Issue 1: Whether the Second Injury Fund claim was timely filed.
Issue 2: Nature and extent of permanent partial disability.
Issue 3: Liability, if any, of the Second Injury Fund.
In Injury No. 11-080366, claimant contends that he is entitled to benefits from the Second Injury Fund under Section 287.220, RSMo. The Second Injury Fund argues that no benefits are due in this case as the Fund believes that the claim is barred by Section 287.430. Specifically, the Second Injury Fund contends that claimant's Claim for Compensation against the Fund was dismissed and not re-filed within two years of the date or injury or within one year from the date of the claim against the employer.
A summary of relevant dates is as follows:
- 10/09/11 Date of injury.
- 10/27/11 Original claim for compensation against the employer and the Second Injury Fund. ${ }^{25}$
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[^0]: ${ }^{19} Meilves v. Morris, 422 S.W.2d 335, 399 (Mo. 1968).
{ }^{20} Griggs v. A.B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo.App. W.D. 1974).
{ }^{21}$ Dunn v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 272 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo.App. E.D. 2008) (Citations omitted).
${ }^{22}$ Section 287.220.1, RSMo.; Anderson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 698 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.App. 1985).
${ }^{23} Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo.App. 1990).
{ }^{24} Section 287.430, RSMo.
{ }^{25}$ Exh. A.
- 8/02/13 Claimant settled with the employer/insurer. ${ }^{26}$
- 8/16/13 Claimant's claim against the Second Injury Fund was dismissed. ${ }^{27}$
- 7/30/14 Claimant re-filed his claim against the Second Injury Fund. ${ }^{28}$
The Second Injury Fund argues that the re-filing of the claim against the Fund, on July 30, 2014, was not timely as it was more than two years after the date of injury (October 9, 2011) and more than a year after the (original) claim against the employer (October 27, 2011).
Claimant, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Elrod v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, ${ }^{29}$ contends that "a claim" does not mean "the claim" or "original claim," but instead refers to any claim that is timely filed. Claimant also relies on the case of the Treasurer of the State - Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Cook. ${ }^{30}$ In Cook, the court found that a stipulation for compromise settlement constitutes "a claim" filed against an employer. Following claimant's reasoning, the August 2, 2013 settlement with the employer/insurer constitutes a claim, and thus the re-filing of the claim against the Second Injury Fund on July 30, 2014, was within the two-year deadline.
On December 31, 2014, after the trial in this case and the filing of the parties' position statements, the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission issued its decision in the case of Couch v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund. ${ }^{31}$ Although not binding, this decision addresses this same statute of limitations question and is instructive to the case at hand. In Couch, the Administrative Law Judge found that for purposes of determining the timeliness of a filing for Second Injury Fund benefits, a settlement between the claimant and the employer/insurer constitutes a claim. The Administrative Law Judge then found that the statute of limitations was not a bar to recovery in that case, where the claim against the Second Injury Fund was filed within one year after the settlement of the claim with employer/insurer. The Commission affirmed, adding that the "[e]mployee also correctly notes that in the case of Elrod v. Treasurer of Mo., 138 S.W.3d 714 (Mo. 2004), the Missouri Supreme Court specifically held that 'a claim' does not mean 'the claim' or 'original claim,' but rather any claim that is timely filed." ${ }^{32}$
Upon a thorough review of the applicable law and the facts, I find that claimant's claim against the Second Injury Fund was timely filed and is not barred by the statute of limitations.
I further find that claimant has established a right to recover from the Second Injury Fund. On October 9, 2011, claimant sustained a compensable work injury that resulted in permanent partial disability of 10 % of the body as a whole referable to the groin. This injury resulted in a total of 40 weeks of disability.
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[^0]: ${ }^{26} Exh. 4.
{ }^{27} Exh. B.
{ }^{28} Exh. C.
{ }^{29} 138 S.W.3d 714 (Mo. 2004).
{ }^{30} 323 S.W.3d 105 (Mo.App.W.D. 2010).
{ }^{31} 2014 WL 7466197 (Mo.Lab.Ind.Rel.Com) (Injury No. 10-012307).
{ }^{32} \mathrm{Id}$.
I also find that at the time of the 2011 work injury, claimant had the following preexisting permanent partial disabilities that meet the statutory requirements and were of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or re-employment: 38 % of the left ankle and 15 % of the right knee. Thus, the pre-existing injuries resulted in 82.9 weeks of disability.
Claimant contends that the primary injury of October 9, 2011, combined synergistically with the pre-existing injuries to cause an overall greater disability. Although no medical expert testified specifically on this issue as it pertains to the 2011 injury, I find that based on record as a whole, claimant has met his burden of proof that the disability from the 2011 work injury combined with the pre-existing permanent partial disabilities to cause 10 % greater overall disability than the independent sum of the disabilities. The Second Injury Fund liability is calculated as follows: 40 weeks for the primary injury (body as a whole referable to the groin) plus 82.9 weeks for the pre-existing injuries (left ankle and right knee) equals 122.9 weeks. I find that it is appropriate to multiply this figure, 122.9 weeks, by a 10 % load factor, resulting in 12.29 weeks of overall greater disability. Thus, the Second Injury Fund is liable for \5,225.59 (12.29 weeks of overall greater disability x \ 425.19 weekly compensation rate).
Any pending objections not expressly ruled on in this award are overruled.
This Award is subject to a lien in the amount of 25 % of the payments hereunder in favor of the Van Camp Law Firm for necessary legal services rendered to claimant.
Made by: $\qquad$
Vicky Ruth
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation