An occupational disease is an identifiable disease arising without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. § 287.067, RSMo. Supp 2007. The employee must provide substantial and competent evidence that he has contracted an occupationally induced disease rather than an ordinary disease of life. Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constructions Co., 1 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo.App. E.D. 1999). The inquiry involves two considerations: (1) whether there was an exposure to the disease which was greater than or different from that which affects the public generally, and (2) whether there was a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort. Id. The claimant has the burden to prove causation of an occupational disease. Townser v. First Data Corp., 215 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Mo.App. E.D. 2007).
The primary issue to be decided is one of medical causal connection. Medical causation must be established by scientific or medical evidence showing the cause and effect relationship between the complained of condition and the asserted cause. Shelby v. Trans World Airlines, 831 S.W2d 221, 222 (Mo.App. W.D. 1992). Questions regarding causation are issues of fact to be decided by the Commission. Sanderson v. Porta-Fab Corp., 989 S.W. 2d 599 (Mo. App. 1999). It is agreed by all of the physicians that the employee has carpal tunnel syndrome. Carpal tunnel syndrome is a known occupational disease. Wiele v. National Supermarkets, 948 S.W. 2d142 (Mo. App. 1997).
Because the decision hinges on the medical causal relationship the credibility of the medical experts is the crucial deciding factor. Where the opinions of medical experts are in conflict, the fact-finding body determines whose opinion is the most credible. Townser, 215 S.W.3d at 242. In this case, Dr. Schlafly opined that the claimant's work was the prevailing factor causing the claimant's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and her left elbow condition, because the claimant's work was repetitious, based on his experience as a board certified hand surgeon since 1986. On the other hand, Dr. Crandall opined that the claimant's work was not the prevailing factor causing her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, because he contended that the claimant's work was not hand intensive. See Dr. Crandall deposition, page 9. "It didn't have enough repetition, intensity, frequency, or awkward position to be able to exceed OSHA guidelines to be considered a biological risk factor to cause the condition such as carpal tunnel syndrome." See Dr. Crandall deposition, page 9.
In briefing the case, the attorneys attacked the foundation of the opposing expert, claiming that the opposing expert had not reviewed a portion of the evidence or had some particular bias. However, both experts are qualified as board certified plastic or hand surgeons with many years of experience in hand surgery. Each expert appeared to have a firm grasp regarding the details of the claimant's occupational activities. The record discloses no bias from either expert. Any allegation of bias would reflect bias of the forum. However, neither expert cited any scientific study supporting his position or establishing scientifically determined factors that cause the claimant's medical conditions. Dr. Schlafly relied exclusively on his experience as a hand surgeon for twenty-two years. See Dr. Schlafly deposition, page 35. Dr. Crandall referred to vague risk factors of an administrative agency, OSHA, without stating what the actual criteria are and how those factors were determined. See Dr. Crandall deposition, pages 9, 19, 20. One might conclude that both positions rely on "junk science", however our Supreme Court has directed this forum to give due consideration to experts in determining technical points:
As a general rule, courts defer to the findings on technical matters within the expertise of administrative agencies. ... In line with the general tendency of administrative law to recognize the expertise of specialized tribunals, compensation boards may rely to a considerable extent on their own knowledge and experience in uncomplicated medical matters, and in such cases awards may be upheld without medical testimony or even in defiance of the only medical testimony. Medical causation of a herniated disc of the spine cannot be
considered uncomplicated. The commission may not substitute an administrative law judge's personal opinion on the question of medical causation of a herniated disc for the uncontradicted testimony of a qualified medical expert. Of course, it is possible that the existence or absence of injury and causation are so obvious from the physical facts that one of ordinary understanding may reject even unchallenged medical expert testimony to the contrary. In addition, an administrative law judge may have the expertise to know that a herniated disc may result from a cause other than trauma. However, the specific medical conclusion that a herniated disc in the neck due to trauma will always have immediate noticeable symptoms is not clear, simple or well recognized by lay persons and is not a matter within the expertise of an administrative law judge. Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. Banc 1994).
