Based upon a comprehensive review of the evidence, my observations of Claimant at hearing and the application of Missouri law, I find:
Claimant's accident of January 5, 2009 arose out of and in the course and scope of employment. Section 287.020.3(1) states:
"In this chapter the term 'injury' is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition
and disability. 'The prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
Section 287.020.3(2) states:
"An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) it is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) it does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life."
Dr. McMullin's uncontroverted opinion is that Claimant's accident at work was the prevailing factor in causing her need for the total knee replacement surgery. Employer did not challenge Dr. McMullin's opinion.
The thrust of Employer's defense is that Claimant's use of the elevator that was not owned or controlled by Employer is a risk to which she would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to employment in her nonemployment life, and thus her accident which happened while using the elevator at work is not compensable. Employer relies upon the case of Miller v. Mo. Highway \& Transp. Comm'n, 287 S.W.3d 671 (Mo. 2009) to support its position. This case is different from the Miller case. In Miller, the employee was simply walking briskly to his truck when he felt his knee pop. There were no defects in the road, and his work did not require him to walk briskly. Nothing, other than his walking briskly, caused his knee to pop. Everyone walks in non-employment life.
In the instant case, Claimant was performing a function of her job when she was injured. She was taking the elevator downstairs to check on weather conditions so she could report those conditions to the employees she supervised. She had her cell phone with her in case her IT specialist called, and she was not on a break. The elevator malfunction is what caused her to fall.
Employer's theory of defense, if followed to its logical conclusion, would mean very few work accidents would ever be compensable, and would render the Workers' Compensation statute virtually meaningless. For example, if a cook cut his finger at work while chopping onions, since people cook at home, and are equally exposed to knives in non-employment life, the accident would not compensable. If an employee injured his back lifting boxes at work, and the employee also lifted boxes at home, in non-employment life, the accident would not be compensable. Interpreting the statute in the manner suggested by Employer would be ridiculous.
Employee was at work, was not on a break, and was performing her job duties when the elevator malfunctioned and caused her to trip and fall and injure her knee. The expert medical
evidence proves the accident which arose out of and in the course of her employment was the prevailing factor in causing the injury and the disability.
Because I find the accident arose out of and in the course of employment, Claimant is entitled to TTD benefits beginning on March 20, 2009, and until such time as she is found to be at maximum medical improvement. TTD benefits are intended to cover a reasonable healing period. Claimant has not been able to work since March 20, 2009, due to the pain in her knee. The medical records and Claimant's testimony establish she has a Baker's cyst on her knee, and she is in pain. There is no evidence Dr. McMullin released Claimant from treatment. As of May 26, 2009, Claimant was still treating for swelling and a Bakers cyst, and had not yet been released to return to work. Employer shall pay Claimant's TTD benefits until such time as Claimant is found by Dr. McMullin to be at maximum medical improvement.
Claimant is entitled to reimbursement for past medical expenses of $\ 64,802.09. Because Employer denied medical treatment for Claimant's total knee replacement surgery, Claimant was free to treat on her own. Employer did not challenge the reasonableness of those expenses. Employer shall also provide additional medical treatment as authorized by Dr. McMullin, until such time as Claimant is found to be at maximum medical improvement.