In re the Marriage of: Stacey L. Noble vs. Bradford R. Noble

IN RE T HE MARRIAGE OF: ) STACEY L. NOBLE, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) WD87485 ) BRADFORD R. NOBLE, ) Opinion filed: February 24, 2026 ) Respondent. ) AP PEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOONE COUNTY, MISSOURI HONORABLE JEFF HARRIS, JUDGE Before Division One: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Thomas N. Chapman, Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge Stacey L. Noble ("Wife") appeals from the trial court's amended judgment dissolving her marriage to Bradford R. Noble ("Husband"). Wife raises three points on appeal. In Point I, Wife argues the trial court misapplied the law by failing to provide an appropriate remedy after allegedly "independently investigating facts in a matter." Point II argues the trial court erred in using Husband's "normalized income" to determine his ability to pay maintenance. Finally, in Point III Wife broadly challenges the trial court's finding that Husband

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did not have the ability to pay maintenance and subsequent denial of maintenance. We affirm. Factual and Procedural Background 1

Husband and Wife were married in June 2001. Four children were born of the marriage. At the time of trial, the ages of the children were 20, 16, 10, and 6. The parties separated in early November 2019, and Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on November 13, 2019. The parties attempted to reconcile and resumed cohabitation in January 2020. In early January 2021, the parties again separated and Wife moved out of the marital home. On January 4, 2021, the trial court entered a consent ruling establishing a temporary parenting plan and ordering Husband to pay a total of $8,000 per month to Wife in combined temporary child support and maintenance, to be paid until ordered otherwise. The parties shared nearly equal custody of the children from January 2021 to May

The matter was originally set for trial in March 2023. On the first day of trial, the parties announced agreement on all issues and were given 60 days to provide the trial court with a property settlement agreement, parenting plan, and proposed judgment. However, prior to a judgment being signed by the trial court, Wife was involved in a substance-abuse incident at her home while the children were in her custody. As a result, juvenile court cases were filed involving the three

1 "We review all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision." Janet v. Janet, 638 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (citing In re Marriage of Wood, 262 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008)).

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minor children. Husband was subsequently granted sole custody of the children from May 2023 until the time of trial. Wife did not make any child support payments to Husband during this time period. The trial court terminated Husband's temporary maintenance and child support obligation in August 2023. The case then proceeded to trial on March 20-21, 2024. The only issues presented for the trial court to decide were the division of property, maintenance, and attorney fees, as custody of the children was within the purview of the juvenile court. 2 The evidence at trial, as pertinent to this appeal, showed the following: Husband is a pain management physician who has been self-employed since approximately 2006. He is the sole owner of Mid-Missouri Pain Management, LLC, d/b/a Noble Pain Management. Husband also owns 70% of Epic Capital

2 At the time of trial, the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the minor children, including issues of child custody and support. See section 211.031.1 ("[T]he juvenile court or the family court in circuits that have a family court as provided in chapter 487 shall have exclusive original jurisdiction"); section 452.305.1(3) ("The court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage if: . . . To the extent it has jurisdiction, the court has considered and made provision for child custody, the support of each child, the maintenance of either spouse and the disposition of property." (emphasis added)); section 452.310.3 ("Upon the filing of the petition in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, each child shall immediately be subject to the jurisdiction of the court in which the proceeding is commenced, unless a proceeding involving allegations of abuse or neglect of the child is pending in juvenile court."); and section 211.093 (detailing how the juvenile court finalizes custodial matters and child support, and when a court of general jurisdiction ultimately takes authority for matters under chapter 452 (and others) in situations such as we have here); see also In re F.R.D., 481 S.W.3d 32, 35 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (discussing the relationship between chapter 211 and chapter 452 in determining child custody); State ex rel. Dubinsky v. Weinstein, 413 S.W.2d 178, 182-83 (Mo. banc 1967) (discussing the paramount authority of the juvenile court). All statutory references are to RSMo (2016), as supplemented through the date of Wife's dissolution petition, unless otherwise noted.

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Investments, LLC which owns the building in which Husband operates his practice. Wife has primarily been a homemaker and mother throughout the parties' marriage. Wife attended college for a short time, but she did not earn a degree. Prior to the marriage, Wife worked full time at a Missouri Department of Revenue call center for approximately three years. During the early years of the marriage, Wife performed secretarial services at the Ellis Fischel Cancer Center for almost three years. Wife left that position shortly before the couple's first child was born. Throughout the remainder of the marriage, Wife has not worked outside of the home beyond assisting at Husband's medical office. Wife considered various occupations such as a real estate agent or nurse, but she did not ultimately engage in either. The couple experienced financial difficulty throughout the marriage and incurred considerable debt. As a married couple in 2019, Husband's after-tax monthly income was $28,275. The couple's total monthly use of cash, including expenses and debt installment payments was $29,600. Thus, they experienced a negative cash flow of $1,325 per month. The couple's assets consist of the marital home, husband's medical practice, various vehicles, several bank accounts, a small retirement account, Husband's model train collection, and Wife's sizeable collection of jewelry and purses. Meanwhile, the couple's debt broadly consists of two mortgages, vehicle loans, credit card debt, and tax debt.