The claimant's medical conditions in this case cannot be considered uncomplicated. Dr. Schlafly opined that the claimant's work duties were repetitive and were, therefore, the prevailing factor causing the claimant's medical conditions. He cited no scientific studies nor did he state which features of her job caused the condition. The sole criterion he used was whether the claimant's job duties were repetitive. Many tasks in life are repetitive, whether they are performed once every second, once every day, or once every week. They can be repetitive regardless of the intensity and pressure on the wrists. Dr. Crandall appears to contend that the claimant's work duties must also be hand intensive. See Dr. Crandall deposition, page 9. "It didn't have enough repetition, intensity, frequency, or awkward position ... to cause the condition such as carpal tunnel." See Dr. Crandall deposition, page 9.
The claimant's evidence clearly related that the claimant performed tasks in her work of labeling automobile seats 600 to 700 times per shift. Both experts agree that repetition is a key criterion for the work to cause the claimant' medical conditions. Dr. Schlafly contends that repetition alone is the key criterion. Dr. Crandall contends that the criteria must also include intensity. See Dr. Crandall deposition, page 9. After reviewing the evidence, the evidence supports a finding that the claimant's activities are not intense. Hand intensity connotes activities such as rapid assembly line work, constant keyboarding, or jack hammering. The video of the claimant's work appears to be repetitive but not intense, frequent or awkward. The work done with the hands appears very low impact and with little resistance.
On balance, the claimant's job duties appear well documented in the evidence, and each party submitted expert opinion evidence from a well qualified surgeon that had a firm understanding of the claimant's job duties. Neither expert provided any scientific studies to support his conclusions. Neither expert offered any other cause of the claimant's medical condition than the idiopathic occurrence of the conditions. The claimant's medical conditions can occur idiopathically. See Dr. Schlafly deposition, pages 42, 43. The weight of each expert's opinion appears relatively equal.
However, under the workers' compensation statute, the burden of proving an entitlement to compensation is on the employee and in asserting any claim based on a factual proposition, the claimant must establish that such proposition is more likely to be true than not true. See Section 287.808, RSMo Supp 2007. The evidence must be weighed impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when weighing evidence and resolving factual conflicts. See Section 287.800, RSMo Supp 2007. In this case, the relatively equal balance of the evidence supports a finding that the claimant has not proven that her work was the prevailing factor causing her medical conditions, because she has not established that proposition is more likely to be true that not true. Therefore, the claim is denied.
Another issue that must be addressed is whether the claimant suffered from cubital tunnel syndrome as a result of her work duties for this employer. Dr. Schlafly diagnosed cubital tunnel syndrome based on the claimant's clinical presentation and performed an ulnar nerve transposition on the left elbow on April 12, 2007. See Dr. Schlafly deposition, page 12. Electrical studies were negative for cubital tunnel syndrome. See Dr. Schlafly deposition, page 12. He based his diagnosis on the claimant's report of numbness in her left small finger. See Dr. Schlafly deposition, page 10. Dr. Schlafly opined that the claimant's work duties at
work were the substantial factor and prevailing factor causing her left elbow condition and need for surgery. See Dr. Schlafly deposition, pages 14, 15. Based on Dr. Crandall's examination and the test results, Dr. Crandall opined that the claimant did not have an abnormal ulnar nerve condition. See Dr. Crandall deposition, pages 7,8 .
Determinations of compensability are addressed by the statute:
In determining compensability and disability, where inconsistent or conflicting medical opinions exist, objective medical findings shall prevail over subjective medical findings. Objective medical findings are those findings demonstrable on physical examination or by appropriate tests or diagnostic procedures. Section 287.190.6(2), RSMo Supp 2007.
Dr. Crandall's findings that the claimant did not suffer from an abnormal ulnar nerve condition are supported by objective testing. Dr. Schlafly's findings are based on the subjective reports of the claimant with no support from the electrical testing, which were negative. Based on the statutory mandate, Dr. Crandall's findings are more credible, because they are supported by objective medical findings. The claim for workers' compensation benefits for the claimant's left elbow condition is denied.
Date: October 20, 2008
Made by: /s/ EDWIN J. KOHNER
EDWIN J. KOHNER
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
A true copy: Attest:
/s/ JEFFREY W. BUKER
Jeffrey W. Buker
Director
Division of Workers' Compensation