The claimant has a long history of complaint and treatment with respect to both her upper extremities, having had surgery on each the right and left shoulder, elbow, and wrist. Despite the various surgeries had by Ms. Highley to her upper extremities in 1994 and in 1996, Ms. Highley was able to continue working in the grinding department for about 21 years prior to her leaving the employment in December of 2003. Clearly the production work performed by Ms. Highley was a fairly strenuous category of labor, becoming less strenuous over the course of time as the claimant became also engaged in set up of machines, employee training, and in quality control. Ms. Highley has suffered from other injuries and conditions in her upper and lower back, and from a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis that has caused her to seek medical treatment and evaluation for her pain complaints. Dr. Robert P. Margolis, the only physician to give testimony as to nature and extent of permanent disability, concludes that the work performed by Ms. Highley for the employer to 12/16/03 was a substantial factor in a recurrence of the bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome for which she had undergone prior surgery in 1994.
The Claimant and the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, stipulated at hearing that the last injury at work resulted in a permanent partial disability equivalent to 15 % of each the left and right upper extremity at the level of the wrist, which coincidentally is the percentage of permanent disability attributed to the last injury by Dr. Margolis.
Both Dr. Margolis, who had the opportunity to perform a medical examination of Ms. Highley on 10/19/05, and Mr. James M. England, the rehabilitation counselor who interviewed Ms. Highley on 2/16/06 for the purpose of rendering an opinion as to her employability, concluded that the disability suffered by Ms. Highley renders her unemployable.
The liability of the employer for disability related to a work injury must first be determined before the liability of the Second Injury Fund, if any, can be determined. For example, if the last injury, considered alone, is the sole cause of a permanent and total disability, the employer shall be responsible for that liability, and the Second Injury Fund shall have no
liability for the combination of disabilities that are pre-existing and work related. Section 287.220 RSMo; Vaught v. Vaughts, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 931 (Mo.App. S.D. 1997); Stewart v. Johnson, 398 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. 1966).
The parties at hearing stipulated that the claimant suffered an injury by occupational disease (recurrent carpal tunnel syndrome) on 12/16/03. It is apparent that 12/16/03 is the last date of exposure to the risk of that injury, inasmuch as Ms. Highley had her second left shoulder surgery performed by Dr. Emanuel on 12/17/03, and she testified that her last day of work at Von Weise Gear was in December of 2003.
It is further apparent that the last injury alone did not result in a disability that is permanent and total. The test for permanent total disability is whether, given the claimant's situation and condition, he is competent to compete in the open labor market. Laturno v. Carnahan, 640 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Mo.App. 1982). This test measures the worker's prospects for returning to employment. Patchin v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Mo.App. 1987). Total disability means the inability to return to any reasonable employment; it does not require that the employee be completely inactive or inert. Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo.App. 1990). The question is whether in the ordinary course of business an employer would reasonably be expected to hire the claimant in his present physical condition, reasonably expecting him to perform the work for which he is hired. Kowalski v. M-G Metals and Sales, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Mo.App. 1982).
The recurrent carpal tunnel syndrome at issue was diagnosed clinically, and was not confirmed by any of the diagnostics performed while Ms. Highley was being evaluated by Drs. Brown and Peeples. Further, although the findings of Drs. Brown and Peeples are inconsistent with those of Dr. Margolis to the extent that he found the claimant to have positive Tinel's sign upon his clinical examination, like Drs. Brown and Peeples, Dr. Margolis noted there was no evidence of atrophy, and further opined that the thenar eminences were strong. Dr. Margolis is aware of the claimant's prior history of bilateral carpal tunnel release. When asked his opinion as to restrictions for Ms. Highley due to her recurrent carpal tunnel, Dr. Margolis opined, "That she should avoid exposure to vibration". Dr. Margolis further acknowledged that he had no further treatment recommendations to make for the last injury (Claimant's Exhibit A, at page 14).
The testimony of Dr. Margolis, in conjunction with the relevant medical records in the matter from Drs. Brown and Peeples, persuades that the last injury suffered by Ms. Highley on 12/16/03 resulted in a permanent and partial disability of the upper extremities bilaterally at the level of the wrist. At issue, then, is the liability of the Second Injury Fund for the combination of disability, if any, between the last injury, resulting in a permanent and partial disability equivalent to 15 % of the left and right upper extremities at the wrist, and any other disability from a preexisting injury or condition, Section 287.220 RSMo.
After a review of the extensive medical in this matter, it is apparent that the opinions of Dr. Margolis and Mr. England as to disability are grounded in an appreciation for the full medical history in the matter, but not necessarily on an appreciation for the complete work history of Ms. Highley.
At hearing in this matter, when asked to provide a working history, Ms. Highley neglected to mention that for a period of time she worked two employments at the same time. At hearing Ms. Highley also acknowledged that she would work 40 or more hours a week, with overtime, and that at the end of her employment with the employer she switched to a weekend shift that required her to work 12 hour days on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, while still picking up some overtime.