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At trial, Husband called an expert witness to testify regarding the value of his medical practice and the income that should be attributed to him for maintenance purposes. Husband's expert testified that only Husband's "normalized income" should be used to determine his ability to pay maintenance, rather than all his gross or taxable income, so as not to double count the income, i.e., once as income for maintenance purposes and again in the business's valuation as an asset of the marriage to be properly divided. The expert defined normalized income as the fair market value of the labor Husband provides to the practice. Wife did not call an expert witness. The parties stipulated to the value of the medical practice itself. Additional facts regarding Husband's income will be discussed in context below. The parties stipulated to the majority of issues before trial. There was no dispute about who would receive what property and the debt associated with that property. The trial court was asked to decide the fair market value of various assets, but those determinations are not at issue on appeal. Wife was awarded assets with a net value of $146,852. Husband was awarded assets with a net value of $798,325.90, which included the marital home and Husband's medical practice. During the marriage, the parties incurred various unsecured debt not included in this property division totaling $120,564, all of which was assigned to Husband. Thus, the net marital property awarded to Husband was $677,761.90. Based on these findings, the trial court ordered Husband to pay a property equalization payment to Wife of $265,454.95. Considering the lack of liquidity available to

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Husband as a result of being awarded all debt of the parties, the court ordered Husband to pay monthly installments of no less than $2,750 plus interest. Husband testified that during the parties' separation he was struggling to pay his temporary support obligation to Wife and to do so he took out a personal loan. Husband subsequently took out an additional personal loan in order to assist with the increased costs of caring for the children who were in his custody full time and to cover his attorney fees. These personal loans were not factored into the overall equitable division of property. The trial court next considered Wife's request for maintenance. The court found that Wife had previously worked as a medical secretary, is capable of being employed, and is capable of furthering her education. Thus, the trial court imputed income to Wife at $18 per hour, which equates to $37,440 in annual gross income. Wife did not present evidence to the trial court "as to her anticipated net income from employment." (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court elected to utilize an online calculator to determine Wife's take-home pay after federal and state income taxes. Based on these calculations, the trial court imputed net income to Wife of $30,469.07 annually, or $2,539 monthly. The trial court then found Wife had reasonable monthly needs of $5,100 and that she lacked the ability to meet these needs. Wife does not challenge her reasonable needs as determined by the trial court, nor does she challenge her imputed monthly income. In determining Husband's ability to meet his needs, the trial court relied on Husband's cash flow analysis, which Wife did not challenge. The trial court agreed

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with Husband's expert that only "normalized income" should be considered in determining Husband's ability to pay maintenance. Using Husband's normalized income, the trial court noted Husband had a monthly cash flow deficit of $318.70 prior to considering any expenses for the children, all of whom were in his care. The trial court further found that, even when considering all income available to Husband, he has a negative monthly cash flow of $430.74 after factoring in all expenses, including those for the children in his care. This deficit does not consider the property equalization payment Husband owes to Wife. Accordingly, the trial court found Husband "does not have the present ability to even pay a nominal modifiable maintenance award, given [Husband's] negative monthly cash flow[.]" The trial court thus awarded no maintenance to Wife and made that order non- modifiable. Further, no child support order was made from Wife to Husband, nor do we have record of the juvenile court rendering an order of child support to be paid by Wife to Husband. Wife subsequently filed her first motion to vacate, reopen evidence, correct, amend, or modify judgment ("Wife's First Motion"). Wife's First Motion raised several arguments. As relevant here, Wife argued the trial court misapplied the law in utilizing Husband's normalized income in its maintenance analysis. Wife further asserted that once the trial court found Wife could not meet her reasonable monthly needs, it was required to award maintenance in some amount. Finally, Wife argued there is no evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding regarding Wife's hypothetical take home pay. She explained that "[t]hough well

