Decision date: March 8, 20123 pages
Summary
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's award allowing workers' compensation for Albert Newhouse's carpal tunnel syndrome, a repetitive motion injury. The Commission rejected the Second Injury Fund's argument that occupational diseases cannot trigger Second Injury Fund liability under Missouri workers' compensation law.
Archive Notice
This archive contains published Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission workers' compensation decisions reproduced for research convenience. Official source links remain authoritative where provided. Joseph Ott, Attorney 67889, Ott Law Firm - Constant Victory - Personal Injury and Litigation maintains these public legal archives to support Missouri case research and to help prospective clients connect that research to the firm's courtroom practice.
Related Legal Help
Third-Party Injury Check
| FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) | |
| Injury No.: 09-090457 | |
| Employee: | Albert Newhouse |
| Employer: | Lou Fusz Toyota (Settled) |
| Insurer: | Sentry Insurance Company (Settled) |
| Additional Party: | Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having read the briefs, heard the parties’ arguments, reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge allowing compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge by this supplemental opinion.We offer this supplemental opinion to address the primary argument raised in the brief of the Second Injury Fund. | |
| Second Injury Fund Argument The Second Injury Fund argues that employee’s repetitive motion injury does not qualify as “a subsequent compensable injury” for purposes of triggering Second Injury Fund liability under § 287.220.1 RSMo, which provides, as follows: | |
| ...If any employee who has a preexisting permanent partial disability whether from compensable injury or otherwise, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee becomes unemployed, ...receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability...so that the degree or percentage of disability, ...caused by the combined disabilities is substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the last injury, considered alone and of itself, and if the employee is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the combined disabilities, the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability. After the compensation liability of the employer for the last injury, considered alone, has been determined by an administrative law judge or the commission, the degree or percentage of employee's disability that is attributable to all injuries or conditions existing at the time the last injury was sustained shall then be determined by that administrative law judge or by the commission and the degree or percentage of disability which existed prior to the last injury plus the disability resulting from the last injury, if any, considered alone, shall be deducted from the combined disability, and compensation for the balance, if any, shall be paid out of a special fund known as the second injury fund, hereinafter provided for.(Emphasis added). |
We summarize our understanding of the Second Injury Fund's legal reasoning: "Injury" as defined in § 287.020.3 RSMo excludes occupational diseases. A repetitive motion injury is an occupational disease by virtue of $\S 287.067$ RSMo. Thus, a repetitive motion injury is not an "injury." A repetitive motion injury can never be a compensable "injury" that can trigger Second Injury Fund liability under § 287.220.1.
We summarize the Second Injury Fund's argument as applied to the facts of this claim: Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome is a repetitive motion injury. Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease. Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome is not an injury. Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome is not a "subsequent compensable injury." Employee has failed to prove he suffered a subsequent compensable injury, so the Second Injury Fund is not implicated in this matter.
The Second Injury Fund argument fails. The Second Injury Fund fails to give effect to the complete definition of injury in § 287.020.3. The complete definition includes occupational diseases within the definition of "injury" where specifically provided in Chapter 287.
Section 287.020.3(5) RSMo states:
The terms "injury" and "personal injuries" shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body and to the personal property which is used to make up the physical structure of the body, such as artificial dentures, artificial limbs, glass eyes, eyeglasses, and other prostheses which are placed in or on the body to replace the physical structure and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. These terms shall in no case except as specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include occupational disease in any form, nor shall they be construed to include any contagious or infectious disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor shall they include death due to natural causes occurring while the worker is at work.
(Emphasis added).
Chapter 287 specifically provides for injuries by occupational disease and specifically says those injuries are compensable.
Section 287.067 RSMo states, in relevant part:
| Employee: | Albert Newhouse |
| - 3 - | |
| progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable. | |
| 8. With regard to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, if the exposure to the repetitive motion which is found to be the cause of the injury is for a period of less than three months and the evidence demonstrates that the exposure to the repetitive motion with the immediate prior employer was the prevailing factor in causing the injury, the prior employer shall be liable for such occupational disease. | |
| (Emphasis added). | |
| The above sections specifically refer to a condition of ill caused by occupational disease, including one caused by repetitive motion, as an “injury.” That is, the legislature specifically provided that the term “injury” includes occupational disease and that injuries by occupational disease, including injuries by repetitive motion, are compensable.Based upon the foregoing, we construe the term “injury” as it appears in the phrase “subsequent compensable injury” in § 287.220.1 to include occupational diseases. | |
| ConclusionWe affirm and adopt the award of the administrative law judge as supplemented herein. We approve and affirm the administrative law judge’s allowance of attorney’s fee herein as being fair and reasonable.Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Joseph E. Denigan, issued September 6, 2011, is attached and incorporated by this reference.Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 8th day of March 2012.LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION | |
| William F. Ringer, Chairman | |
| James Avery, Member | |
| Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member | |
| Attest: | |
| Secretary |
January 17, 2023#19-108693
The Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision denying workers' compensation benefits to Brian Cox, finding no compensable occupational disease or accident under Missouri law. The case involved disputed causation regarding whether Cox's carpal tunnel syndrome arose from his employment duties at the smelter or loading dock positions.
February 9, 2022#09-015610
The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's December 2020 award and remanded for reconsideration of whether the employee achieved permanent total disability status when combining her primary bilateral carpal tunnel injury with preexisting disabilities, including newly admitted vocational expert testimony and complete medical evaluation evidence. The Commission reconsidered the case on remand, admitting previously excluded vocational expert testimony documenting the employee's preexisting psychiatric disabilities (depression, PTSD, anxiety disorder) and modified its award accordingly.
January 21, 2022#17-105467
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's decision denying compensation for a work-related occupational disease injury to the employee's left wrist, finding the claim was barred by a prior settlement for left shoulder disability. A dissenting opinion argued the prior settlement only covered the shoulder injury and that the employer's authorization of medical testing suggested the wrist injury was compensable, but the majority affirmed the denial.
August 25, 2021#14-105395
The Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's award allowing permanent total disability compensation to Clifford Wolf against the Second Injury Fund, finding his primary carpal tunnel syndrome injury combined with preexisting disabilities from a prior back injury and polio rendered him permanently and totally disabled. The employee settled his primary claim for $35,500 based on 22.5% permanent partial disability of the right wrist and 20% of the left wrist.
June 7, 2021#03-051173
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's award of workers' compensation to Kevin G. Young for carpal tunnel injuries, finding the award supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Commission upheld the ALJ's evidentiary rulings excluding certain statements that were not provided to the employee's attorney within the statutory thirty-day period required by Missouri law.