State of Missouri ex rel Andrew Bailey, Missouri Attorney General vs. Ronnie Pope

STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL ) ANDREW BAILEY, MISSOURI ) ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) ) Respondent, ) WD87652 ) V. ) OPINION FILED: ) JANUARY 27, 2026 RONNIE POPE, ) ) Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri The Honorable Christopher K. Limbaugh, Judge

Before Division One: Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge, Gary D. Witt, Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge

Ronnie Pope appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri ("trial court"), finding in favor of the State of Missouri and against Pope on the State's claim for reimbursement under the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act ("MIRA"), sections 217.825-217.841. 1 On appeal, Pope argues that the trial court erred in applying Section 217.825 to Pope's assets because MIRA is pre-empted by 42 U.S.C. section 1983. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016) as currently updated by supplement unless otherwise noted. Sections 217.825-217.841 were repealed effective August 28, 2025.

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Factual and Procedural Background Pope was a pre-trial detainee in the City of St. Louis Jail ("City Jail") in May of

1. During his incarceration, Pope alleged he was assaulted and injured by a

corrections officer at the City Jail. After filing a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, 2 Pope's case was settled in September of 2023 for $20,000. Upon settlement, $8000 was paid to Pope's attorney; the remaining $12,000 was deposited into Pope's inmate account at the Department of Corrections in December of 2023. On January 9, 2024, the Missouri Attorney General filed a petition for reimbursement pursuant to MIRA. 3 On motion by the State, the trial court ordered the transfer of 90% of the remaining funds 4 in Pope's account ($11,351.79) to be held in escrow pending the outcome of the MIRA claim. Pending resolution, the trial court ordered an appeal bond and a receiver at the Department of Corrections to escrow the funds. In his Answer and accompanying correspondence, Pope, acting pro se, asserted that he received the money from "a settlement from the state." On June 10, 2024, Pope filed a pro se "Motion to Stay Proceedings and Motion to Withdraw[] Income Withholding Order Due to Fraud/Misrepresentation." In his motion

2 Although the trial court references Pope's section 1983 claim in its judgment, the federal lawsuit is not included in the record on appeal. 3 On October, 20, 2021, after his conviction for two felonies, Pope was transferred from the City Jail to the Missouri Department of Corrections. It is for Pope's State confinement that the State sought reimbursement. 4 The version of Section 217.833.1 in effect at the time authorized the seizure of up to 90% of the inmate's assets from "any other source whatsoever" (section 217.827(a)) to defray the State's expenses for incarcerating that inmate.

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Pope argued that permitting the State "[t]o take [the damages award] from Mr. Pope is doing nothing but impeeding [sic] upon his constitutional violations as a prisoner one more time" and that it is "unlawful" and "unconstitutional" to take his award of damages from him. The trial court did not rule on Pope's motion prior to trial. The case was tried on June 18, 2024. Because he remained incarcerated, Pope was not present for trial nor was he represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Before judgment was entered, Pope retained counsel. Pope's counsel entered her appearance on July 15, 2024, and raised two arguments in a post-trial motion. First, Pope argued that the State should be limited to a maximum of 90% of the assets held in escrow. Second, Pope argued that the assets were proceeds from a federal section 1983 lawsuit against the City of St. Louis, and, therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, MIRA was pre-empted by federal law. On August 26, 2024, after a hearing on Pope's post-trial motions, 5 the trial court entered judgment for the State and, exercising its discretion, awarded the State one-half of the escrowed funds ($5,108.31). 6 On October 15, 2024, after Pope moved for an order instructing the receiver to return escrowed funds in excess of the supersedeas bond to Pope, the trial court entered a modified Order that the receiver return the excess funds (the remaining $5,108.31) to Pope's inmate account.

5 The record does not include a transcript of the hearing; we rely on the written Judgment entered by the trial court on August 26, 2024, to establish the sequence of events at that hearing. 6 While the statute provides for the seizure of up to 90% of an inmate's assets, the trial court ordered the seizure of 50% of those assets. The State does not appeal that portion of the judgment and we do not address it further.

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Pope appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 81.08 7 , arguing that MIRA, as applied to Pope's case, violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because it is pre-empted by 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 8 On November 19, 2024, the Missouri Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. Standard of Review This Court must affirm the trial court's judgment in a court-tried case unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). Allegations that the trial court erroneously declared or applied the law are reviewed de novo. Sender v. City of St. Louis, 681 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Mo. banc 2024). Specifically, constitutional challenges to a statute are issues of law to be reviewed de novo, and Pope "bears the burden of proving the statute clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitution" as applied. See State v. Young, 362 S.W.3d 386, 390 (Mo. banc 2012); see generally State ex rel. Nixon v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77 (Mo. banc 2008) (analyzing a Constitutional challenge to MIRA). We presume a statute is valid "unless it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision." City of St. Louis v. State, 682 S.W.3d 387, 396 (Mo. banc 2024) (citation modified). Further, we "will attempt to avoid an interpretation of the Constitution that will limit or cripple legislative enactments any further than what was necessary by the absolute requirements of the law." Id.

7 Unless otherwise indicated, rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024), the version applicable to Pope's trial, post-trial motions, and judgment. 8 42 U.S.C. section 1983 provides a legal remedy when a person acting under the authority of state law violates a plaintiff's federally protected rights.

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Analysis

Before we reach the merits of Pope's claim, we must address the issue of whether Pope's claimed errors are preserved for our review. The State argues that Pope's brief is procedurally barred, and thus can be reviewed only for plain error, because: 1) it violates Rule 84.04 in that it does not include a preservation statement; 2) Pope failed to raise his constitutional claims at the earliest opportunity, failed to specifically designate which constitutional provision was violated, and failed to state the facts showing the violation; and 3) the evidence was insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Pope acknowledges, in his Reply brief, that he failed to comply with Rule 84.04 in that he did not include a preservation statement in his initial brief. Because we can readily discern Pope's arguments, we exercise our discretion to decide Pope's appeal on the merits insofar as compliance with Rule 84.04 is concerned. City of St. Louis, 682 S.W.3d at 397 n.7. We now turn to the timing of Pope's constitutional challenge and whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. "Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys." State v. Chambers, 481 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.4 (Mo. banc 2016) (citation modified) (holding that a defendant representing himself pro se "does not affect our standard of review of his unpreserved claim of error"). Moreover, "appellate courts are merely courts of review for trial errors, and there can be no review of a matter which has not been presented to or expressly decided by the trial court." State v. Williams, 688 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation modified).

6

Pope's Answer, filed pro se on February 20, 2024, alleged the money in his inmate account was derived from "a settlement from the state." In a letter to the court also filed on February 20, 2024, Pope noted that the basis for the settlement was from a lawsuit he filed, through counsel, alleging an assault from a City Jail corrections officer. Pope also submitted a copy of the release he signed, which stated that he was releasing the City of St. Louis from "all claims for alleged injuries" associated with his pre-trial detention. The release also referenced a federal case number. In Pope's pro se "Motion to Stay Proceedings and Motion to Withdraw [] Income Withholding Order Due to Fraud/Misrepresentation," Pope argued that permitting the State to take his damages award from him was another "constitutional violation" and that it was "unlawful" and "unconstitutional" to take his award of damages from him. None of Pope's pre-trial filings identified a specific constitutional provision that was violated. During the trial the court inquired of State's counsel as to whether the source of Pope's funds was from "a 1983 action." State's counsel responded that she didn't know because she "didn't see anything on Case.net." 9 Thus, not until Pope retained counsel for the current action, on July 15, 2024, and counsel submitted a post- trial Memorandum in Support of Judgment for the Defendant, was the specific constitutional violation officially raised. Ultimately, before entering judgment, the trial

9 Pope's section 1983 claim was filed in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, so it would not have appeared on the State of Missouri Case.net service. While Pope's federal case pleadings were not included in the exhibits presented at trial or in the record on appeal, the State's Reply Brief notes that the case was "readily ascertainable from the public docket and cannot be reasonably disputed."

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court had an opportunity to review all the filings from both parties before it heard argument on the post-trial motions on July 30, 2024. And the trial court's August 26, 2024 judgment does reference Pope's underlying claim as a "federal 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983 lawsuit against the City of St. Louis." Accordingly, against that background, we believe the constitutional issue was adequately presented to the trial court prior to the entry of judgment, the trial court addressed the issue, and the issue is preserved for appellate review. We will therefore review the merits of Pope's claim. The crux of Pope's claim is that MIRA is pre-empted by federal law and thus, the State should be foreclosed from recovering any of the assets Pope obtained from his civil rights settlement. Neither this Court nor the Missouri Supreme Court has had occasion to rule on the intersection between MIRA and section 1983 protections and the extent to which section 1983 pre-empts MIRA under the Supremacy Clause. Both Pope and the State encourage us to apply the holding in Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1992). 10 In Hankins, an inmate recovered a judgment against a Missouri prison employee under section 1983. Id. at 854. The State then indemnified the employee and paid the judgment into the inmate's prison account. Id. Immediately thereafter, the State sought to recoup the same judgment proceeds through MIRA. Id. The Hankins court held that section 1983 pre-empted MIRA to the extent MIRA would permit the State to "recoup

10 Both parties briefed extensively regarding the application of a 2004 unpublished per curiam order from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and upon which the trial court partially relied in its judgment. However, unpublished per curiam orders are not precedential and "[u]npublished opinions issued before January 1, 2007, generally should not be cited." Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 8th Cir. R. 32.1A.

