First of all, it is important to note that employee's alleged injury occurred on January 10, 2008. Therefore, this case falls under the purview of the 2005 amendments to Missouri Workers' Compensation Law.
Section 287.120 RSMo ${ }^{1}$ "requires employers to furnish compensation according to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law for personal injuries of employees caused by accidents arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment." Gordon v. City of Ellisville, 268 S.W.3d 454, 458-59 (Mo. App. 2008).
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2007 unless otherwise indicated.
Improve: Robert Gregory
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Section 287.020.2 RSMo defines "accident" as: "An unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor."
Pursuant to § 287.020.3 RSMo, an "injury" is defined to be "an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment." Section 287.020.3(1) RSMo further states that:
"An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. 'The prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability."
It is employee's "burden to prove all essential elements of his claim, including a causal connection between the injury and the job." *Bond v. Site Line Surveying*, 322 S.W.3d 165, 170 (Mo. App. 2010). Therefore, the primary issue in this case is whether employee met his burden of establishing that the January 10, 2008, incident was the prevailing factor in causing the injury.
I do not believe employee met his burden of proof that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment because the great weight of the evidence established that the January 10, 2008, incident was not the prevailing factor in causing employee's injury to his left knee. In my opinion, the January 10, 2008, incident was merely a triggering or precipitating factor relating back to employee's history of left knee problems and, more specifically, the December 2007 surgery for which employee was still treating with Dr. Grantham.
The opinions of Dr. Estep, Dr. Roeder, and Dr. Burleigh are more credible than Drs. Swaim and Black. Dr. Estep had the unique perspective of seeing employee within a day of the January 10, 2008, work incident and he believed that the prevailing factor in causing his injury was his postsurgical difficulty, not the work incident. Dr. Estep had contemporaneous information about the status of employee's knee before the event and about any change in the knee right after the event.
Dr. Roeder noted that employee's knee condition was caused by his preexisting degenerative condition. He opined that the January 10, 2008, incident was not the prevailing factor in causing employee's injury. Dr. Roeder noted that the physiological problems in employee's knee were not solved by the December 2007 surgery because employee was continuing to have problems on the date of the alleged incident.
Dr. Burleigh set out his opinion in the "Workers' Compensation Treatment Form" completed during employee's January 18, 2008, visit. Dr. Burleigh marked the box indicating that the work incident was "Not Prevailing Factor." Dr. Burleigh's medical causation opinion is further evidenced by his impression of employee's x-ray results, which indicate employee had "postoperative symptomatology."
Injury No.: 08-002381
Drs. Swaim and Black's opinions should be given less weight. Dr. Swaim conceded that a number of different factors could have caused employee's knee injury, including employee's obesity, degenerative changes prior to January 2008, or an osteochondral defect that may have also preexisted the January 10, 2008, incident. In addition to the aforementioned, Dr. Swaim provided his opinions without the knowledge of employee's left knee problems occurring prior to the November 2007 fall.
Dr. Black simply found employee's "total knee arthroplasty to be related to his fall." Dr. Black's opinion fails to meet the level of proof required of $\S 287.020 .3$ RSMo, which requires the prevailing factor to be "the primary factor in relation to any other factor." Without more, Dr. Black's opinion could simply mean that he believes the January 10, 2008, incident was a "triggering" or "precipitating" factor, which would not be compensable.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the great weight of the evidence establishes that employee failed to meet his burden of proving that the January 10, 2008, work incident was the prevailing factor in causing his left knee condition. As such, I would reverse the award of the ALJ and issue a final award denying compensation.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of the Commission.
James Avery, Member