Matthew J. Callow, Respondent, v. Danielle N. Callow, Appellant.

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SOUTHERN DIVISION

MATTHEW J. CALLOW,

Respondent,

v.

DANIELLE N. CALLOW,

Appellant.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. ED113129

Filed: November 25, 2025

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County The Honorable Julia M. Koester, Judge Danielle Callow ("Mother") appeals from a judgment dissolving her marriage with Matthew Callow ("Father"). Mother claims the circuit court erred by denying maintenance, miscalculating child support, dividing marital property and uninsured medical bills, and failing to consider newly discovered evidence. The judgment is affirmed. Background Mother and Father married in October 2012. They separated in October 2021. They have one unemancipated child ("Child").

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Father was employed full time during the marriage. Mother was a real estate agent and dog groomer until February 2020. Mother quit working due to the Covid-19 pandemic and never resumed working. Both Mother and Father have health challenges. Mother was diagnosed with Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome and Fabry's Disease. Mother takes multiple medications prescribed by multiple doctors. Mother attempted suicide in 2021. Father is a recovering alcoholic, but he has been sober since 2019. Prior to trial, Mother and Father sold the marital home. They divided the proceeds between themselves. The circuit court's judgment divided the remaining marital property, which included four vehicles and Father's retirement accounts. The judgment awarded Mother two vehicles with a combined value of $20,000; Father was awarded two vehicles with a combined value of $4,800. Mother's request for maintenance was denied. The circuit court entered a parenting plan for Child and created its own Form 14 for child support. The circuit court's Form 14 imputed income to Mother, but calculated that Mother was entitled to child support. Mother appeals. Standard of Review This Court will affirm the circuit court's judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). "All fact issues upon which no specific findings are made shall be considered as having been found in accordance with the result reached." Rule 73.01(c). This Court accepts all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the judgment. Lollar v. Lollar, 609

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S.W.3d 41, 46 (Mo. banc 2020). The circuit court "can believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented." Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 707 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Mo. App. 2025) (quoting Herd v. Herd, 537 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Mo. App. 2018)). "This Court disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary." Lollar, 609 S.W.3d at 46. Analysis Denial of Maintenance Mother claims the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to award her maintenance. Mother argues this violated section 452.335, RSMo 2016, 1 because she lacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs, cannot work due to her medical conditions, and Father has the ability to pay. Mother argues the circuit court overlooked her testimony about the extent of her medical conditions and the amount of her reasonable needs. This argument ignores the standard of review. "Determining what evidence to believe is wholly within the province of the [circuit] court." Landewee v. Landewee, 515 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting In re Marriage of Harp, 278 S.W.3d 681, 688 (Mo. App. 2008)). This Court defers to the circuit court's factual findings "even where the evidence could have supported a different conclusion." Davis v. Davis, 582 S.W.3d 100, 108 (Mo. App. 2019) (quoting Sulkin v. Sulkin, 552 S.W.3d 793, 795-96 (Mo. App. 2018)). Mother's trial testimony undermines her argument that her medical conditions preclude meaningful employment. Mother testified that she recently brokered the sale of

1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016.

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a home and completed all of the related paperwork. Mother also testified she fixed appliances at her home, she built and installed a shelf, and spent hours on her computer preparing for her deposition in this case. Although Mother is currently unemployed, "[u]nemployment alone is not enough to require an award of maintenance." Davis, 582 S.W.3d at 109 (quoting In re Marriage of Clift, 108 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Mo. App. 2003)). Mother's trial testimony provided evidence supporting a conclusion that Mother's medical conditions were not as debilitating as she claimed. Likewise, the circuit court was not required to accept Mother's evidence of her reasonable needs. In re Marriage of Holden, 81 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Mo. App. 2002). Mother testified she reported expenses for items that she did not have and double counted another item. While Mother stated her reasonable expense forms would be amended, the record does not reflect any modification. Mother never demonstrated what her reasonable needs are or how they could not be met without a maintenance award. Mother failed to demonstrate the circuit court abused its discretion. Miscalculation of Child Support Mother claims the circuit court abused its discretion by imputing income to her because it rendered the child support calculation incorrect. Mother argues she is unemployed and cannot support herself with appropriate employment due to her medical conditions. The circuit court's discretion in imputing income is limited by whether the record supports a finding that the parent has the capacity to earn the imputed amount. McKenna v. McKenna, 717 S.W.3d 634, 645 (Mo. App. 2025). "[T]here must be evidence to

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support a finding that the parent is deliberately limiting his or her work to reduce income before it is appropriate to impute income." Buchholz v. Buchholz, 166 S.W.3d 146, 156 (Mo. App. 2005) (quoting Davis v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 21 S.W.3d 140, 141 (Mo. App. 2000)). "In determining a parent's ability to pay child support, a court may consider past, present, and anticipated earning capacity." Carter v. Carter, 709 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Mo. App. 2025). Mother testified that she had not and would not seek employment while her disability claim was pending. Yet, Mother also testified she brokered the sale of a home and has other marketable skills. Mother's testimony supports a finding that she had the capacity to earn income, but was deliberately not seeking employment in an attempt to receive disability benefits. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to her. Division of Marital Property Mother claims the circuit court erred by dividing the marital property equally. Mother asserts there should have been an unequal distribution in her favor due to the extraordinary amount of Husband's marital misconduct. It is within the circuit court's discretion to identify, value, and divide marital property. Lollar, 609 S.W.3d at 46. Generally, the marital property division "should be substantially equal unless one of the statutory factors renders such a division unjust." Gipson v. Gipson, 686 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Mo. App. 2024) (quoting Travis v. Travis, 163 S.W.3d 43, 46-47 (Mo. App. 2005)). The circuit court's property division is presumed

