"Being creatures of statute, ALJ's and the Division of Workers' Compensation only have the authority granted by statute...most pertinently, common law rights to discovery in workers' compensation cases have been, in some instances, abridged or expanded, but nevertheless, prescribed by statute, including an ALJ's scope of authority to permit or prohibit certain forms of discovery...[N]o additional common law rights to discovery exist in workers' compensation cases beyond those provided by statute (emphasis added)." ${ }^{5}$ This legal proposition applies to the Commission.
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[^0]: ${ }^{2}$ Allcorn v. TAP Enterprises, Inc. 277 S.W.3d 823, 828 (Mo. App. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
${ }^{3}$ ABB Power T \& D Co. v. Kempker, 236 S.W.3d 43, 51-52 (Mo. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted.); See also Treasurer of the State of Missouri v. Daryl Majors, No. WD79465, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 885, at 4 (W.D. Mo. September 6, 2016), citing ABB Power T \& D Co. v. Kempker, Id. (Mo. App. 2007).
${ }^{4}$ David Pursley v. Christian Hospital Northeast/Northwest and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 355 S.W.3d 508 (Mo. App. 2011).
${ }^{5}$ Lutes v. Honorable Lee B. Schaefer, 431 S.W.3d 550,553 (Mo. App. 2014).
Enployee: John O. McDowell
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Consistent with the requirement that all workers' compensation proceedings be "simple, informal and summary, and without regard to the technical rules of evidence," § 287.210.7 of the Workers' Compensation Law codifies an exception to the hearsay rule by permitting admission of the complete report of a treating or examining physician without other foundational evidence, subject to a party's compliance with specified procedures. Among the procedures specified in the statute are the requirements that a party give notice to the other side within sixty days of the hearing that it intends to submit a report in lieu of testimony of its medical expert and also provide the other side a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain cross-examination testimony from the treating or examining physician.
In its answer to employee's application for review, and in oral argument before the Commission, employer alleges for the first time that admission of Dr. Stillings' report infringes its "fundamental right of cross-examination." Although not entirely clear, this argument appears to suggest that § 287.210.7 impairs employer's constitutional due process rights. ${ }^{6}$
The Commission's adjudicative power is confined to the ascertainment of facts and the application of existing law to issues within the Commission's area of expertise. As such, we do not believe our statutory authority includes jurisdiction to decide whether provisions of the workers' compensation law are constitutional. ${ }^{7}$ Therefore, even assuming employer has timely raised this issue, we decline to consider it. That said, we note that in the context of criminal law, courts have held that once an opportunity for cross-examination of a witness has been provided to a criminal defendant, "the actual use then made of the opportunity becomes a matter of defense strategy, and deliberate trial tactics do not ordinarily exact constitutional protection." 8
In its brief on appeal, employer argues that the provisions of $\S 491.070$ must be applied to § 287.210.7. Section 491.070 provides, in pertinent part, "A party to a case, civil or criminal, against whom a witness has been called and given some evidence, shall be entitled to cross-examine said witness...on the entire case."
As earlier noted, no rights to discovery exist in workers' compensation cases beyond those provided by statute. Further, consistent with § 287.800, we construe all provisions of the workers' compensation law strictly, presuming nothing that is not expressed. Both the limits of our statutory authority and legislature's "strict construction" mandate preclude us from injecting other statutory or regulatory standards, such as $\S 491.070$, into the workers' compensation law.
Employer's attorney does not dispute employer receipt of employee's notice of Dr. Stillings' report on August 18, 2014, within sixty days of hearing. There is no evidence that employee placed unreasonable restrictions on Dr. Stillings' availability. To the contrary, subsequent to his sixty-day notice, employee's attorney advised
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[^0]: ${ }^{6}$ Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1; Constitution of Missouri, Article 1, Section 10 .
${ }^{7}$ Thomas F. Hunt v. Laclede Gas Company 869 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. App. 1999): Henry Mikel v.Pott Industries/St. Louis Ship (Mo. 1995); LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 2016, 3-124, § 124.02.
${ }^{8}$ State of Missouri v. Terrese D. Aaron, 218 S.W.3 501, 508 (Mo. App. 2007).
Employer of available dates and furnished employer contact information for Dr. Stillings' office staff. Employee further notified employer that Dr. Stillings' was in poor health and that his office would be closing. Dr. Stillings' unavailability due his death on March 16, 2015, nearly seven months after employee's sixty-day notice, was not a circumstance employee caused or could have avoided. Employer's attorney acknowledged that he intentionally delayed deposing Dr. Stillings to secure another expert opinion.
Employer's actions, as a matter of trial strategy, were not unreasonable. However, employer's intentional delay of nearly seven months in deposing Dr. Stillings is not relevant to the issue of whether employee provided reasonable access and a "reasonable opportunity" for employer to depose employee's medical expert. We find, considering all the facts and circumstances in this case, that employee provided employer a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain the Dr. Stillings' cross-examination testimony as required by $\S 287.210 .7$.
As we have found, employee properly complied with all procedures set out in § 287.210 in his submission of Dr. Stillings' report into evidence. The ALJ properly overruled employer's objection to the introduction of Employee Exhibit 2/Report of Dr. Stillings.