The instant case is routinely classified or pigeonholed in workers' compensation matters as a "going to and from work" type accident. There are certain guiding principles, which control the resolution of these types of proceedings.
The general long standing principle is that an employee does not suffer injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment if the employee is injured or dies while going or journeying to or returning from the place of employment. McClain v. Welsh Co., 748 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988).
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, further expounds this general principle at law in the McClain case supra, (at p. 725):
"Going to or returning from employment is a personal act, akin to dressing, grooming and presenting oneself for work. . . . In other words, a trip to or from one's place of work is merely an inevitable circumstance with which every employee is confronted and which ordinarily bears no immediate relation to the actual services to be performed.
'If a worker is to do the task for which he is employed, he must of course present himself at his place of work at the appointed hour; and when his day's work is over, he is no longer subject to his employer's direction and control but is free to return to his home to do anything else that may happen to suit his own personal convenience.'
. . . Suffice it to say that the following exceptions have been recognized by our courts: (1) the 'journey' exception authorizes compensation when an injury suffered by the employee occurs while the employee is traveling for the employer. . . . (2) the 'conveyance exception' where the employer furnishes the employee with a vehicle or the employee uses his own vehicle and the employer pays expenses on it when used for business purposes. . . . However, the use of the vehicle to go to or return home after the work day serves no employment-related function so that no award of compensation is authorized. . . . (3) the 'special task' exception whereby the employee performs a special task, service or errand in connection with his employment. In such cases compensation is awarded. . . . (4) the exception which authorizes compensation where the duties of the employee entail travel away from the employer's business to obtain parts or supplies for employer."
In the case of Ray v. Great Western Stage and Equip. Co., 413 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. App. W.D. 1967), the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals cited with approval the following principles of law enunciated by Professor Larson in his treatise, (at p. 582):
"The mere fact that claimant is, while going to work, also carrying with him some of the paraphernalia of his employment does not, in itself, convert the trip into a part of the employment. For example, the mere fact that at the time of the accident the employee had with him some of the tools of his trade, such as a steamfitter's hard hat, a pocket rule, and a level, all belonging to the employer, does not make the accident compensable.
Adherence to this methodical process of analysis in particular cases can help remove some of the uncertainty that attends the many familiar situations involving teachers who prepare lessons or correct papers at home, lawyers who take home briefs, salesman who work on accounts at home, and newspapermen who polish up a bit of writing at home-all of whom might be tempted under a more vague rule to assert compensation coverage of all their movements to, from or around the house by virtue of some morsel of work carried around in their pockets."
Applying these principles, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, reached the following conclusions in Ray, supra, (at pp. 582-583):
"In the case before us we find no substantial evidence that (1) employer contracted to pay claimant's transportation costs from his home to the office; (2) claimant was either to perform any part of his work at
home or that his duties required him to do so; (3) that at the time of the accident claimant was in the performance of any duty which the employer requested, required or even knew was being performed at home. . . . These activities are quite similar to school teachers grading papers at home, lawyers who take home briefs, salesmen who work on accounts at home, and newspapermen who polish up a bit of writing at home, none of whom are covered, as stated by Larson, supra."
In addition to the reference to the Larson treatise in the Ray case, supra, the Commission also notes the following general principles of law in the same treatise, at A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, Desk Edition, Sections 16-10[2][3] (2004):
"When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal indicia may be looked for: the quantity and regularity of work performed at home; the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and special circumstances of the particular employment that make it necessary and not merely personally convenient to work at home.
. . . Is compensation law prepared to follow up the implications of a decision that professional employees (who all in some degree share the characteristic of doing part of their work at home) may convert virtually their entire day into the 'course of employment' by virtue of such trivia as opening the front door to see whether to suspend school on stormy days? Teachers, doctors, lawyers, architects, artists, executives-in fact almost any employee-may have frequent occasion to perform services of some kind at home, often far more substantial than that of looking over the weather. If the going and coming rule is to be subjected to a process of gradual erosion, through the device of finding some tidbit of work performed at home, then in fairness to employees generally the entire doctrine should be scrapped and a fresh start should be made in which all goings and comings are covered. . . .
Ohio, . . . became alarmed at where this line of cases might be leading. . . . [T]here was evidence that . . . teachers did work at home outside regular hours, although they were at liberty to do the work at the school if they wished. The choice was left to their own convenience. When injured, this teacher had some papers with her to be corrected at home, but the claim was based principally on the theory that claimant did some work at home in preparation for her school duties. The court suddenly saw before it the endless procession of indistinguishable cases ultimately destroying the going and coming rule, . . . .
If work is done at home for the employee's convenience, the going and coming trip is not a business trip within the dual-purpose rule, since serving the employee's own convenience in selecting an off-premises place in which to do the work is a personal and not a business purpose. . . .
Whenever it could honestly be said that the taking of work home was solely for the employee's personal convenience, compensation for injuries during the regular trip to or from work which the claimant would have taken in any case has been denied. Thus, in a California case, the claimant was a schoolteacher who had been injured in an automobile accident while driving to school from her home. Reversing the appellate court, the California Supreme Court refused to allow compensation benefits. Applying the 'going and coming' rule, the court held that injuries sustained while traveling to work are compensable only when the employer requires work to be done at home. Although teachers normally do work at home, the court found that it was not required by the employer and was done merely for the convenience of the teacher. The court held that 'if work is done at home for the employee's convenience, the commute does not constitute a business trip.' The court refused to hold that the claimant was within the scope of her employment merely because she was incidentally transporting instructional material at the time of her injury."
III. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Relying on the undisputed facts and general principles of law as set forth above, the Commission concludes, as a matter of law, that the death of the employee was not attributable to an acc