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correct and Mother "bears the burden of overcoming the presumption." Lollar, 609 S.W.3d at 46. "A spouse's marital miscount may influence a division of marital property in some circumstances." Landewee v. Landewee, 515 S.W.3d 691, 698 (Mo. banc 2017). The circuit court is required to consider the parties' conduct during the marriage. Section 452.330.1(4). "[M]arital conduct is only a factor in property division when the offending conduct places extra burdens on the other spouse." Landewee, 515 S.W.3d at 698 (quoting Shafer v. Shafer, 423 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Mo. App. 2014) (internal quotations omitted)). Mother argues she should have been awarded an unequal share of the marital residence and Father's retirement account. Mother omits the fact there also were four vehicles divided between them. Mother received the two vehicles with significantly more value. The martial property and Father's retirement account were split equally. Mother asserts that Father's drinking and extramarital relationship warranted a finding of misconduct. Father has remained sober since 2019 and thereafter, assumed the extra burden of assisting Mother with her medical conditions. Father's extramarital relationship started after he and Mother separated and after their unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation. Mother did not show this relationship placed any additional burden on her. See Messer v. Messer, 41 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Mo. App. 2001) (affirming circuit court's decision that an extramarital affair after separation was not misconduct without demonstrating extra burdens placed on the other spouse).

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The circuit court did not find that either party committed marital misconduct. Mother fails to demonstrate there was an increased burden upon her which would justify an even larger share of the martial property. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion. Uninsured Medical Expenses for Child Mother claims the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering her and Father to pay any uninsured medical expenses for Child equally. Mother argues this violates section 454.633 because the uninsured medical expenses should be allocated according to their income. Section 454.633.3 states, "[R]esponsibility for the child's care expenses that are not covered by a health benefit plan may be equitably apportioned between the parents by the court or the division, in percentage shares based on their income ...." (Emphasis added). However, if there is no designation in the judgment, parents "shall be liable for fifty percent of such expenses." Id. The circuit court could have decided to order Mother and Father to pay Child's uninsured health expenses pro-rata, but it was not required to do so. The circuit court's adoption of sharing expenses equally "followed the applicable statute and adopted the statutory default of an equal division." Hernandez v. Hernandez, 249 S.W.3d 885, 891 (Mo. App. 2008). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion. Newly Discovered Evidence Mother claims the circuit court erred by denying her post-trial motion to reopen the evidence because there was newly discovered evidence. Mother argues that the Social Security Administration's determination bolstered her testimony regarding her ability to

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work and that the circuit court thereby failed to consider all of the relevant evidence regarding her earning capacity. The circuit court "may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact or make new findings, and direct the entry of a new judgment." Rule 78.01. The circuit court has discretion in determining whether to reopen a case for new evidence. Hagen v. Harris, 680 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Mo. App. 2023). "Motions based on newly discovered evidence are looked upon with disfavor, and the party urging such an error on appeal must carry a heavy burden." Soehlke v. Soehlke, 398 S.W.3d 10, 21 n.6 (Mo. banc 2013). To prevail on a motion for new trial due to newly discovered evidence, a party must demonstrate: 1) the evidence has come to the knowledge of the party since the trial; 2) failure to discover the evidence sooner was not the result of a lack of due diligence; 3) the evidence is so material that a new trial would produce a different outcome; and 4) it is not cumulative only or merely impeaching the credibility of a witness. Cent. Tr. & Inv. Co. v. Signalpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 422 S.W.3d 312, 325 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Hancock v. Shook, 100 S.W.3d 786, 798 (Mo. banc 2003)). The circuit court held a hearing on Mother's motion. Mother requested the circuit court consider the Social Security Administration's decision. That decision relied upon medical records and testimony that were not presented to the circuit court. Mother did not seek to admit any medical testimony during the trial or in her post-trial motion. The Social Security Administration's decision would be merely cumulative evidence, reiterating Mother's testimony.

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Further, a "social security determination is not binding on Missouri courts." In re Marriage of Lindhorst, 347 S.W.3d 474, 476 n.1 (Mo. banc 2011). Merely reopening the judgment to receive the Social Security Administration's decision into evidence would not be "so material that it would probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted ...." Hagen, 680 S.W.3d at 535-36 (quoting Pijanowski v. Pijanowski, 272 S.W.3d 321, 324 (Mo. App. 2008)). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Mother's motion for a new trial. Conclusion The circuit c ourt's judgment is affirmed.

_______________________________ J OHN P. TORBITZKY, CHIEF JUDGE Philip M. Hess, Judge and Lisa P. Page, Judge; concur.