The multiple issues raised herein boil down to a single question: Did Travelers effectively cancel the Policy prior to Employee's date of loss? If so, then BSI/National remains liable for the benefits paid under the Act by virtue of BSI's position as general contractor, and under $\S 287.040$. However, if Travelers cannot establish an effective and timely cancellation, it will be liable for the benefits.
Insurance policies are contracts. Stickler v. Foremost Signature Ins. Co., 150 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). To determine whether an insurance policy provides coverage, we look to the insurance contract itself. Farm Bureau Town \& Country Ins. Co. of Missouri v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp., 347 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). Because insurance coverage is a matter of contract, absent a statute or public policy that requires coverage, we enforce an insurance policy as written. Id.
Generally, an insurance policy may only be canceled by mutual assent of the parties or pursuant to the terms of the policy. Stone v. Farm Bureau Town \& Country Ins. Co. of Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 736, 744-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006), citing MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southwest Baptist College, 381 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Mo.1964); Stickler v. Foremost Signature Ins. Co., 150 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Mo.App.2004). "A unilateral cancellation must strictly comply with the policy." Stone at 45, citing Blair v. Perry County Mut. Ins. Co., 118 S.W.3d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 2003).
Travelers, as insurer, has the burden of showing, as an affirmative defense, the cancellation of the insurance contract before the date of the accident. Nichols v. Mama Stuffeati's, 965 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ${ }^{8}$ citing Dyche v. Bostian, 361 Mo. 122, 233 S.W.2d 721 (1950).
The language of the cancellation portion of the Policy is clear. The Missouri Cancellation and Nonrenewal Endorsement (the "Missouri Endorsement") (Ex. B-6, p. 167), which replaces other provisions ${ }^{9}$ of the Policy dealing with cancellation, contains the following relevant sections: ${ }^{10}$
(2) We may cancel this policy. We will mail or deliver to you not less than 60 days advance written notice stating when the cancellation is to take effect and our reason for cancellation. Proof of mailing of this notice to you at your mailing address shown in item 1 of the Informational Page will be sufficient to prove notice.
(3) The 60-day notice requirement does not apply where cancellation is based on one or more of the following reasons:
(a) nonpayment of premium....
(4) The policy period will end on the day and hour stated in the cancellation notice.
"The Missouri courts have held, in an unbroken line of decisions, that strict compliance with all the requirements in regard to notice is a prerequisite to cancellation." Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stone \& Sons, Inc,, 822 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) citing Farrar v. Mayabb, 326 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Mo.App.1959). Thus, if Travelers desires to cancel the Policy for nonpayment of premium, the Policy terms require Travelers to mail or deliver advance written notice stating when the cancellation is to take effect and the reasons for the cancellation. Other than the word "advance," there is no language in the applicable portions of the Policy addressing the timing of the written notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium.
A notice of cancellation in Missouri must be very specific. The requirements were summarized by the court in Blair by Snider v. Perry Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 118 S.W.3d 605, 607 (Mo. 2003) as follows, with citations and quotation marks removed:
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[^0]: ${ }^{8}$ This is one of several cases cited in this Award in support of other principles of law not affected by the Hampton ruling, which overruled many workers' compensation cases only with respect to the proper standard of review. See Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 200, 224-32 (Mo. banc 2003). No further note will be made of such Hampton cases.
${ }^{9}$ The main body of the Policy, specifically Section D (2) on page 6 (Ex. B-6 p. 148), contains the following language describing how Travelers can unilaterally cancel the policy: "We may cancel this policy. We must mail or deliver to you not less than ten days advance written notice stating when the cancellation is to take effect. Mailing the notice to you at your mailing address shown in Item 1 of the Information Page will be sufficient to prove notice." However, the Missouri Endorsement, by its own terms, replaces that Cancellation Condition of the Policy.
${ }^{10} The Missouri Endorsement language mirrors the statutory language of \S 379.883$, the statutory provision regarding cancellation that applies to commercial casualty insurance policies, including workers compensation. The Policy requires "advance" written notice, while $\S 379.883$ mandates "prior" written notice.
A unilateral cancellation must strictly comply with the policy. There would have to be an unequivocal, unmistakable act of cancellation, not dependent upon some future event, and a mere intention to cancel would not suffice to effect a cancellation under the policy provisions. A notice of cancellation to be effective must be a present cancellation as distinguished from an intention to cancel at a future day. The assured must be informed, not that the policy will be canceled, but that it is canceled.
See also, Clark v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 390 S.W.3d 208, 213 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)(Part of the key to Blair, then, is that, to be effective, a cancellation notice cannot indicate that the policy will be canceled but must indicate that it in fact is canceled). In Clark, the Court held the statement, "your policy will be canceled at (a future date)" quite simply is not a present cancellation under the case law. Id. at 214. At best, this language simply showed an intention to cancel the policy in the future if the insured did not pay the premium by the due date. Id. The contingent nature of the language prevented it from being an effective cancellation notice under Blair. Id.
The Blair decision controlled in two cases with facts similar to the instant case: Stone v. Farm Bureau Town \& Country Ins., 203 S.W.3d 736, 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) and Clark v. Progressive Preferred Ins., 390 S.W.3d 208, 212-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). In Stone and Clark, the insurer sent two letters: (1) A reminder notice to the insured regarding an overdue premium payment; and (2) a second letter to the insured indicating that the insurance policy was canceled because the overdue premium payment was not received. The Missouri Court of Appeals held the insurers' initial reminder letters were not effective notice of cancellation because the language of those letters was contingent and merely expressed an intention to cancel the policy in the future if the overdue premium payment was not made by the identified date. Stone, 203 S.W.3d at 746; Clark, 390 S.W.3d at 213-14. In Clark, the Missouri Court of Appeals particularly noted the insurer's initial letter included a "payment coupon" the insured could return with the overdue premium payment by the identified deadline, and found the "payment coupon" effectively served as a billing invoice to the insured with a contingent warning that the policy might be canceled in the future. Id., at 214 (citing Blair and Stone).
In addition to the Policy language itself and the requirements of Blair and its progeny, Missouri statutes provide guidance regarding the sufficiency of notice of cancellation. Section 379.883.3 RSMo states:
Notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of a commercial casualty insurance policy shall state the insurer's actual reason for proposing the action, the statement of reason to be sufficiently clear and specific so that the recipient can identify the basis of the insurer's decision without further inquiry.
Considering the Policy, the case law and the statute, Travelers must establish it mailed or delivered advance written notice to STL Brick stating the Policy in fact is canceled for sufficiently clear and specific reasons.
Travelers relies on two documents ${ }^{11}$ to establish effective notice of cancellation, the March Notice dated March 13, 2014 and the April Letter dated April 15, 2014. The terms of the
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[^0]: ${ }^{11}$ Travelers' third argument, that a Form WC-75 filed with the Division of Workers' Compensation establishes a cancellation date of April 2, is misplaced. Section 287.090 .3 is ministerial in nature and does not require an insurer to file (a Form 75) notice of cancellation with the Division prior to effectuating the cancellation of a workers'
March Notice, which are more fully set for the above, are incongruous. The effective date is prominent, the reason for the cancellation (nonpayment of premiums) is apparent, and at least once the language "is canceled" as of the effective date appears. Conversely, the March Notice also uses the term "will be canceled," includes a payment coupon, and indicates Travelers "will be pleased to rescind" the cancellation upon receipt of the minimum due. Furthermore, the March Notice, on page 3, states to prevent cancellation, "the entire past due amount must be received," which creates ambiguity because the "minimum due" and the "entire past due amount" are two different sums. ${ }^{12}$
The March Notice is not an effective notice of cancellation. Far from the unequivocal, unmistakable act of cancellation required, the March Notice is internally contradictory (the Policy "is" and "will be" canceled), conditional (subject to rescission), and confusing (will payment of the entire past due amount or minimum payment suffice to maintain coverage). It is nearly identical to the notices found deficient in Stone and Clark. As evidenced by the payment coupon, the cancellation is contingent and prospective, not certain and immediate. Furthermore, due to the ambiguity regarding minimum vs. past due payment, the reasons are not sufficiently clear and specific as required by $\S 379.883 .3$.
In contrast, the April Letter is written notice to STL Brick stating the Policy in fact is canceled for sufficiently clear and specific reasons. Coverage, according to the April 15 Letter, has been terminated (as of April 2, 2014), and claims arising "after the effective date of cancellation" will not be covered. Reasons are sufficiently clear and specific and the act of cancellation is unequivocal and unmistakable.
Although the April Letter is substantively a proper notice of cancellation, there remains an issue of the effective date of cancellation. On its face, the April $15^{\text {th }}$ Letter announces an effective date of April 02, 2014. While the Policy does not require a specific number of days notice for cancellation due to nonpayment (as in Blair, et al) it does require "advance" notice (or "prior" notice as per §379.883). The word "advance" mandates notice "before something happens." ${ }^{13}$ As do most courts, Missouri agrees that a notice, otherwise sufficient in form and content, which purports to cancel an insurance... contact at a time earlier than permitted under...the contract is not wholly ineffective but serves to cancel the contract and the coverage afforded by it at the expiration of the permitted time. Stone, 203 S.W.3d at 748, citing 96 A.L.R.2d $286 \S 3$ (1964). Retroactive notice is not permitted pursuant to the Policy, and the April 2, 2014 date does not control. However, the April 15 Letter is not a wholly ineffective means to cancel the Policy.
As the proponent of cancellation, Travelers must establish it mailed or delivered the April 15 Letter, being otherwise sufficient in form and content, to STL Brick. When an insurer seeks
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[^0]: compensation insurance policy. Simpson v. Saunchegrow Const., 965 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Furthermore, the information placed by the insurer in the Form 75 is self-reported, self-serving and, in this case, inaccurate. Although I overruled BSI/National's objection to the admission of Ex. T-1 purporting to be an electronic version of Travelers' Form 75, the contents of Ex. T-1 do not impact the issues herein decided.
${ }^{12} The March Notice indicates the MINIMUM DUE of \ 17,963.92 includes " $\ 14,971.96 WAS due on 03/02/14; $\ 2,981.96 that is due on $) 4 / 02 / 14, \ 10.00 for PAST DUE installment charges; $\ 10.00 for current installment charge." Thus, the minimum due contains both past due and current charges, which is different from the "entire past due amount."
${ }^{13}$ The plain meaning of "in advance," according to Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, online, is "before something happens."
to cancel an insurance policy pursuant to a specific provision for cancellation, the insurer must prove that it mailed a notice of cancellation to the insured at the address shown on the insurer's records. ${ }^{14}$ See Gambill v. Cedar Fork Mut. Aid Soc., 967 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (Defendant is required to prove it mailed a notice of cancellation). The burden of proving cancellation is on the party asserting it. Id. citing O'Connor, 831 S.W.2d at 751[3]; Farrar v. Mayabb, 326 S.W.2d 337, 341[4] (Mo.App.1959). In Gambill, the insurer's secretary testified to her general practice and circumstantial reasons she felt the notice was properly mailed, but such evidence was insufficient to establish the notice was mailed. Other than producing a copy of the April 15 Letter with an address that matches the address on the Information Page, ${ }^{15}$ Travelers has provided no evidence to support a finding it complied with the "mailed or delivered" requirements of the Policy.
With the April 15 Letter, Travelers has produced a cancellation notice that strictly complies with the Policy and communicates a current, unequivocal, and unmistakable act of cancellation for sufficiently clear and specific reasons. However, there is no proof it was mailed or delivered to STL Brick as required by the terms of the Policy. Therefore, Travelers has not met its burden of proving the Policy was effectively canceled prior to Employee's date of injury.