Susana Sullins, Appellant, v. John R. Knierim, Respondent.

3Jntbe;.fffilissouri<[ourtof~ppeaIs QfasternlJ.Bistrict DIVISIONFOUR Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) AppealfromtheCircuitCourt ofJeffersonCounty CaseNumber23CV194-5603 SUSANASULLINS, No.ED92849 Appellant, v. JOHNR.KNIERIM, HonorableMarkT.Stoll

Introduction AppellantSusanaSullins(Mother)appealsfromthetrialcourt'sFindingsofFact, ConclusionsofLawandJudgment(Judgment),whichdeclaredtheparties'daughter (Daughter)emancipated,determinedthatJohnKnierim(Father)wasnotobligatedto contributetocertainpastexpensesforDaughter,anddeniedMother'srequestfor attorney'sfees.Motherassertsfivepointsonappeal:(1)thetrialcourterredinfinding Daughteremancipatedbecausesubstantialuncontrovertedevidencedemonstratedthat Daughterwas"mentallyandvocationallyincapacitated"fromsupportingherselfunder Section452.340.4,RSMo/entitlingMothertocontinuedchildsupport;(2)thecourt erred,abuseditsdiscretion,andmisappliedSection452.340.5,becausethe uncontrovertedevidencedemonstratedthatDaughterhadbeendiagnosedwitha 1AllstatutoryreferencesaretoRSMoSupp.2008,unlessotherwiseindicated.

developmentaldisability,asdefinedinSection630.005,orhada diagnosedhealth problemthatlimitedherabilitytocarrytherequisitenumberofcredithourspersemester; (3)thecourtimproperlyreliedonexcludedevidenceandmisappliedSection452.340.5in thatfailuretocomplywithnoticerequirementsdoesnotemancipatea minorchild;(4)the courterredindenyingMother'srequestforretroactivemodificationofthechildsupport amount;and(5)thecourterredindenyingMother'srequestforattorney'sfees.We affirmin partandreversein part,andweremandforfurtherproceedingsinaccordance withthisopinion. Background Theparties'marriagewasdissolvedin1996.Thedissolutionjudgmentawarded MotherprimarylegalandphysicalcustodyandorderedFatherto pay$571.96permonth forsupportofthetwochildrenbornofthemarriage:a son(Son),bornin1984and emancipatedin2003,andDaughter,bornonApril6,1988.Thedissolutionjudgment orderedthattheparties"shallconfer"witheachotherondecisionsaffectingthe children'seducation,includingspecialtutoring;andthatthepartieswouldbeboundby therecommendationsofthechildren'sschoolregardingtheneedfor,interalia,special tutoring.Thejudgmentdidnotprovideforpaymentofcollegeexpenses.Thejudgment alsofailedtoprovideforreducedpaymentsforonechilduponSon'semancipation;and in2004,Fatherfiledanamendedmotionto modifythechildsupportamountinlightof Son'semancipation.In2005,Motherfileda counter-motiontodetermineFather's liabilityfor,interalia,tutoringexpensesincurredforDaughterthroughSylvanLearning Center(Sylvan). 2

In2006,Motherfileda counter-motionto modifythejudgmentofmodification requestingthecourt(1)toextendFather'schildsupportobligationafterDaughter reachedthestatutoryageofmajority,becauseshewasphysicallyormentally incapacitatedfromsupportingherself,unmarried,andinsolvent;(2)to increasethechild supportamountinaccordancewiththeGuidelines,retroactiveto thedateoffiling;and (3)toorderFathertocontributeto post-secondaryorvocationaltrainingexpenses.In June2008,Fatherfileda secondamendedmotionto modifyseekingtodeclareDaughter emancipated,becausealthoughshehadbeenenrolledin JeffersonCollegebeginningin theFallof2007,shehadnotbeentakingtherequirednumberofcredithours.Both partiessoughtreasonableattorneys'feesfromtheother. Ata November2008hearing,thefollowingevidencewasadduced.Kevan Rzeppa(Rzeppa),a licensedprofessionalcounseloremployedbytheMissouri DepartmentofElementaryandSecondaryEducation,DepartmentofVocational Rehabilitation(MDVR),testifiedthatin 2007,Daughterappliedforandwasgranted vocationalservicesat thePriorityII level,whichis thecategoryassignedto"eligible individual[s]witha significantdisability."MDVRdefinesa significantdisabilityasone thatseriouslylimitsoneormorefunctionalcapabilitiesin tepnsofanemployment outcome,andthatcanbeexpectedtorequiremultiplevocationalrehabilitativeservices overanextendedperiodoftime.RzeppadeterminedfromDaughter'srecordsthat Daughterhadborderlineintellectualfunctioningwithmaladaptivebehaviors,which seriouslylimitedherfunctionalcapabilitiesin thecategoryofworkskills,specificallyin theareasofreading,writing,andcomprehendingnewmaterials.Rzeppatestifiedthat Daughter'svocationalgoalwasto bea teacher'sassistantordaycareteacher,andRzeppa 3

