| FINAL AWARD DENYING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) |
| Injury No. 12-030357 |
| Employee: | Patton H. Van Hoogstraat |
| Employer: | Gen. Geo. C. Marshall VFW Post 2184 |
| Insurer: | Missouri Employers Mutual Insurance Co. |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having read the briefs, reviewed the evidence, and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge denying compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge with this supplemental opinion. |
| Discussion Medical Causation Employee claims that while lifting a table for employer on or about April 14, 2012, he suffered accidental injury in the form of bilateral inguinal hernias. The administrative law judge determined that employee failed to meet his burden of proving a compensable injury. We agree with this result. However, we wish to provide some clarifications. In a discussion on page 5 of his award under the heading “Accident and Injury Arising Out of and In the Course of Employment,” the administrative law judge found that employee’s claim for benefits under Chapter 287 was undermined by employee’s apparent choice to utilize his own physicians, as well as the various discrepancies in the evidence with regard to the date and history of the alleged accident. We note, however, that the administrative law judge ultimately did not apply the relevant statutory test under § 287.020.3(2) RSMo to resolve the stated issue whether employee’s claimed injuries arose out of and in the course of employment.Similarly, in a discussion on page 6 labeled “Medical Causation,” the administrative law judge considered which of the medical experts provided the more persuasive testimony, but did not apply the relevant statutory test under § 287.020.3(1) RSMo whether employee suffered an accident that was the prevailing factor causing the claimed medical conditions or disabilities.Section 287.020.3 RSMo governs any discussion of these issues, and provides, as follows:(1) In this chapter the term “injury” is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. “The prevailing factor” is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. |
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
The issue commonly designated as "medical causation" is encapsulated in the requirement under paragraph (1) above that "[a]n injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability." After careful consideration, we agree with the administrative law judge's (implied) finding that the opinions from employee's expert, Dr. Gary Sides, are insufficient to satisfy this statutory requirement, for the following reasons.
We acknowledge that minor inconsistencies with regard to the date of injury or history of accident are not necessarily fatal to a claim, especially where "inconsistencies and contradictions in the claimant's testimony [are] either explained by other testimony given by the claimant or there [are] other facts and circumstances in the case from which the Industrial Commission [can] reasonably determine what the true state of facts was and believe the claimant on that basis." Pate v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., etc., 428 S.W.2d 744, 752-53 (Mo. App. 1968). Here, though, there are so many inconsistencies with respect to the timing, onset, and mechanism of injury, the activities in which employee was engaged at the time, the identity of the coworkers who purportedly witnessed the event, and whether employee continued working after the onset of symptoms, combined with a lack of any comprehensive explanation ${ }^{1}$ for these contradictions, that we simply cannot rely on employee's testimony to determine the correct facts. Likewise, although we are aware there is no requirement under Chapter 287 that the medical treatment records identify employment as the source of injury, Daly v. Powell Distrib., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Mo. App. 2010), the varying histories contained in the treatment records in this case compound the confusion over when and how employee's hernias manifested.
In light of the foregoing considerations, we find that Dr. Sides's opinions, however valid, rely upon factual assumptions that are not adequately established in the record. ${ }^{2}$ For this reason, we cannot rely on them, and we conclude therefore that the claimed accident of
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Employee advanced the explanation that he didn't know what a hernia was or whether he'd suffered any injury as the reason for his (apparent) delay in seeking medical treatment; and the explanation that he didn't know anything about workers' compensation proceedings as the reason for the discrepancies regarding the date of injury. While not inherently incredible, these explanations from employee fail to resolve the material discrepancies regarding what employee was doing at the time of the claimed injury, who was there, and whether employee finished his shift.
${ }^{2}$ Also, as employer suggests in its brief, Dr. Sides's opinion (even if believed) that employee suffered his hernias in March 2012 would appear to preclude an award of compensation in this claim, owing to the requirement under $\S 287.195$ RSMo that "[I]n all claims for compensation for hernia resulting from injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, it must be definitely proved to the satisfaction of the division or the commission: ... [t]hat the hernia did not exist prior to the accident or unusual strain resulting in the injury for which compensation is claimed." Again, employee claims herein that his hernias resulted from an accident occurring on or about April 14, 2012; employee does not advance a gradual onset or occupational disease theory of injury.
April 14, 2012, was not the prevailing factor causing the resulting medical conditions of bilateral inguinal hernias, or any disability associated therewith.
The remaining issues are moot, owing to employee's failure to meet his burden with respect to the issue of medical causation. Accordingly, we disclaim the administrative law judge's discussion and analysis with respect to the issue of notice, and whether employee suffered injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment.