| FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge by Supplemental Opinion) |
| Employee: | Darlana Jones |
| Employer: | Mother of Good Counsel (Settled) |
| Insurer: | Healthcare Facilities of Missouri (Settled) |
| Additional Party: | Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund |
| I. Introduction |
| The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence, read the briefs, and considered the whole record, the Commission finds that the award of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, the Commission affirms the award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Matthew D. Vacca, dated April 23, 2010, as supplemented herein. |
| II. Findings of Fact |
| The findings of fact and stipulations of the parties were accurately recounted in the award of the ALJ and, to the extent they are not inconsistent with the facts and stipulations listed below, they are incorporated and adopted by the Commission herein.The parties stipulated that on March 1, 2001, employee sustained an accident which arose out of and in the course of her employment. The sole issue presented for resolution before the ALJ was the liability of the Second Injury Fund for enhanced permanent partial disability or permanent total disability.Three experts provided opinions with regard to employee’s condition. Dr. Volarich opined that employee is permanently totally disabled as a result of her work injury combined with her preexisting disabilities. Vocational rehabilitation expert, Barbara Parker, found that employee is unable to compete in the open labor market as a result of a combination of her disabilities, not just her hands. Contrary to Dr. Volarich and Ms. Parker’s opinions, vocational rehabilitation expert, James England, found that if employee is excluded from the open labor market, it “would be due to the hands regardless of any other physical problems.”On July 11, 2008, Dr. Volarich evaluated employee for the purpose of an independent medical evaluation. Dr. Volarich based his independent medical evaluation on the history given to him by employee, a review of past medical records and tests, and a physical examination performed by him on July 11, 2008. |
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Barbara Parker evaluated employee on October 2, 2009, for the purpose of assessing employee's potential for employment in the St. Louis Metropolitan area. Ms. Parker based her opinions on her personal interview of employee, a review of depositions of employee from October 2, 2002, and October 8, 2008, and a review of employee's medical records.
James England provided a report dated March 11, 2009, in which he evaluated the employability of employee in the open labor market. Mr. England based his opinions on a review of employee's medical records, doctors' reports, and a copy of a deposition taken of employee on October 8, 2008.
Unlike Dr. Volarich and Ms. Parker, Mr. England did not personally interview employee. The October 8, 2008, deposition that Mr. England reviewed did not include employee's complaints concerning her pseudotumor cerebri or her asthma. Mr. England admitted during his deposition that he would have a better assessment of someone if he could personally meet with them. Mr. England also conceded that it is possible that if not all of employee's physical problems were discussed in the October 8, 2008, deposition, he may not have a full understanding of employee's condition.
III. Conclusions of Law
First of all, we must address the Second Injury Fund's argument that there is no evidence that employee's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by an occupational disease. This argument contradicts facts stipulated to by both parties. As listed above, the parties stipulated that employee sustained an accident on March 1, 2001, which arose out of and in the course of her employment.
In *Boyer v. National Express, Co.*, 49 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. App. 2001), the Court determined that:
The rules of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, in particular, 8 C.S.R. 50-2.010(14), provide: 'hearings before the division shall be simple, informal proceedings. The rules of evidence for civil cases in the state of Missouri shall apply. Prior to hearing, the parties shall stipulate uncontested facts and present evidence only on contested issues.' Therefore, the ALJ should confine the evidence during the hearing to the stated contested issues. *Lawson v. Emerson Electric Company*, 809 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Mo. App. 1991). Stipulations are controlling and conclusive, and the courts are bound to enforce them. *Spacewalker, Inc. v. American Family*, 954 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Mo. App. 1997). A stipulation should be interpreted in view of the result, which the parties were attempting to accomplish. *Id.* In *Lawson*, our colleagues in the Southern District concluded that the Commission acted in excess of its powers in making its award on grounds not in issue. *Lawson v. Emerson Electric Company*, 809 S.W.2d at 126.
*Boyer*, 49 S.W.3d at 705.
From the foregoing reasons, we determine that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to consider the Second Injury Fund's argument that employee failed to prove by substantial and competent evidence that she sustained an occupational disease. We agree with the ALJ that, based upon facts stipulated to by both parties, the sole issue presented for resolution is the liability of the Second Injury Fund. Therefore, we will confine our analysis to the same.
The Second Injury Fund also argues that employee is not permanently totally disabled. Based upon the testimony of employee, her medical records, and the reports and testimony of the aforementioned experts, we agree with the ALJ and find that employee is permanently and totally disabled. Therefore, the primary issues to be determined are: 1) At the time of employee's last injury, did she suffer from preexisting disabilities that posed a hindrance and obstacle to her employment or reemployment?; and 2) If employee suffered from such preexisting disabilities, did the last injury, considered alone, result in employee's permanent total disability, or was employee rendered permanently totally disabled as a result of the last injury combining with employee's preexisting disabilities?
With regard to the first issue, we find, based upon employee's testimony, her medical records, and the reports and testimony of Dr. Volarich and Ms. Parker, that employee's pseudotumor cerebri and asthma were preexisting disabilities that posed a hindrance and obstacle to her employment or reemployment. Employee's pseudotumor cerebri is a condition of hypertension within the brain that causes an excretion of excess cerebral/spinal fluid. This excess cerebral/spinal fluid causes pressure inside her brain cavity. It is partially controlled by her prescription drug, Diamox, but it still builds until the pressure is relieved by a spinal tap. Her symptoms are recurring, including headaches and blurred vision. In addition, employee's chronic asthma requires daily medications and often causes wheezing. Employee testified that her asthma limits her with any physical exertion.
Having come to the conclusion that employee suffered from preexisting disabilities, we turn to precedent for guidance in evaluating cases of this nature.
The court in Kizior v. Trans World Airlines, 5 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. App. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003) set out a step-by-step test for determining Second Injury Fund liability in cases involving preexisting disabilities:
Section 287.220.1 contains four distinct steps in calculating the compensation due an employee, and from what source, in cases involving permanent disability: (1) the employer's liability is considered in isolation 'the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability'; (2) Next, the degree or percentage of the employee's disability attributable to all injuries existing at the time of the accident is considered; (3) The degree or percentage of disability existing prior to the last injury, combined with the disability resulting from the last injury, considered alone, is deducted from the