| Issued by THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION |
| TEMPORARY OR PARTIAL AWARD |
| (Reversing Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge) |
| Injury No.: 06-001823 |
| Employee: | Kristen Norman |
| Employer: | Phelps County Regional Medical Center |
| Insurer: | Liberty Mutual Insurance Company |
| Date of Accident: | January 8, 2006 |
| Place and County of Accident: | Phelps County, Missouri |
| The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. We have reviewed the evidence, read the briefs of the parties, heard oral argument and considered the whole record. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, the Commission reverses the award and decision of the administrative law judge dated January 4, 2007. The award and decision of Chief Administrative Law Judge Victorine R. Mahon, is attached hereto solely for reference. |
| I. Issue |
| The sole issue presented to the Commission is whether or not employee sustained injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment on January 8, 2006. Since the date of accident is January 8, 2006, the workers' compensation law as amended in 2005 governs this case. |
| II. Facts |
| On January 8, 2006, employee was performing her housekeeping work duties for her employer. Employer assigned employee the duty of cleaning a sink in the operating room of the employer. Pursuant to the rules of the employer, prior to an employee performing such a duty, it was required for employee to put scrubs on over her clothes as well as booties over her shoes. At the time of the accident employee had put scrubs on over her clothes and was preparing to put on booties over her shoes. |
| Employee’s testimony concerning her attempt to put booties on over her shoes was as follows: she was standing in the doorway between the locker room and the operating room. While standing in the doorway and holding the bootie, she shifted her entire weight to her right lower extremity with her right side/right shoulder leaning against the doorway for support. Employee then lifted her left leg anteriorly crossing her right knee attempting to slip the bootie over her left shoe. In that instant her left knee popped and dislocated. The subsequent events and circumstances surrounding the injury and employee’s eventual medical care and treatment are not relevant to the instant appeal, other than the testimony of the medical experts concerning medical causation. |
| The employee’s treating physician for her left knee dislocation was Dr. Bradley Walz, a board certified orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Walz diagnosed and treated the employee for a left knee dislocation. Dr. Walz testified that employee’s left knee dislocation was related to her injury at work. Dr. Walz further was of the opinion that employee’s left knee injury at work was the primary factor leading to employee’s left knee dislocation. Dr. Walz testified that the left knee dislocation occurred while employee was attempting to put on the surgical bootie over her left shoe. |
| The Commission reviewed all of the treating medical records placed in evidence as well as the deposition testimony of Dr. Robert Pearson proffered by employer/insurer. |
| III. Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law |
As of the date of this accident § 286.120.1 RSMo, as amended in 2005, provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, . . . .
The definitions of both accident and injury were significantly changed in the 2005 legislation. The definitions are set forth in § 287.020.2 RSMo and § 287.020.3 RSMo, and are as follows:
- The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
- (1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. "The prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life;
(3) An injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is not compensable;
(4) A cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease, or cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction suffered by a worker is an injury only if the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the resulting medical condition;
(5) The terms "injury" and "personal injuries" shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body and to the personal property which is used to make up the physical structure of the body, such as artificial dentures, artificial limbs, glass eyes, eyeglasses, and other prostheses which are placed in or on the body to replace the physical structure and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. These terms shall in no case except as specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include occupational disease in any form, nor shall they be construed to include any contagious or infectious disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor shall they include death due to natural causes occurring while the worker is at work.
In addition to these definitions the legislature also provided the following additional legislation contained in § 287.020 .10 which is as follows:
In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of "accident", "occupational disease", arising out of", and in the course of the employment" to include, but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care and Rehabilitation, 80 S.W. 3d 524 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc 1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999) and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
Construing these statutory sections, in order for an employee to prove a compensable case, the employee must prove he or she sustained an injury due to an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. In the instant case, the employee described the occurrence of the accident and injury sustained. There was no evidence proffered to impeach or contradict her testimony and accordingly the Commission finds her description of the accident and injury sustained to be credible and worthy of belief.
Pursuant to the statutory changes enacted in 2005, accident is defined as: an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an
injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. Furthermore, an injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
The definition of "trauma" includes (1) "an injury (as a wound) to living tissue caused by an extrinsic agent" as well as (2) "an agent, force or mechanism that causes trauma" (Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, $10^{\text {th }}$ Ed.).
The occurrence, as described by the employee, consisted of the presence of some agent, force, mechanism or circumstance that subjected her body to unusual and unexpected forces which resulted in injury.
Applying the plain meaning of this language to the facts in the instant case, employee satisfied her burden of proof as to the existence of an accident. Employee testified that while standing on her right leg, and lifting her left leg anteriorly across her right knee, while attempting to put a bootie over her shoe, her left knee popped and dislocated, causing her to fall. This described activity constitutes a traumatic stimulus or unexpected traumatic event clearly identifiable by time and place of occurrence and clearly producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. There is no evidence contra and employee's description satisfies the statutory definition of an accident.
The Commission further concludes that the statutory definition of injury was proven by the employee. There was violence to the physical structure of employee's body, i.e., a left knee dislocation. The Commission finds the testimony of Dr. Walz credible, reliable and worthy of belief, in that employee's left knee dislocation was directly related to her attempt to affix a surgical bootie over her left foot, and this injury at work was the primary factor leading to her left knee dislocation. The activity of employee affixing a surgical bootie over her left foot was a hazard or risk related to her employment, in that, it was the act of employee complying with the employer's rule.
The Commission further finds that the injury was due to an accident which arose out of and in the course of her employment.
Employer had a mandatory rule that an employee must wear plastic booties over an employee's shoes while cleaning the sink in the operating room. At the time of the injury employee was attempting to conform to the rule imposed by the employer. Accordingly, it is reasonably apparent that the injury sustained arose out of the employee's employment as a causal connection existed between the conditions under which the employee was performing her work, and the resultant injury, i.e., her left knee dislocation.
The Commission also finds that at the time the injury and accident occurred, employee was within her period of employment where she might reasonably be and where she was fulfilling the duties of her employment or she was engaged in the performance of some task incidental thereto, i.e., attempting to affix a bootie over her foot as required by her employer. Accordingly, employee was in the course of her employment.