In her deposition testimony Ms. Highley acknowledges that while working at Von Wiese Gear she also worked as a manager at a Taco Bell located at her husband's place of employment, Wallis Oil. As for the timing of that employment, Ms. Highley notes as follows:
Q: About how long did you do that?
A: About a year, a little over a year.
Q: And you're doing it at the same time you worked with---
A: Yes.
Q: --Von Weise?
A: Right. I was doing it at the same time that I was working the three days.
Q: Okay. And about how long ago was that that you were doing that?
A: Before --- It was a year before, I guess, I left Von Weise.
Q: So kind of the early 2000, 2001, 2002?
A: Somewhere in there. (Claimant's Exhibit RR, at pages 30-32)
Dr. Margolis does not mention a history of claimant having worked two jobs a year or so prior to leaving Von Wiese Gear, nor does Mr. England. Mr. England does not mention such work experience in his vocational history, or as a part of his analysis as to transferable skills. Mr. England acknowledges that he read the deposition of Ms. Highley and, without any further specifics, claims that his review of that deposition does not change any of his
opinions (Claimant's Exhibit B, at page 25). However, it is noteworthy that the report that he relies on as the basis for his opinions was written on $2 / 24 / 06$, approximately 6 months prior to the taking of the deposition of Ms. Highley on 8/04/06. It is apparent to this fact finder that the analysis of Mr. England is flawed, to the extent that it fails to take into consideration the full work history of the claimant.
It is further hard to reconcile certain statements made by Mr. England as to the ability of Ms. Highley to work before and after her last injury, and as to her limitations both before and after that same injury. When asked whether Ms. Highley was capable of employment in the labor market prior to her last injury, Mr. England acknowledged that he supposed that she was, inasmuch as she continued to work for the employer up until 12/16/03. In other words, Mr. England is acknowledging that the claimant, prior to her recurrent carpal tunnel syndrome, was capable of more than just a sedentary form of employment. The only restriction placed on Ms. Highley by Dr. Margolis as a result of the recurrent carpal tunnel syndrome was a proscription against exposure to vibration. The question, then, is whether a proscription against an exposure to vibration, the only restriction offered by Dr. Margolis as a consequence of the recurrent carpal tunnel syndrome, is sufficient to cause the claimant to become unemployable on the open labor market. The argument, as made by the Second Injury Fund, is to the effect that if the claimant is in fact unemployable on the open labor market, it is because her condition has progressively worsened post her last employment with Von Weise Gear. If the claimant were capable of a light or sedentary form of employment prior to her last injury, then the claimant must persuade that the disability from the last injury combines with her prior disability so as to render her unemployable.
The claimant testified in a very credible manner, and her testimony as to her history of treatment and complaint was generally consistent with the medical records in evidence. The fact that she was a capable of working two employments within a year or so of her last day of work for the employer, and was capable of working 12 hour days with overtime prior to leaving work to have her left shoulder surgery, makes it impossible for this fact finder to conclude, as a matter of a reasonable certainty, that the last injury, a recurrent carpal tunnel syndrome, by combination with the prior disabilities, has caused the claimant to become unemployable on the open labor market.
Second Injury Fund liability is triggered when the preexisting injury is a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment. "If the Second Injury Fund is to fulfill its acknowledged purpose, the proper focus of the inquiry as to the nature of the prior disability is not on the extent to which the condition has caused difficulty in the past; it is on the potential that the condition may combine with a work related injury in the future so as to cause a greater degree of disability than would have resulted in the absence of the condition." Wuebbling v. West County Drywall, 898 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Mo.App. E.D. 1995).
The testimony of Ms. Highley, in conjunction with that of Dr. Margolis, persuades that the claimant suffers from the following preexisting permanent partial disability that constitutes a hindrance or obstacle to employment; 17.5 % of the right wrist; 17.5 % of the left wrist; 45 % of the left elbow; 25 % of the right elbow; 25 % of the right shoulder; 41 % of the left shoulder; 15 % of the body as a whole referable to the low back; 15 % body as a whole referable to the neck; and 12.5 % of the body as a whole referable to multiple sclerosis. The testimony of Dr. Margolis persuades that these prior disabilities, in combination with the disability referable to the recurrent bilateral carpal tunnel resulting from the last work injury, results in a disability that is greater than the simple sum of disabilities. The disability suffered from the last injury, 15 % permanent partial disability referable to the left and right upper extremities at the wrist, reaches the threshold to trigger potential Second Injury Fund liability, Section 287.220 RSMo.
The testimony further persuades that permanent partial disability by combination exceeds the simple sum of disabilities by a factor of 15 %. The total due as against the Second Injury Fund is 15 % of 584 weeks of disability, or a total of 87.6 weeks. At the stipulated rate of $\ 347.05 per week, the amount due is $\ 30,401.58.