There is no dispute that the claimant developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome in 2008. The claimant alleges that her work using her hands as a plastic components operator for this employer producing shoes was the prevailing factor causing her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Her allegations are supported by a medical opinion from a qualified hand surgeon, Dr. Brown. The defense denies that the claimant's performance of duties at work were the substantial factor causing her left carpal tunnel syndrome. The defense position is supported by a medical opinion from a qualified hand surgeon, Dr. Strecker, who found no evidence that the claimant's work was the prevailing factor causing her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
An employee's claim for compensation due to an occupational disease is to be determined under Section 287.067, RSMo Supp. 2008. That section defines an occupational disease as:
[A]n identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
Compensability of carpal tunnel syndrome is determined under subsection 3 of that section:
- An injury due to repetitive motion is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of this chapter. An occupational disease due to repetitive motion is
compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The "prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.
A single medical opinion will support a finding of compensability even where the causes of the disease are indeterminate. Dawson at 716; Sellers v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 776 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. App. 1989); Sheehan at 797. The opinion may be based on a doctor's written report alone. Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Mo. App. 1988). "A medical expert's opinion must be supported by facts and reasons proven by competent evidence that will give the opinion sufficient probative force to be substantial evidence." Silman v. Montgomery \& Associates, 891 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo. App. 1995); Pippin v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 799 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Mo. App. 1990). Where the opinions of medical experts are in conflict, the fact finding body determines whose opinion is the most credible. Hawkins v. Emerson Electric Co., 676 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Mo. App. 1984). Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony which it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. George v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, 855 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. App. 1993); Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. App. 1992); Hutchinson v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Mo. App. 1986). An administrative law judge may not constitute himself or herself as an expert witness and substitute his or her personal opinion of medical causation of a complicated medical question for the uncontradicted testimony of a qualified medical expert. Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1994); Bruflat v. Mister Guy, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Mo. App. 1996); Eubanks v. Poindexter Mechanical, 901 S.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Mo. App. 1995). However, even uncontradicted medical evidence may be disbelieved. Massey v. Missouri Butcher \& Cafe Supply, 890 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo. App. 1995); Jones v. Jefferson City School Dist., 801 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Mo. App. 1990).
Because the decision hinges on the medical causal relationship the credibility of the medical experts is the crucial deciding factor. Where the opinions of medical experts are in conflict, the fact-finding body determines whose opinion is the most credible. Townser, 215 S.W.3d at 242. In this case, Dr. Brown opined that the claimant's work was the prevailing factor causing the claimant's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, because the claimant's work was repetitious. On the other hand, Dr. Strecker opined that the claimant's work was not the prevailing factor causing her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, because he found no evidence that the claimant's work was the primary or prevailing factor causing the condition. See Dr. Strecker deposition, page 11. Neither attorney asked him for his opinion on the primary factor causing the condition in the claimant's hands.
In briefing the case, the defense attacked the foundation of the claimant's expert, claiming that Dr. Brown was disadvantaged by not having reviewed the claimant's work site or reviewing video tapes of the process. Notwithstanding, Dr. Brown's description of the claimant's work seems to be consistent with those described by the claimant, Jeff Turner, and Dr. Strecker. The claimant also contends that the claimant's personal physician opined that the claimant's condition resulted from her working conditions. However, Dr. Williams, the claimant's personal physician offered no opinion whether the claimant's working conditions were the prevailing factor causing the claimant's medical condition. In addition, the record does
not disclose the qualifications of Dr. Williams or whether his qualifications are equal to or exceed those of the two very qualified hand surgeons that offered forensic medical opinions. Finally, the defense looks to Jeff Turner's testimony that the employer engineered the work stations to eliminate the hand intensive and repetitive trauma that can cause carpal tunnel syndrome. He testified that the employer had two ergonomic studies of the work station in question. Certainly, the employer's intention was to eliminate dangerous conditions and ensure the safety of its work force. Whether those objectives were met is more of a question for the forensic medical experts rather than the employer's production manager. In addition, Jeff Turner did not disclose the findings of the two ergonomic studies.
The defense contends that Dr. Strecker had superior knowledge of the claimant's work related activities and was in a better position to evaluate the claimant's working conditions regarding the intensity of the claimant's work, because its expert visited the employer's plant, witnessed the activities at the work site, and performed some of the functions.