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intentioned, the [c]ourt's use of an on-line calculator to impute net income to [Wife] abandons the appearance of impartiality. It is axiomatic that a trial judge cannot introduce evidence." Wife's First Motion did not seek any specific relief in regard to this claim of error. At the hearing on Wife's First Motion the trial court stated it did not believe any impropriety was involved but asked Wife's counsel if he "would be seeking as a possible relief just the deletion of that verbiage?" Wife's counsel responded, "That's right." The trial court then filed an amended judgment. The amended judgment omitted the reference to an online calculator and the resulting finding regarding Wife's after-tax imputed income. The amended judgment is identical to the original judgment in all other respects. Shortly thereafter, Wife filed another motion to vacate, reopen evidence, correct, amend, or modify amended judgment ("Wife's Second Motion"). Wife reiterated the arguments surrounding maintenance made in her First Motion. Wife then alleged, "Merely deleting the paragraph containing evidence previously obtained and considered by the [trial] court and thereafter entering the same judgment verbatim does nothing to rectify the appearance of impropriety in the first instance." To remedy the alleged impropriety, Wife requested recusal. The trial court denied Wife's Second Motion. This appeal follows. Rule 84.04 3 Briefing Deficiencies

3 All rule references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024).

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We begin by addressing Wife's briefing deficiencies as they permeate each point of her appellate brief. "Rule 84.04 plainly sets forth the required contents of briefs filed in all appellate courts." Bazuaye v. Bazuaye, 722 S.W.3d 657, 661 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Lexow v. Boeing, 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022)). "Compliance with the briefing requirements of Rule 84.04 is mandatory to ensure that the appellate court does not become an advocate by speculating on facts and arguments that have not been made." Carter v. Carter, 721 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Acton v. Rahn, 611 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). "An appellant's failure to substantially comply with Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for our review and constitutes grounds for dismissal of the appeal." Bazuaye, 722 S.W.3d at 661-62 (quoting Marvin v. Kensinger, 682 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). Each point violates Rule 84.04(d)(1)(C) when Wife attempts to explain why various trial court actions misapplied the law. 4 For instance, Point II spans the length of an entire page and provides eight subpoints for consideration. Thus, the points are not concise and each point fails to explain, in summary fashion, the legal reasons for reversal. See Rule 84.04(d)(1). In Points II and III, several of

4 Rule 84.04(d)(1) requires an appellant's point relied on to "(A) Identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) State concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and (C) Explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error."

Moreover, "Rule 84.04(d) also requires separate points to challenge separate rulings or actions." Lexow, 643 S.W.3d at 505-06. Alleging multiple claims of error in a single point results in a multifarious point relied on. "Multifarious points relied on are noncompliant with Rule 84.04(d) and preserve nothing for review." Id. at 506 (quoting Macke v. Patton, 591 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo. banc 2019)).

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these subpoints raise separate claims of error such that the points are multifarious. However, because we find Wife's argument in these points sufficiently understandable, we address the merits below. See Malin v. Cole Cnty. Prosecuting Att'y, 631 S.W.3d 638, 644 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) ("[W]e exercise our discretion to attempt to review the point on the merits ex gratia because his argument is sufficiently understandable to put the court and his opponent on notice[.]"). Point I, however, we address and deny separately. Point I Point I in its entirety, reads as follows: The trial court erred in denying [Wife's] Second Motion for New Trial at Paragraph 17(f) because the court misapplied the law, in that: A. Neither party favored the trial court with evidence of [Wife's] anticipated net income from possible future employment; B. The Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2-2.9(C) prohibits a judge from independently investigating facts in a matter; C. The amended judgment ignored the [trial court's] prior performance of independent research to reach a factual conclusion; D. Merely deleting the paragraph containing the evidence previously obtained and thereafter entering the same [j]udgment verbatim does nothing to rectify the appearance of impropriety in the first instance; and E. [Wife's] second motion for new trial challenged the [trial court's] impartiality based on [its] independent investigation of facts that were in dispute in the proceeding which supported recusal from further proceedings as an appropriate remedy. 5

5 Wife's point relied on as restated in the argument section of her brief varies from that provided in the point relied on section, which is quoted above. In her argument Wife adds an additional subpoint to her point relied on and amended one of her original subpoints. The two altered subpoints state:

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Point I is convoluted and contains various abstract statements of law that do not clearly explain the legal reasons behind the trial court's alleged error. As best we understand Point I, and as Husband understood Point I in responding to it, Wife's claim is that the trial court misapplied the law in denying Wife's second motion for new trial because striking a paragraph from the judgment is an insufficient remedy for a violation of Rule 2-2.9(C). 6

The argument section of an appellant's brief must "explain why, in the context of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error. It should advise

B. The trial court went outside of the record and performed independent research to determine Wife's reasonable needs were $5,100 per month; C. Rule 2.03, Canon 3B(7) prohibits a judge from independently investigating facts in a matter; Notably these two different versions provide two different legal citations. Wife first directs us to "The Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2-2.9(C)," then in her argument directs us to "Rule 2.03, Canon 3B(7)." The Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024) do not contain a Rule 2.03. Simply put, there has not been a "Rule 2.03" since the Missouri Supreme Court Rules were amended in 2006. Presumably, Wife intended to direct this Court and Husband to Rule 2-2.9(C) in both instances. 6 Notably, Wife arguably accepted the remedy of which she now complains. As discussed in the "Post-Judgment Proceedings" section, at the hearing on Wife's First Motion, Wife agreed with the trial court that striking the reference to an extrajudicial resource was sufficient to cure the trial court's alleged violation of Rule 2-2.9(C). Then, in Wife's Second Motion, Wife claimed that the striking remedy was insufficient to remedy the trial court's violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Wife asked the trial court to abandon its judgment and recuse itself from the matter. In denying Wife's second motion for new trial, the trial court declined to do so. Wife now asks this Court to determine that the trial court should have provided a remedy she did not request until her second motion for a new trial instead of the remedy she agreed to in her first motion for a new trial. We need not reach whether Wife's original acceptance of the remedy constituted a waiver of the right to complain of the same conduct and seek a different remedy. However, we find it noteworthy that Wife failed to direct us to any supporting legal authority to resolve the conflict between the appropriate remedies for judicial violations of Rule 2-2.9(C).

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the appellate court how principles of law and the facts of the case interact." Marvin, 682 S.W.3d at 798 (quoting Fritz v. Fritz, 243 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007)). "A point is considered abandoned when appellant fails to include relevant authorities or explain the lack thereof." Phox v. Boes, 702 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citing Auman v. Richard, 672 S.W.3d 277, 283 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). First, Rule 84.04(d)(5) requires that "[i]mmediately following each 'Point Relied On,' the appellant . . . shall include a list of cases, not to exceed four, and the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions or other authority upon which that party principally relies." In support of Point I, Wife lists only Rule 2-2.9(C). Wife does not direct us to a single case that supports her allegation of error. It is not evident the trial court violated Rule 2-2.9(C). Thus, Wife's failure to direct us to additional authority violates Rule 84.04(d)(5). Second, the argument section of Wife's brief does not provide additional meaningful support. In her argument, Wife directs us to a single case to support her claim of error: In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). In Murchison, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed "whether a contempt proceeding conducted in accordance with [certain] standards complies with the due process requirement of an impartial tribunal where the same judge presiding at the contempt hearing had also served as the 'one-man grand jury' out of which the contempt charges arose." Id. at 134. There, the trial court had "an interest in the outcome" because the judge acted "as a grand jury and then [tried] the very persons accused as a result of his

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investigations." Id. at 136-37. Murchison contemplates principals of due process that arise out of one's right to a fair trial. We fail to see a connection between the considerations in Murchison's criminal "one-man grand jury" argument and Wife's argument regarding Point I. The attenuated (at best) relationship between the two is further evidenced by Wife's failure to use the phrase "due process" anywhere in her brief. Further, Wife does not tie together the facts of her case with Murchison. We are not persuaded by Murchison because Wife failed to demonstrate its applicability to her case. As such, Wife only directs us to the Code of Judicial Conduct to support her claim of reversible error. Wife makes assertions such as: "When it comes to judicial neutrality, the route taken matters" and "because deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges, jurists must avoid even the appearance of advocacy." Yet, neither of those statements are accompanied by supporting legal authority of any kind. "[A]n appellant is required to provide relevant and available legal authority in the argument or explain why such authority is not available." WCT & D, LLC v. City of Kan. City, 476 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Moseley v. Grundy Cnty. Dist. R-V Sch., 319 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010)). "Without more, this Court cannot provide meaningful appellate review." Green v. Lebanon R-III Sch. Dist., 13 S.W.3d 278, 285 (Mo. banc 2000) (citation omitted). Addressing the merits of Point I would require us to re-construe her point

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relied on and locate legal authority to support her arguments, becoming Wife's advocate. This, we cannot do. See R.M. v. King, 671 S.W.3d 394, 400 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) ("In other words, we would have to act as [the appellant's] advocate, which we cannot do."). Accordingly, Point I is denied. 7

Points II and III In Points II and III Wife broadly challenges the trial court's failure to award maintenance. In Point II, Wife argues the trial court erred in utilizing Husband's "normalized income" to determine his ability to pay maintenance. In Point III, Wife alleges the trial court erred in finding Husband did not have the ability to pay maintenance. As these points are interrelated, we discuss them together for ease of analysis.

7 Ex gratia, we note that Wife appears to argue the trial court violated Rule 2- 2.9(C) by using online calculators to determine the net income of someone in Missouri earning a gross wage of $18 per hour for full-time work. We disagree. Rule 2-2.9(C) provides, "A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that properly may be judicially noticed." Here, the trial court relied on the record to determine that Wife was capable of earning $18 per hour. The online calculators were used to determine, at that rate of pay, how much Wife would "take home" after federal and state taxes were considered. Said another way, the trial court merely used an online calculator to do what he could have done by hand, had he taken judicial notice of the federal and state income tax rates. "In Missouri, judicial notice may be taken of a fact which is common knowledge of people of ordinary intelligence, and it may be taken of a fact, not commonly known, but which can be reliably determined by resort to a readily available, accurate and credible source." Whitmoor Realty, LLC v. Beckerle as Tr. of Delora A. Beckerle Living Tr. dated June 10, 1999, 588 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (quoting State v. Weber, 814 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991)). The federal and state income tax rates may be reliably determined. As such, the trial court did not rely on any extrajudicial information other than that which "properly may be judicially noticed." Therefore, Rule 2-2.9(C) was not violated.

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Standard of Review "As with any court-tried case, our review of a dissolution of marriage action is guided by the standards set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)." L.R.S. v. C.A.S., 525 S.W.3d 172, 183 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (citing Alabach v. Alabach, 478 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)). "Accordingly, the dissolution judgment will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law." Id. (citation omitted). "We do not retry the case, rather we accept as true the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and disregard contradictory evidence." Janet v. Janet, 638 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting McCallum v. McCallum, 128 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003)). "We defer to the trial court's factual findings, giving due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Richardson v. Richardson, 564 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting Blue Ridge Bank & Tr. Co. v. Trosen, 309 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)). "A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to award maintenance." Martin v. Martin, 483 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (quoting Alberty v. Alberty, 260 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008)). "We reverse only upon finding an abuse of discretion." McVean v. McVean, 719 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (citation omitted). "The trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and

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is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Id. (citing Dickerson v. Dickerson, 580 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). "[O]ur primary concern is the correctness of the trial court result, not the route taken to reach it." Sparks v. Sparks, 417 S.W.3d 269, 280 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "Therefore, we are obliged to affirm if we determine that the trial court reached the correct result, regardless of whether the trial court's proffered reasons are wrong or insufficient." L.R.S., 525 S.W.3d at 183 (quoting O'Gorman & Sandroni, P.C. v. Dodson, 478 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)). " The trial court's judgment is presumed to be valid and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the trial court's judgment is incorrect." Dubrovenskiy v. Vakula, 621 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citation omitted). Analysis "A maintenance award is aimed at closing the gap between the income of the spouse seeking maintenance and that spouse's monthly expenses." McVean, 719 S.W.3d at 904 (quoting In re Marriage of Neu, 167 S.W.3d 791, 795 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025)). Awarding maintenance under section 452.335 is a two-step process. First, the trial court evaluates a spouse's need for maintenance. "The trial court may award maintenance only if it first finds the party seeking it lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to them, to provide for their reasonable needs, and is unable to support themselves through appropriate

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employment." McVean, 719 S.W.3d at 904 (citing section 452.335.1 and D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 103 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)). "Thus, the court must determine the spouse's reasonable needs and that she cannot meet them through use of property or appropriate employment." Maxwell v. Maxwell, 235 S.W.3d 81, 83 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (footnote and citation omitted). "The party seeking the award of maintenance has the burden to establish this threshold requirement." Bitters v. Olive, 691 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). Second, if the spouse meets their initial burden, the trial court turns to the amount of maintenance. Id. In determining the amount of maintenance to be awarded, the trial court must consider the factors enumerated in section 452.335.2. 8 Id. One such factor is the paying spouse's ability to pay. Section 452.335.2(8). "If and when both steps are satisfied, maintenance can be awarded

8 The statutorily enumerated factors are: (1) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian; (2) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; (3) The comparative earning capacity of each spouse; (4) The standard of living established during the marriage; (5) The obligations and assets, including the marital property apportioned to him and the separate property of each party; (6) The duration of the marriage; (7) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; (8) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; (9) The conduct of the parties during the marriage; and (10) Any other relevant factors. Section 452.335.2.

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'in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just.'" Maxwell, 235 S.W.3d at 83 (quoting Section 452.335.2) (additional citation omitted). "In determining the amount of the maintenance award, the trial court should also balance the reasonable needs of the spouse seeking maintenance with the paying spouse's ability to pay." L.R.S., 525 S.W.3d at 188 (citation omitted). "An award of maintenance should not exceed [Husband's] capacity to provide." Barth v. Barth, 372 S.W.3d 496, 508 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (quoting Squires v. Squires, 734 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987)). The first step of the maintenance analysis is not at issue in this case. The trial court expressly found that Wife "lacks the ability to meet her reasonable monthly needs." Neither party challenged that finding. Thus, the court proceeded to the second step of the maintenance analysis and considered the factors laid out in section 452.335.2 to determine the amount and duration of the potential award. In doing so, the court heard testimony regarding Husband's income. Husband's expert testified that, when assessing the income Husband derives from his medical practice, it is "necessary to separate the practice's income into two streams[.]" The first stream represents Husband's return on labor, which Husband refers to as his "normalized income." Husband's expert defines normalized income as the fair market value of the services he provides to the medical practice, or what the practice would have to pay a third-party physician to perform the same services. In this case, Husband's normalized income was

