"A mere cursory reading of $\S 287.220 .1$ makes it clear that an employee/claimant must establish that he or she sustained a compensable injury and that the injury caused the requisite level of permanent partial disability as part of his or her claim against the Fund."2
The administrative law judge allowed compensation in this matter without making a finding that employee's alleged primary injury - bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a compensable injury. In particular, the administrative law judge did not address whether employee had proven his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was medically causally related to his employment.
"An occupational disease is compensable if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020."3
"In proving a causal connection between the conditions of employment and the occupational disease, the claimant bears the burden of proof. 'To prove causation it is sufficient to show 'a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the job which is common to all jobs of that sort.' And, 'there must be evidence of a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease.' However, the cause and development of an occupational
[^0]
[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
${ }^{2}$ Nance v. Treasurer of Mo., 85 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Mo. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003).
${ }^{3}$ Section 287.067.2 RSMo.
Improvee: Wilbert Shepard
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disease is not a matter of common knowledge. There must be medical evidence of a direct causal connection. 'The question of causation [is] one for medical testimony, without which a finding for claimant would be based on mere conjecture and speculation and not on substantial evidence.' 'A claimant must submit medical evidence establishing a probability that working conditions caused the disease, although they need not be the sole cause.'[^4]
The administrative law judge sustained the Second Injury Fund objections to the admission of Dr. Berkin's report (hearsay) and Dr. Berkin's deposition (offered after the record closed). Employee did not raise the propriety of the administrative law judge's evidentiary ruling as an issue in either his Application for Review or his brief. Consequently, Dr. Berkin's opinions are not in evidence. We disregard references in employee's brief to Dr. Berkin's opinions.
In his brief, employee states Dr. Volarich provided an opinion establishing employee's carpal tunnel syndrome is compensable. We have reviewed Dr. Volarich's deposition and his report. Dr. Volarich offers no opinion that there was a causal relationship between the conditions under which employee performed his work duties and the development of carpal tunnel syndrome. Nor did Dr. Volarich offer an opinion that there exists a recognizable link between carpal tunnel syndrome and some distinctive feature of employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort.
**Conclusion**
The record is devoid of an expert medical opinion establishing a medical causal relationship between employee's work duties and his carpal tunnel syndrome. Because employee has failed to establish that he sustained a compensable occupational disease, employee's claim against the Second Injury Fund must fail.
**Award**
We reverse the award of the administrative law judge and deny compensation in this matter. All other issues are moot.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 9th day of February 2011.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Ringer, Chairman
Alice A. Bartlett, Member
DISSENTING OPINION FILED
John J. Hickey, Member
Attest:
[^4]: Vickers v. Mo. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 283 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Mo. App. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
Employee: Wilbert Shepard
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Secretary
I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge should be affirmed. I adopt the award and decision of the administrative law judge.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of the Commission to deny benefits in this case.
John J. Hickey, Member