Hickey, Member