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determined to be $425,000. 9 The second stream represents the medical practice's return on investment, which is anything over and above Husband's normalized income. Husband's expert explained, "That return on investment is what determines the value of the company which goes on the parties' marital balance sheet for the appropriate asset division." In other words, in determining the value of his medical practice, Husband deducted his normalized income of $425,000 which is the amount for which he could hire a third-party physician to do the same work. The remaining income over $425,000 from the medical practice was used in determining the value of the practice. The parties stipulated at trial that the value of the medical practice itself was $487,000. 10

What the parties dispute, however, is the income available to Husband for the purposes of maintenance. Wife argues the trial court should have considered Husband's actual earnings from all sources as shown on his tax returns, which in 2023 was approximately $612,553. Alternatively, Husband argues only his normalized income of $425,000 should be used to determine his ability to pay maintenance. Husband asserts that using normalized income avoids "double dipping," or awarding Wife "the same dollar twice—once in the property division and again in a maintenance award." His expert explained the concept as follows: If you do not normalize the practice's income with respect to labor, you're going to capture all of the company's earnings in the value of

9 Wife has not challenged the numerical value of Husband's normalized income. Indeed, though Wife's expert was not called at trial, testimony from Husband's expert was had that he adopted Wife's expert's normalized income for Husband of $425,000. 10 As it is not at issue in this appeal, we express no opinion on the propriety of the business valuation method discussed above.

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the company. That is the asset that is divided in the marital estate. So if that were the case, the value of the practice would be substantially higher and [Husband] would be paying out in the property division every dollar of income that the practice earns. . . . [A]nd then he'd turn right around and have to pay maintenance at whatever percentage the Court determines is appropriate off the same income. That same dollar is being paid out twice. The trial court agreed with the concept and Husband's expert's analysis and found that only Husband's normalized income should be used to determine his ability to pay maintenance. Thus, the legal question Wife presents in Point II is which income value should be used to determine Husband's ability to pay maintenance—normalized income or income from all sources as shown on his tax returns. 11 Wife frames this question as a matter of first impression for our state. It is unnecessary for us to resolve this debate because our resolution of the case is the same regardless of which income figure the trial court utilized for Husband. Using either Husband's normalized income or his income from all sources as shown on his tax returns Husband does not have the ability to pay Wife maintenance. The trial court conducted a thorough review of the parties' financial circumstances. Husband and Wife had accumulated substantial marital debt. The trial court first noted that even when living as a married couple, the parties had a negative cash flow of $1,325 per month in 2019. After analyzing Husband's financials using his normalized income, the trial court then found that, Even when factoring in all income available to [Husband] from both

11 We again stress that both the dollar amount of Husband's normalized income and his income from all sources is not disputed.

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streams of income from his business, his net monthly income . . . is $32,629.42 per month. When considering all expenses, including those of the children,[ 12 ] he has a negative cash flow of --$430.74 per month. And, this cash flow deficit does not take into consideration the property equalization payment that [Husband] must pay [Wife]. Thus, whether utilizing normalized income or income from all sources, the trial court found Husband has a negative cash flow, i.e. he is unable to meet his reasonable needs and the needs of Wife. See section 452.335.2. The trial court further found that, "The majority of [Husband's] expenses . . . include debt and loan payments that are allocated and set aside by this [c]ourt to [Husband] as his obligations, not including his own personal daily living expenses." We recognize that "[t]he responsibility for all or almost all the marital debt does not preclude the court from awarding maintenance to Wife." Russum v. Russum, 214 S.W.3d 376, 382 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 839 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992)). However, that does not change that Husband must have the capacity to pay any maintenance awarded. The court derived Husband's financial capacity from his cash flow analysis. Wife does not challenge Husband's cash flow analysis on appeal, nor did she object to the analysis or any particular expense thereon at trial. "Moreover, Wife 'cites us to nothing in the record to cast doubt upon the validity of the expenses' identified on Husband's [cash flow analysis]." Barth, 372 S.W.3d at 508 (quoting Handy v.

12 We note that at the time of trial, Husband had full custody of the children and was providing for all of their expenses. Wife does not challenge the trial court's consideration of the children's expenses when determining Husband's ability to pay maintenance. Thus, we express no opinion on the matter.

