I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence in the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge should be reversed.
I find the opinion of Dr. Jerry Meyers persuasive that employee was permanently and totally disabled due to the primary injury in combination with employee's preexisting conditions. This opinion was supported by vocational expert Timothy D. Kaver, who stated on July 8, 2019:
> I concur with Dr. Meyers' opinion that [employee] is totally and permanently disabled due to the combination of his most recent November and December of 2016 work-related bilateral carpal tunnel injuries/surgeries. The carpal tunnel injuries/surgeries have created obstacles to his reemployment, and combined with his pre-existing medical concerns [employee] is totally and permanently disabled.
*Award, p. 6 (citing Exhibit 16).*
I do not find persuasive vocational expert J. Stephan Dolan's opinion that he was permanently and totally disabled because he "was unemployable and had no access to the labor market prior to the primary injury," or that employee "was employed only because of accommodations and excess use of opioids." *Award, p. 6 (quoting Exhibit II).*
I further disagree with the administrative law judge's finding that "the role of the claimant's pre-existing medical conditions that did not constitute pre-existing permanent partial disabilities, suggests that the claimant does not meet the current statutory criteria for permanent total disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund [because the] statute in its current state appears to require exclusion of those pre-existing medical conditions in determining the source of the claimant's total disability." *Award, p. 12.*
When interpreting statutes, one is required to give words their plain and ordinary meaning whenever possible with a goal of giving effect to the legislature's intent. *St. Louis Police Officers' Association v. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis, 259 S.W.3d 526,528 (Mo. banc 2008).* Statutes should be interpreted to avoid unreasonable or absurd results including those that might defeat the purpose of the legislature. *Leiser v. City of Wildwood, 59 S.W.3d 597,603 (Mo. App. 2001).* An adjudicator should presume that the legislature included every word of the statute for a purpose and that every word has meaning. *Hewitt v. St. Louis Rams P'ship, 409 S.W.3d 572,574 (Mo. App. 2013).*
There is no question that, due to lack of funding, the legislature intended to limit the Second Injury Fund's liability when it enacted the current version of § 287.220, RSMo. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the legislature did not intend to disallow consideration of other conditions once an employee meets the threshold under one of the four statutory categories. The legislature presumably intended to set a threshold to
Injury No. 16-104170
Employee: Troy Barnes
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reach Second Injury Fund liability where a preexisting condition must have been significant enough to equate to at least fifty weeks of disability and meets one of the subsections 1-4. If the employee satisfies one of these conditions precedent, nothing in the language of the statute prohibits the administrative law judge from considering other unrelated conditions that do not necessarily qualify under one of the four condition precedents. Certainly, the statute would not intend to prohibit permanent total disability for an individual who was able to qualify under more than one subsection or condition precedent.
The administrative law judge's interpretation of § 287.220.3 is inconsistent with the recent Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, opinion in *Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Jonathan Parker WD83030* (July 14, 2020, Rule 83.02 motion for transfer granted September 4, 2020). I agree with the Western District appellate court majority's reasoning in this important decision, now under consideration by our state's Supreme Court.
I would reverse the administrative law judge's award denying benefits against the Second Injury Fund. Because the Commission majority has decided otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
Shalonn K. Curls, Member