| Issued by THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION |
| FINAL AWARD DENYING COMPENSATION(Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge) |
| Injury No.: 03-015678 |
| Employee: | Melanie Days |
| Employer: | Laclede Gas Company |
| Insurer: | Self-Insured |
| Date of Accident: | Alleged February 18, 2003 |
| Place and County of Accident: | Alleged St. Louis City |
| The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided bysection 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record, the Commission finds that the award of the administrative law judge is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Pursuant to section 286.090 RSMo, the Commission affirms the award and decision of the administrative law judge dated June 4, 2007, and awards no compensation in the above-captioned case.The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Karla Ogrodnik Boresi, issued June 4, 2007, is attached and incorporated by this reference.Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 16th day of November 2007.LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION |
| William F. Ringer, Chairman |
| Alice A. Bartlett, Member |
| DISSENTING OPINION FILED |
| John J. Hickey, Member |
| Attest: |
| Secretary |
| DISSENTING OPINION |
| I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge should be reversed.The administrative law judge clearly erred in accepting the opinion of employer's medical expert, Dr. Ollinger, over |
the evidence provided by employee's medical expert, Dr. Feinberg, and Dr. Hannaway, a neurologist. The administrative law judge used the evidence provided by Dr. Ollinger to find that employee failed to prove her carpal tunnel syndrome was an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of her employment. However, based on the competent and substantial evidence provided by Drs. Feinberg and Hannaway, it is clear that employee's excessive typing at work was a substantial cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome.
"An occupational disease is compensable if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020." Section 287.067 RSMo 2000. The employee must establish, generally through expert testimony, the probability that the claimed occupational disease was caused by conditions in the work place. Dawson v. Associated Elec., 885 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Mo.App. 1994). The employee bears the burden of proving a direct causal relationship between the conditions of his employment and the occupational disease. Jacobs v. City of Jefferson, 991 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Mo.App. 1999).
In order to support a finding of occupational disease, employee must provide substantial and competent evidence that he/she has contracted an occupationally induced disease rather than an ordinary disease of life. The inquiry involves two considerations: (1) whether there was an exposure to the disease which was greater than or different from that which affects the public generally, and (2) whether there was a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort.
Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Const. Co., Inc., 1 S.W3d 43, 48 (Mo.App. 1999) (citations omitted).
Employee worked as a service representative for employer. She testified that she used a keyboard between five-and-a-half to six hours each day at work. Employer presented evidence from an occupational therapist, Mr. Victor Zuccarello, who had performed a job analysis for employer's work place in 2003. Mr. Zuccarello determined that service representatives generated approximately 12,300 keystrokes each day.
Employee first began experiencing hand pain around September 2002. Employee complained of her pain and was sent to Dr. Ollinger by employer in February 2003. Dr. Ollinger diagnosed employee with carpal tunnel syndrome and suggested that employee see a different doctor for treatment. Additionally, Dr. Ollinger opined that employee's work was not a substantial cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome. One of the reasons for this opinion was his belief that there was no repetition in employee's work. Based on his odd belief that performing a task 12,300 times in a single day is not repetitive, I would find his opinion not to be as credible as the opinions of Drs. Hannaway and Feinberg.
Dr. Hannaway, examined employee on April 8, 2003. Based upon his examination and a review of employee's work history, Dr. Hannaway concluded that employee's "chronic keyboard work" was a substantial cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome. He then referred employee to Dr. Mackinnon for carpal tunnel release surgery. Dr. Mackinnon performed release surgery on employee's left wrist on September 5, 2003.
Employee saw Dr. Feinberg on March 14, 2006, for an independent medical examination. After examining employee and thoroughly reviewing her medical records and work history, Dr. Feinberg concluded that employee's work was a substantial cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome as well as her need for carpal tunnel release surgery and repeat EMG nerve conduction velocity testing.
Based on the above, I believe the competent and substantial evidence provided by Drs. Hannaway and Feinberg shows that the repetitive motion of excessive typing exposed employee to the hazard of carpal tunnel syndrome, that this exposure was greater than the exposure to the general public, and that there is a recognizable link between her repetitive and excessive typing and carpal tunnel syndrome.
Therefore, I would find that employee has met her burden to show that her excessive typing was a substantial cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome, and as such, has a compensable occupational disease. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the administrative law judge and award compensation.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of the Commission to deny compensation.