The administrative law judge found that the ulnar shortening procedure performed by Dr. David Strege on January 21, 2010, was reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve employee from the effects of his TFCC tear sustained in the work injury, and awarded employee his past medical expenses for this surgery. Employer challenges this finding on appeal. We ultimately agree with the administrative law judge's findings, but once again, we wish to specifically identify the expert opinions upon which we rely in order to fulfill the requirements of § 286.090 RSMo.
Employer has not appealed the administrative law judge's determination that the accident of September 19, 2008, caused employee to suffer a TFCC tear. Dr. Schlafly opined that an ulnar shortening procedure is an accepted surgical treatment of a TFCC tear, and pointed out that the symptoms referable to employee's TFCC tear persisted after the initial wrist arthroscopy. Dr. Schlafly opined that the ulnar shortening procedure was not only reasonable but, in his experience, would provide employee a more predictably beneficial result. Dr. Brown, meanwhile, characterized ulnar shortening as a very aggressive treatment option that is more reserved for a diagnosis of ulnar impaction syndrome. Dr. Brown did acknowledge, however, that the initial wrist arthroscopy failed to resolve employee's ulnar-sided wrist complaints referable to the TFCC tear, and that ulnar shortening is an accepted surgical treatment for a TFCC tear.
After careful consideration, we find Dr. Schlafly's opinion on this point to be persuasive. We find that the ulnar shortening procedure was reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve the effects of employee's injuries sustained in the September 2008 accident. We conclude, therefore, that employee is entitled to his past medical expenses incurred for this procedure.
Employer additionally argues it is not liable for the past medical expenses awarded by the administrative law judge because employee is not entitled to those expenses where his health insurance with employer paid some of the costs of his treatment. Employer acknowledges § 287.270 RSMo, but argues that the evidence shows that it paid 100% of the costs of employee's health insurance, with the effect that this insurance should be deemed to be a "benefit derived from the employer" for purposes of that provision. Employer points to the testimony from its witness Sherry Drew, an 8-year employee of employer's human resources department.
Ms. Drew testified that, historically, after an employee's third year with employer, employer would pay 100% of the employee's premiums for health insurance. But Ms. Drew did not address the question of who bears other costs typically associated with health insurance, such as copays or coinsurance, or the amount of any deductible. Ms. Drew also admitted
them. The most important thing to consider is that significant changes have gone into effect that she believes make employees once again liable for a portion of the premiums. (Ms. Drew was unable to identify when this occurred or whether it may have affected employee.) Ms. Drew further testified the group health insurer probably has a subrogation interest or reimbursement provision requiring repayment in the event medical bills are determined to be work-related; Ms. Drew was unable to specifically testify whether employee's insurance with employer works this way, although she speculated employee would have to pay the insurer back in the event his medical expenses were deemed compensable under workers' compensation.
For obvious reasons, the foregoing testimony does not persuade us to make a finding that employee's health insurance was fully subsidized by employer, so we need not address the question whether payments from a fully subsidized health insurance plan may be deemed "benefits derived from the employer" for purposes of $\S 287.270$. And especially in light of Ms. Drew's concession regarding the group health insurer's likely subrogation interest, we are not persuaded to make any finding that employee's liability for expenses he incurred for past medical care in connection with the work injury has been extinguished in any amount. See Farmer-Cummings v. Pers. Pool of Platte County, 110 S.W.3d 818 (Mo. 2003). Accordingly, we affirm the administrative law judge's conclusion employer is liable to employee for $\ 34,323.53 in past medical expenses.