Employee is seeking reimbursement for medical and prescription bills incurred as a result of treatment provided for his low back, right knee, and left ankle between May 30, 2006 and January 7, 2007. The bills are included in Claimant's Exhibits R, V, and W and total \$3,018.00.
Section 287.140.1 Mo. Rev. Stat. (2000) provides in part:
In addition to all other compensation, the employee shall receive and the employer shall provide such medical, surgical, chiropractic, and hospital treatment, including nursing, custodial, ambulance and medicines as may reasonably be required after the injury or disability to cure and relieve [the employee] from the effects of the injury. If the employee desires, he shall have the right to select his own physician, surgeon, or other such requirement at his own expense.
While the employer has the right to select the provider of medical and other services, this right may be waived by the employer if the employer after notice of the injury, refuses or neglects to provide the necessary medical care. Shores v. General Motors Corp, 842 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. App. 1992); Sheehan v. Springfield Seed \& Floral, 733 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. App. 1987); Wiedower v. ACF Industries, Inc., 657 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. App. 1983); Hendricks v. Motor Freight Corp., 570 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. App. 1978). While an employer initially has the right to select the medical care provider, the employer may waive that right, by failing, neglecting or refusing to provide medical treatment after receiving notice of an injury. Under such circumstances the employee may make his or her own selection, procure the necessary treatment and have the reasonable costs thereof assessed against the employer. Wiedower at 74; Hendricks at 709. The employer may also consent affirmatively to the selection of a health care provider by the employee or consent inferentially by failing to object to the employee's selection after having knowledge of that selection. Hendricks at 709-710.
If the employer/insurer discontinue treatment even though the employee needs further treatment to cure and relieve the effects of his or her injury, then the employer/insurer will be liable for the entire cost of such additional treatment to the extent the treatment is proved by the employee to be reasonably necessary to cure employee of the effects of the workrelated injury. Emert v. Ford Motor Company, 863 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. App. 1993); Wood v. Dierbergs Market, 843 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. App. 1992); see Herring v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 816, 822 (Mo. App. 1995).
If, after the treating physician selected by the employer has provided medical treatment and released the employee to return to work, the employee seeks additional treatment without notifying the employer that further treatment is needed, then the employee and not the employer is liable for the cost of such treatment. Blackwell v. Puritan-Bennett Corp., 901 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Mo. App. 1995).
The employee must also prove that the medical care provided by the physician selected by the employee was reasonably necessary to cure and relieve the employee of the effects of the injury. Chambliss v. Lutheran Medical Center, 822 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. App. 1991); Jones v. Jefferson City School District, 801 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. App. 1990); Roberts v. Consumers Market, 725 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. App. 1987); Brueggemann v. Permaneer Door Corp., 527 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. App. 1975).
Employee must establish the causal relationship between the bills for medical services and the treatment provided. Martin v. Mid-America Farm Lines, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. 1989). It is not necessary to have testimony on the medicalcausal relationship of each individual expense where the causal relationship can reasonably be inferred. Lenzini v. Columbia Foods, 829 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Mo. App. 1992). Employee may establish the causal relationship through the testimony of a physician or through the medical records in evidence which relate to the services provided. Idem.: Wood v. Dierbergs Market, 843 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Mo. App. 1992); Meyer v. Superior Insulating Tape, 882 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Mo. App. 1994).
In the absence of such proof, medical bills may be excluded. Cahall v. Riddle Trucking, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Mo. App. 1997); Meyer v. Superior Insulating Tape 882 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Mo. App. 1994). Bills showing only a balance due may be excluded for lack of adequate foundation. Hamby v. Ray Webbe Corp., 877 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. App. 1994).