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Handy, 338 S.W.3d 852, 859 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). The trial court did not err in relying on Husband's unchallenged cash flow analysis to determine that, regardless of whether his normalized income or his income from all sources as shown on his tax returns was assigned to Husband, he has a negative monthly cash flow and thus no ability to pay maintenance. See Handy, 338 S.W.3d at 859 ("Such [documents] can serve as substantial evidence to support a finding of reasonable needs or expenses." (quoting Cohen v. Cohen, 73 S.W.3d 39, 50 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002))). Wife argues the trial court's finding regarding Husband's income from all sources is "in gratia and not necessary to the determination of this appeal." The court prefaced its finding discussing Husband's ability to pay when considering income from all sources with the words "although not necessary for the [c]ourt's finding that maintenance is not appropriate." However, even if the trial court had not considered the entirety of Husband's income, we would affirm on the same basis that we do today. Our concern on appeal is "whether the trial court reached the proper result, not the route taken to reach that result." Sparks, 417 S.W.3d at 295 (citation omitted). "We affirm if the result was correct on any rational basis." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we deny Wife's claim in Point II that the trial court misapplied the law in utilizing Husband's normalized income to determine his ability to pay maintenance because, regardless of which income stream we consider, Husband does not have the ability to pay. Turning to Point III, we understand Wife's argument to be that because the

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trial court found she was unable to meet her reasonable monthly needs, the court was under an obligation to award her maintenance in some amount. 13 In other words, she argues that once a spouse meets their burden to establish need under the first step of the maintenance analysis, the court has no discretion to deny maintenance and must grant maintenance in some amount. To hold otherwise, she asserts, elevates the paying spouse's ability to meet their needs over the needs of the spouse seeking maintenance. We disagree. First, we reiterate, as Wife points out, that in evaluating the factors in section 452.335.2, the trial court must balance "the reasonable needs of the spouse seeking maintenance with the other spouse's ability to pay." Bitters, 691 S.W.3d at 12 (quoting Dowell v. Dowell, 203 S.W.3d 271, 285 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006)). And "the statute gives the trial court broad discretion in applying these factors." McVean, 719 S.W.3d at 904 (citation omitted). Importantly, "[a]n award of maintenance should not exceed [Husband's] capacity to provide." Barth, 372 S.W.3d at 508 (quoting Squires, 734 S.W.2d at 614); see also Handy, 338 S.W.3d at 859 (stating same). Even if a spouse demonstrates their need for maintenance, a court may deny maintenance if the paying spouse does not have the ability to contribute to their support. For example, in Owens v. Owens, the wife argued the trial court erred in

13 As discussed above, Wife's Point III violates Rule 84.04 in that it is multifarious. Point III raises multiple arguments including that (1) Husband's needs are being elevated over Wife's, (2) maintenance is mandatory in this case, and (3) normalized income is again inappropriate.

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denying her maintenance. 219 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007). On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court denial "on the basis that Husband is without ability to pay a maintenance award." Id. at 871. Both spouses in Owens experienced a shortfall, thus "the trial court did not err in denying maintenance, because even if Wife were unable to meet her reasonable needs, Husband would not have the resources to pay a maintenance award." Id. at 872; see also Sheerin v. Sheerin, 475 S.W.3d 704, 707 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) ("[T]he trial court expressly acknowledged that its award left [husband] at a deficit of $500 per month. Thus, the award is clearly beyond his means."); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 707 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025) ("If there is a gap between the 'reasonable needs' of the spouse and the resources and potential earnings of that spouse, and the other spouse has the ability to pay maintenance, maintenance should be awarded." (emphasis added) (quoting Hammer v. Hammer, 139 S.W.3d 239, 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004))). Further, "[w]e have long observed that a party seeking maintenance generally need not deplete or consume marital assets awarded to the party to establish a right to receive maintenance." Barth, 372 S.W.3d at 508 (citing Hall v. Hall, 336 S.W.3d 188, 200 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). "Similarly, in determining the ability to pay, a party obligated to pay maintenance may not be required, except in extraordinary circumstances, to deplete or consume marital assets awarded to the party." Id. (citation omitted). Barth further held that a trial court should not "order or presume the borrowing of funds in determining Husband's ability to pay

