At hearing, the employer/insurer objected to admission of employee's Exhibit 2, PhD audiologist David Mason's deposition, curriculum vitae, and report. Employer/insurer objected based on a lack of foundation and Dr. Mason's failure to qualify as an expert pursuant to § 490.065. Employer/insurer further alleged that Dr. Mason's opinions were "not offered within a reasonable degree of medical certainty as required by Section 287.190.6 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri."¹
The administrative law judge took employer/insurer's objection under advisement. In his January 18, 2017, Final Award, the administrative law judge overruled employer/insurer's objection to employee's Exhibit 2, citing *Landers v. Chrysler Corp., Nixon v. Lichtenstein* and several Commission decisions including *Earl Resinger v. Mississippi Lime Company*.² The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's decision in *Resinger* without opinion pursuant to Rule 84.16(B) on August 23, 2016.³
Employer/insurer argues that the case law cited by the administrative law judge in support of his decision to overrule employer/insurer's objections include criteria that render Dr. Mason's opinions on tinnitus and on the cause of hearing loss inadmissible. We disagree.
In *Landers v. Chrysler Corp.*, the court determined that a non-physician psychologist's testimony was sufficient to satisfy an employee's burden of proving medical causation of a
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1 Transcript, 7.
2 *Landers v. Chrysler Corp.*, 963 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1997); *Nixon v. Lichtenstein*, 959 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1997); *Earl Resinger v. Mississippi Lime Company*, Injury No. 12-103979 (LIRC, December 23, 2015), See Award, p. 4.
3 *Resinger v. Miss. Lime Co.*, 504 S.W.3d 97 (Mo. App. 2016).
Injury No.: 13-104480
Employee: David Hogenmiller
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brain injury. The court reasoned, "[C]onceivably a psychologist or other non-physician might attain a degree of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in medicine that would provide the foundation to become a medical expert." The *Landers* decision stands for the proposition that where an expert witness possesses scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in resolving an issue of medical causation, the fact that the witness does not possess a license to practice medicine is not dispositive.
Employer/insurer notes that *Nixon v. Lichtenstein*, a case involving trust and corporation law, states that "In order to qualify as an expert, the witness must have knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education supporting his or her opinion which is intended to aid the trier of fact." The court in *Nixon* further observed:
> "Whether a witness' qualifications to state an opinion are sufficiently established rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of abuse." *State ex rel Jefferson County v. Watson*, 867 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). The question the trial court must ask is whether the witness possesses certain knowledge, wisdom, or skill regarding the relevant subject matter which was acquired by study, investigation, observation, practice, or experience. *Id.* "If the witness has some qualifications, the testimony should be permitted."
The administrative law judge's decision recites Dr. Mason's credentials as follows:
> [Dr. Mason's] C.V. indicated that he had a BA in Speech Pathology, an MA in Audiology and a PhD in Hearing Science. He has been in private practice as an audiologist since 2003. He was a dispensing audiologist at the St. Louis Hearing and Speech Center starting in 2012. He taught graduate level classes at the Central Institute for the Deaf in 2003, and undergraduate level audiology and hearing science classes at St. Louis University in 2008-2009. From 1983 to 2003, he was an audiologist and Assistant Professor at the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis; and was Interim Head of Audiology from 1995-1998. He was an audiology consultant to Union Pacific Railroad from 1988-1990.
Medical causation may be established by "proper opinion testimony." In our view, pursuant to the criteria set out in *Landers* and *Nixon*, Dr. Mason's credentials are more than sufficient to give weight to his opinions regarding tinnitus and medical causation of the employee's hearing loss. We affirm the administrative law judge's admission of employee's Exhibit 2 into evidence.
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4 *Landers v. Chrysler Corp.*, supra at 282.
5 *Nixon v. Lichtenstein*, 959 S.W.2d 854, 860 (Mo. App. 1999).
6 *Id.*
7 *Award*, pp. 7-8.
8 *Beatrice v. Curators of U. of Mo.*, 438 S.W.3d 426, 435 (Mo. App. 2014).
Injury No.: 13-104480
Employee: David Hogenmiller
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