Sections 287.063.1 and 287.063.2 address liability for occupational disease. It provides:
- An employee shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists, subject to the provisions relating to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, as is set forth in subsection 7 of section 287.067, RSMo.
- The employer liable for the compensation in this section provided shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease for which claim is made regardless of the length of time of such last exposure.
Subsection 7 of section 287.067, to which 287.063.1 refers, states:
With regard to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, if the exposure to the repetitive motion which is found to be the cause of the injury is for a period of less than three months and the evidence demonstrates that the exposure to the repetitive motion with a prior employer was the substantial contributing factor to the injury, the prior employer shall be liable for such occupational disease.
It is undisputed that employee was an employee with Ameristar for a period greater than three months at the time the claim for compensation was filed as well as the amended claim for compensation was filed. The administrative law judge held in her award that she was constrained to follow the reasoning in Endicott v. Display Technologies, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612 (Mo. banc 2002), in applying the last exposure rule pursuant to section 287.063 and section 287.067, and concluded that in so doing, the responsible employer was Ameristar and not Station. The administrative law judge concluded that she must look to the date the employee filed her claim and whether more than three months had passed since working for Ameristar. Then, if so, there must be a determination that there was extremity intensive employment for a greater period of three months during the subsequent period of employment and if the employment were repetitive in nature liability should attach and be imposed on the last employer.
However, the Commission is convinced that a closer reading of Endicott, supra, requires, as a matter of law, that the liability and responsibility for workers' compensation benefits in this case be imposed on Station, in lieu of Ameristar. Endicott states the last exposure rule is not a rule of causation. "Rather, as the starting point, the last employer before the date of claim is liable if that employer exposed the employee to the hazard of the occupational disease." Id. at 615. The Commission is of the opinion that for the holding in Endicott to apply to the instant case, employee must have had employment with Ameristar for more than three months before her claim was filed and
employee must have been exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease she contracted, i.e. bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome.
The evidence is uncontradicted that employee's employment and exposure to repetitive motion while an employee with Station, was the substantial contributing factor to the injury contracted. Prior to her employment with Ameristar, which began December 20, 2000, the employee was diagnosed with both bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral cubital syndrome, and Dr. Sudekum was of the opinion that she had contracted these diseases due to her occupation as a dealer at Station. On December 11, 2000, Dr. Sudekum removed her from her work capacity as a dealer, and imposed light duty restrictions, removing her from her injurious exposure. When Ameristar became her employer on December 20, 2000, her light duty restrictions were still in effect, and she did not expose herself to the hazards of the disease between December 20, 2000 and her surgeries undergone in January, 2001. Thus, there was no substantial, competent or credible evidence that employee, while employed with Ameristar between December 20, 2000 and her initial surgery of January 5, 2001, was exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease she contracted. It is the opinion of the Commission that for the liability for the employee's occupational disease to be the responsibility of the subsequent employer, Ameristar, the employee would have to have been employed in an occupation or process at Ameristar in which the hazard of the disease exists.
Emphasizing paragraph 7 of section 287.067 RSMo, it is clear that "if the exposure to the repetitive motion which is found to be the cause of the injury is for a period of less than three months and the evidence demonstrates that the exposure to the repetitive motion with a prior employer was the substantial contributing factor to the injury, the prior employer shall be liable for such occupational disease".
In the instant case the evidence clearly indicates that employee was not exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease she contracted between December 20, 2000 and January 5, 2001, and even if there were exposures, they were not for a period greater than three months; and, it is unequivocal that the employee's prior employment with Station was the substantial contributing factor to her injuries.
As of January 5, 2001, the employee became incapacitated for work due to her occupational injuries, and it is disability after exposure in the employer's business that creates the obligation to compensation and the employer's liability is fixed as of that time. King v. St. Louis Steel Casting Co., 182 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. 1944).
It is true that employee eventually returned to employment as a dealer with Ameristar, commencing full time approximately June 2001. It is true that, at the time the claim for compensation was filed on January 3, 2002, employee had served in that work capacity for a time period greater than three months. It is also true that employee's work for Ameristar exposed employee to a hazard (repetitive motion) capable of causing carpal tunnel syndrome and cubital tunnel syndrome. However, the hazard to which Ameristar exposed employee did not cause employee's conditions of carpal tunnel syndrome and cubital tunnel syndrome that are the subject of this claim.
Before she was ever exposed to any hazard of her disease with Ameristar, employee had completed medical treatment for the disease, had achieved maximum medical improvement from the disease, had been released by her physician to full duty work without restrictions, and had actually returned to performing full duty work. Common sense convinces us that it is not possible that employee's later employment activities with Ameristar caused a disease from which employee had already maximally recovered. Not coincidentally, there is no medical opinion before us that supports a finding or conclusion that employee's later work for Ameristar involved repetitive motion capable of retroactively causing the injuries from which employee had already maximally recovered before she began repe