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maintenance[.]" Id. at 508-09. Here, Husband met his temporary support obligation to Wife by not paying other bills as they became due and ultimately by taking out a personal loan. The only way Husband could generate enough cash flow to fulfill a maintenance obligation in this case is to deplete marital assets awarded to him, default on existing loans, or incur new loans. We will not require Husband to do so. Wife directs us to two cases in support of her argument that maintenance is mandatory once a spouse demonstrates her need for maintenance. Neither is persuasive. First, Wife relies on Barton v. Barton, where a trial court's denial of maintenance was reversed. 157 S.W.3d 762, 768 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005). Barton presented a very different factual scenario than the case at hand. There, the wife was disabled and could not work such that she was receiving Supplemental Security Income benefits. Id. at 764. There was nothing in the record to demonstrate that the wife was able to meet her reasonable needs, yet the trial court failed to recognize her eligibility for maintenance, the first step of section 452.335. Id. at 766-67. That failure was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 767. The trial court in Barton appeared to consider the statutorily enumerated factors in section 452.335.2 (i.e., the second step) without first considering the wife's eligibility for maintenance. However, "[t]he factors in [section] 452.335.2, one of which is the spouse's ability to pay, are only to be considered after the court finds that the threshold test is satisfied and allows an award of maintenance." Id. (quoting Wallace, 839 S.W.2d at 357). Further, the record contained no facts to support a

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finding that husband could not meet his needs while also contributing to wife's needs. Id. And, the trial court improperly credited the child support payments wife was receiving as income available for her support. Id. at 768. Ultimately, "the trial court failed to employ the enumerated factors in [s]ection 452.335.2 in the context of [w]ife's entitlement to maintenance." Id. Here, however, the trial court expressly found that Wife could not meet her needs before it proceeded with its analysis under section 452.335.2. Wife is not disabled; she is healthy and capable of being employed. And, as discussed in Point II, there are sufficient facts in the record to support a finding that Husband does not have the ability to pay maintenance. Second, Wife relies on Breihan v. Breihan, 73 S.W.3d 771 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002). We fail to see how Breihan is applicable here. The only issues discussed in Breihan were the imputation of employment income and investment income to the wife, and the allocation of attorney fees. Id. at 777. Wife does not challenge any of the above in her points on appeal. Breihan is also factually distinguishable in that "there was substantial evidence that [h]usband was capable of paying maintenance." Id. at 776. Finally, Wife makes a textual argument based on the plain language of the statute. She argues, "use of the mandatory word 'shall' in [section] 452.335.2 imposes a duty on the [c]ourt to award maintenance in some amount." 14 We

14 Section 452.335.2 provides in relevant part, "The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just, and after considering all relevant factors . . . ." (emphasis added).

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certainly do not dispute the general rule that the word "shall" in statutes is mandatory. State ex rel. Robison v. Lindley-Myers, 551 S.W.3d 468, 474 n.4 (Mo. banc 2018) (citation omitted). However, statutes must "be read in pari materia with related sections[ ] and . . . construed in context with each other." Id. (quoting Street v. Dir. of Revenue, 361 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Mo. banc 2012)). The maintenance statute begins by providing that, "the court may grant a maintenance order to either spouse, but only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance . . . ." Section 452.335.1 (emphasis added). The word "may" denotes permissive language. Lindley-Myers, 551 S.W.3d at 474 n.4. In light of the case law previously discussed, it is not necessary to explore Wife's textual argument further. Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding maintenance. Martin, 483 S.W.3d at 458 (citation omitted). In context, a court may do so if the maintenance seeking spouse demonstrates that they cannot meet their reasonable needs. Section 452.335.1; McVean, 719 S.W.3d at 904. The trial court then must apply the statutory factors to award maintenance as it deems just. Section 452.335.2; McVean, 719 S.W.3d at

1. The trial court did so here. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Wife maintenance on the basis that Husband did not have the ability to pay. Point III is denied. 15

15 At the conclusion of Wife's Point III argument, in two sentences Wife asserts that denying maintenance outright was improper because it leaves nothing for the court to modify in the future should circumstances change. She argues that instead, the court should have awarded nominal support. However, Wife's third point relied on makes no mention of modifiable or nominal maintenance. "Our courts 'adhere[ ] to the well- entrenched doctrine that the questions for decision on appeal are those stated in the points relied on, and a question not there presented will be considered abandoned." KDW

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Conclusion For the above and foregoing reasons, the amended judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ______________________________ W. DOUGLAS THOMSON, JUDGE All concur.

Staffing, LLC v. Grove Constr., LLC, 584 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Further, when nominal maintenance is discussed in the argument of Point III, Wife cites two cases that in no way discuss if maintenance should be modifiable or when nominal maintenance is appropriate. See Barton, 157 S.W.3d 762; Orange v. White, 502 S.W.3d 773 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). Wife's reference "does not explain the relevance of the holding in [those cases] to the argument in this case, nor [are the cases] cited as standing for a particular rule of law." Finnical v. Finnical, 81 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002). Wife has failed to explain how the authority to which she directs us relates to this case. "Under Rule 84.04, we are not required to review a claim on appeal if it appears without citation of applicable or relevant authority." Id. (citation omitted). For these reasons, to the extent Wife challenges the trial court's ruling that maintenance is non-modifiable, we decline to review it.