Certainly, both experts are qualified as board certified plastic or hand surgeons with many years of experience in hand surgery. Each expert appeared to have a firm grasp regarding the details of the claimant's occupational activities. The record discloses no bias from either expert. However, neither expert cited any scientific study supporting his position or establishing scientifically determined factors that cause the claimant's medical conditions. Dr. Brown relied exclusively on his experience as a hand surgeon since 2003 and his contention that the claimant's work was repetitious and hand intensive based on the claimant's description. Dr. Strecker relied on his experience as a hand surgeon since 1989 and found no evidence that the claimant's work was not the primary or prevailing factor causing the claimant's condition. One might conclude that both positions rely on "junk science", however our Supreme Court has directed this forum to give due consideration to experts in determining technical points:
As a general rule, courts defer to the findings on technical matters within the expertise of administrative agencies. ... In line with the general tendency of administrative law to recognize the expertise of specialized tribunals, compensation boards may rely to a considerable extent on their own knowledge and experience in uncomplicated medical matters, and in such cases awards may be upheld without medical testimony or even in defiance of the only medical testimony. Medical causation of a herniated disc of the spine cannot be considered uncomplicated. The commission may not substitute an administrative law judge's personal opinion on the question of medical causation of a herniated disc for the uncontradicted testimony of a qualified medical expert. Of course, it is possible that the existence or absence of injury and causation are so obvious from the physical facts that one of ordinary understanding may reject even unchallenged medical expert testimony to the contrary. In addition, an administrative law judge may have the expertise to know that a herniated disc may result from a cause other than trauma. However, the specific medical conclusion that a herniated disc in the neck due to trauma will always have immediate noticeable symptoms is not clear, simple or well recognized by lay persons and is not a matter within the expertise of an administrative law judge. Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. Banc 1994).
The claimant's medical condition in this case cannot be considered uncomplicated. Dr. Brown opined that the claimant's work duties were repetitive, hand intensive, and were, therefore, the prevailing factor causing the claimant's medical conditions. He opined that the claimant's gender and body mass index predisposed her to carpal tunnel syndrome. He cited no scientific studies nor did he state which features of her job caused the condition. The sole criterion he used was whether the claimant's job duties were repetitive and hand intensive. Many tasks in life are repetitive, whether they are performed once every second, once every day, or once every week. They can be repetitive regardless of the intensity and pressure on the wrists. Dr. Brown testified that the claimant's work was hand intensive.
On the other hand, Dr. Strecker did not elaborate on what he found to be the prevailing factor causing the claimant's condition, and neither attorney asked him to so opine. The implication is that he contends that the occurrence is idiopathic.
The claimant's evidence clearly related that the claimant performed tasks in her work of manufacturing athletic shoe soles. After reviewing the evidence, the evidence supports a finding that the claimant's activities are not intense. Hand intensity connotes activities such as rapid assembly line work, constant keyboarding, or jack hammering. Dr. Strecker's tour of the employer's facility, review of the functions performed, and performance of the claimant's work supports a finding that the claimant's work appears to be repetitive but not intense, frequent or awkward. The work done with the hands appears to be low impact and with little resistance.
On balance, the claimant's job duties appear well documented in the evidence, and each party submitted expert opinion evidence from a well qualified surgeon that had an understanding of the claimant's job duties. Neither expert provided any scientific studies to support his conclusions. Neither expert offered any other cause of the claimant's medical condition other than the idiopathic occurrence of the conditions. Both experts suggested that the claimant may be predisposed to carpal tunnel syndrome due to gender and body mass index, but neither expert identified those conditions as the prevailing factor causing the claimant's medical condition and disability. The weight of each expert's opinion appears relatively equal, except for Dr. Strecker's personal evaluation of the claimant's work site. The presence of other factors that predispose the claimant to carpal tunnel suggests that other explanations for the cause of the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome exist, but neither expert attached any weight to those factors in relative importance to the claimant's work duties.
Under the workers' compensation statute, the burden of proving an entitlement to compensation is on the employee and in asserting any claim based on a factual proposition, the claimant must establish that such proposition is more likely to be true than not true. See Section 287.808, RSMo Supp 2008. The evidence must be weighed impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when weighing evidence and resolving factual conflicts. See Section 287.800, RSMo Supp 2007. In this case, the relatively equal balance of the evidence supports a finding that the claimant has not proven that her work was the prevailing factor causing her medical conditions, because she has not established that proposition is more likely to be true than not true. Therefore, the claim is denied.