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the very monies it has paid to satisfy a section 1983 judgment against one of its employees." Id. at 861 (explicitly limiting its holding to the facts of the case and noting that neither the State nor its employees would be deterred against future constitutional deprivations if the State could later recoup any section 1983 award it paid to inmates through MIRA). After Hankins was decided, a subsequent opinion from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Beeks v. Hundley, 34 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1994), restricted the holding of Hankins to the peculiar situation in which the tort defendant (i.e. the State) is the same entity seeking restitution in a subsequent MIRA claim. In Beeks, the issue was whether section 1983 pre-empted the seizure of inmates' section 1983 judgments 11 to pay victim restitution under Chapter 910 of the Iowa Code. 12 Id. at 659. In holding that section 1983 did not pre-empt Iowa's victim restitution statute, the Beeks court focused on the purpose of Iowa's victim restitution act as an inmate's "pre-existing obligation" to the victims of the inmate's crimes when compared to the purposes of section 1983. 13 Id. at

1. The court noted that section 1983 had two distinct purposes. First, to compensate

persons injured by a deprivation of federal rights and second, to deter abuses of power by

11 The inmates prevailed in their underlying section 1983 action. Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115, 119 (8th Cir. 1993). 12 Iowa Code Section 910.2 (2025) requires that in all criminal cases except simple misdemeanors, the offender be ordered to pay restitution to the victims of his criminal activities. Offenders must make restitution payments while in prison based on a restitution plan prepared by the Department of Corrections. Section 910.9. 13 Indeed, the court pointed out that the restitution orders remain "enforceable after prison sentences have been served" and the inmates "received virtually all the benefits from their section 1983 money judgment[s] when the proceeds were applied to satisfy their restitution debts." Beeks, 34 F.3d at 661.

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those acting on behalf of the government. Id. The court noted that there was nothing in the Iowa victim restitution act suggesting that the act was "intended to frustrate section 1983 inmate plaintiffs, or to reduce the deterrence effect of section 1983 judgments." Id. at 662. Further, the court opined that because the money recovered under the section 1983 action was not being repaid to the state institution that violated the individuals' rights, "the [Iowa] statute uniformly affects all offenders, not only those who have prevailed in a federal civil rights action." Id. at 661-62. Thus, enforcement of the Iowa victim reimbursement statute was "not inimical to the core purpose of section 1983." Id. at 662. Here, the City of St. Louis is a political subdivision of the State of Missouri; thus, the State is attempting to recover the proceeds of a suit for damages caused by the actions of a political subdivision of the State, not the proceeds of a suit for damages caused by the State itself. More specifically, the damages were the result of actions at the City Jail caused by a City of St. Louis employee, not damages caused by actions directly attributable to a State employee or occurring at a State facility. Our court, in an analogous matter, held that a political subdivision of the state did not constitute an "agency of the state" for purposes of the State Legal Defense Fund. Wilson v. Attorney General, 619 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (interpreting section 105.711.2(2)). The court noted that the state was not compelled to fund the political subdivision and nothing obligates the state to satisfy the liabilities or obligations of the political subdivision; therefore, the political subdivision was not an agency of the state. Id. We find this to be instructive.

10

The purpose of MIRA was to use the assets of incarcerated individuals to offset the cost to the State of their incarceration. See State ex rel. Nixon v. Koonce, 173 S.W.3d 277, 283 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). That is precisely what the State sought to do in this case: offset the cost of Pope's State incarceration with Pope's assets, those assets being the proceeds of his settlement with the City of St Louis. While the City of St. Louis is a political subdivision of the State of Missouri, there is nothing in the record to establish that any monies seized from Pope in this MIRA action were returned to the City of St. Louis. Thus, the State's seizing of Pope's section 1983 judgment under MIRA does not undermine the deterrence effect on the City of St. Louis of committing future constitutional deprivations. We are mindful that the Missouri Legislature recently repealed MIRA in its entirety. 14 Nonetheless, nothing in the bill that repealed these statutes indicates any intent for retroactive application of that repeal. We are therefore bound by Missouri's general savings statutes, sections 1.170 and 1.180. See Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Mo. App. E.D. 1983). Section 1.170 dictates that "[t]he repeal of any statutory provision does not affect any act done or right accrued or established in any proceeding, suit or prosecution had or commenced in any civil case previous to the time when the repeal takes effect; but every such act, right and proceeding remains as valid and effectual as if the provisions so repealed had remained in force." Likewise, section 1.180 mandates, "No action or plea pending at the time any statutory provisions are repealed

14 See HB495, effective August 28, 2025.

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shall be affected by the repeal; but the same shall proceed, in all respects, as if the statutory provisions had not been repealed[.]" Because the trial court's judgment was entered in August of 2024, before the repeal of MIRA, and because we hold that Pope's assets do not fall under the limited pre-emption described in Hankins, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Conclusion The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

__________________________________ Gary D. Witt, Judge

All concur