I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based upon my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge is in error and should be reversed.
Employee requested a hardship hearing seeking a temporary award of medical treatment for a torn medial meniscus and temporary total disability. The administrative law judge denied all benefits in a final award after concluding that employee failed to meet his burden of proving medical causation.
In this case, employee testified about how he injured himself. He explained that he never had any acute injury to his knee before the work accident. Three witnesses at work remember the events surrounding the work accident. Employer's expert testified that the mechanism of injury described by employee could have caused the medial meniscus tear. However, because other medical records suggest that employee suffered some chronic knee problems, Dr. Haupt could not state within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the accident caused the tear.
As this matter was before the administrative law judge on a request for a temporary award seeking medical treatment, the standard of proof for causation was not reasonable certainty but, rather, reasonable probability.
"To obtain an award for temporary disability and medical aid, the claimant must prove the injury's cause by a reasonable probability." Loepke v. Opies Transp., 945 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Mo. App. 1997), quoting Downing v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Mo. App. 1995). Dr. Haupt's belief that the accident could have caused the medial meniscus tear combined with the evidence that employee had no acute knee injury before the work accident is sufficient to satisfy this standard.
Medical opinion testimony, as here, "which speaks in terms of likelihood rather than certainty, is admissible and probative." Dean v. St. Luke's Hosp., 936 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Mo.App. 1997). "Such testimony, particularly when combined with other credible evidence of a nonmedical character, can be enough to support an award . . . " Id.; see Miller v. Penmac Pers. Servs., Inc., 68 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Mo. App. 2002) (quoting Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. banc 1994)) ("'Cautious or indefinite expert testimony on medical causation combined with lay testimony can provide sufficient competent evidence to support causation of injury."').
Elliott v. Ind. W. Express, 118 S.W.3d 297, 301-302 (Mo. App. 2003).
"'Probable means founded on reason and experience which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room for doubt.'" Thorsen v. Sachs Elec. Co., 52 S.W.3d 611, 620 (Mo. App. 2001) (citations omitted).
I believe employee has shown a reasonable probability that the work accident caused his medial meniscus tear. I would award medical treatment for the injury and any related temporary total disability.
For the foregoing reasons, I must dissent from the award of the majority of the Commission.
John J. Hickey, Member