estimatedthatit wouldtakeDaughteruntilapproximatelyMay2011toachieveher vocationalgoals.Oncross-examination,Rzeppastatedthatsheknewofnolimitations thatwouldpreventDaughterfromworkingfulltime. Daughter'sMDVRfile,admittedat trial,includedher2007Individualized EducationPlan(IEP),whichnoteda 2000diagnosisof"unspecifieddisorderofthe nervoussystem"thataffectedherabilitiesto read,write,andcomprehendmaterial presentedinclass.TheIEPnotedthather2007FullScaleIQscoreof75placed Daughterintheborderlinerangeofintelligence,andthatshewasenrolledina mixof specialeducationandregularclasses.Daughter'shighschoolSeniorEvaluationReport statedherclassificationas"otherhealthimpaired"(OHI),notingherweaknessesin mathematics,writtenlanguageandreading;butfurtherstatedthatherdeficitsdidnot appearto becausedby,interalia,"auditoryorvisualacuitydeficits,motordeficits, mentalretardation,[or]behavioral/emotionaldisturbance." Daughter'sMDVRfilealsoincludeda 2008reportentitled"psychoeducational testresultsandanalysis,"notingthattheresultsofhermultidisciplinaryevaluationswere "consistentwithonewhohasborderlineintellectualfunctioningas both[her]FSIQ[was] intheborderlinerange[and]herWIATCompositescore[was]in theextremelylow range."ThereportfurtherstatedDaughter'stestresultssupporteda diagnosisof languageimpairment,herlanguagedeficits"significantlyimpact[ed]herschool performance,"andheracademicbehaviorswere"ofsuchfTequency,duration,and intensitythattheyaremarkedlyatypicalanda functionof[Daughter]'s learning disability." 4

SundayeHarrison(Harrison),thedisabilityservicescoordinatorat Jefferson College,testifiedthatDaughterprovideddocumentationof herOHIdisability,andwas givenaccommodationsintheformofextendedtime,alternatetestinglocations,peer tutoring,andreducedcourseload.ShespecifiedthatDaughterwouldonlyhaveto maintainonecredithourto beeligibleforenrollment. HarrisonfurthertestifiedthatDaughterenteredJeffersonCollegeona scholarship throughtheA+Programin2007.Inthe2007fallsemester,Daughtercompletedfive credithours;shecompletedtwelvecredithoursin the2008springsemester;andwas,at thetimeofthetrial,enrolledinninecredithoursin the2008fallsemester.Daughter remainedingoodstanding,butbecauseshedroppeda classinthe2008springsemester, shelostherscholarshipthroughtheA+Program. FathertestifiedthathehadnotreceiveddocumentationregardingDaughter's enrollmentinJeffersonCollege,includingtranscripts,herclassschedule,grades,or costs;exceptthat,uponhisrequest,shetwicesenthimgrades,andMothersenthimtwo bills,onceforbooksandoncefortuitionafterDaughterlostherA+ status.Heagreed thathehadnotpaidanymoneytowardsDaughter'scollegeexpenses.Uponobjectionby Mother'scounsel,thetrialcourtdeterminedFathercouldnotusethisevidenceof Daughter'sfailuretocomplywiththestatutorynotificationrequirementsasa basisfor emancipation,becauseFatherhadnotincludedthisbasisforemancipationin his pleadings.Fathermadeanofferofproof. Regardingchildsupport,Fathertestifiedthathewasnolongerrequestingthathis childsupportobligationbereduced,andthathewouldvoluntarilypaychildsupportfor Daughteruntilhertwenty-firstbirthdayin April2009in theamountorderedbythe 5

dissolutionjudgment.RegardingSylvanfees,hetestifiedthatMotherdidnotnotifyhim thatshehadenrolledDaughterinSylvanuntilsherequestedhecontributeto thefees. Oncross-examination,Fatheragreedthatheattendeda 2004IEPmeetingat Daughter's school,andthathedidnotmakeanyrequestsfromJeffersonCollegeforinformation. MothertestifiedthatshebelievedDaughterwasmentallyincapacitatedand unabletosupportherself.AlthoughDaughterhadworkedpart-timesincehighschool, MothertestifiedthatshecontrolledDaughter'sfinancesbecauseDaughterhaddifficulty doingsimplemathematics,bouncedchecks,andincurredverylargecell-phonebills.She hadnot,however,setupa guardianshipforDaughterorsoughtto haveherdeclared incapacitated;norwasDaughtereligibleto receivesocialsecurityordisabilitybenefits. Further,in May2008,Daughterwasadmittedforthreeweeksinanoutpatientprogramat St.Anthony'sfordepressionandsuicidaltendencies. RegardingSylvan,MotheragreedthatshetoldFatheraboutSylvanafter Daughterenrolled,butassertedthatFatherknewofherintentiontoenrollDaughter beforethefactbecauseheattendedanIEPmeetingin2004wherea representativefrom Sylvanwasalsopresent.Motheracknowledged,however,thatat the2004IEPmeeting theschooldidnotrecommendDaughtergettutoringthroughSylvan;rather,Daughter's teacherstatedthatfreetutoringwasavailablethroughtheschool.Motherrequestedthat Fatherbeorderedtopayone-halfof(1)thebillsfromSylvan,(2)a June2008doctor's bill,(3)co-paymentsandbillsforDaughter'sMay2008treatmentat St.Anthony's,(4) medicationco-paymentsincurredin 2008,and(5)collegeexpensesfromJefferson College,includingbooks,fees,mealplan,transportation,andtuitionincurredafter Daughterlostherscholarship. 6

ThetrialcourtinstructedthepartiestosubmitProposedFindingsandConclusions ofLawandJudgment.ThecourtadoptedFather'sproposedjudgment,whichdetermined thefollowing,asrelevant.Daughterhadbeendiagnosedwitha learningdisabilityfor whichshereceivedacademicaccommodations,butshehadnotbeendiagnosedwitha physicalormentaldisability.TherewasinsufficientevidencetoestablishthatDaughter qualifiedforextendedsupportunderSection452.340.4,in thatshewasnotmentally incapacitatedfromsupportingherself.DaughteremancipatedonJanuary31,2008, because,althou~attendinganinstituteofhighereducation,shewasnotenrolledin nine credithourspersemesterandnotworking15hoursperweek,andshewasnotdiagnosed witha developmentaldisabilityasdefinedinSection630.005,whichwouldhaveallowed hertocontinuereceivingsupportunderSection452.340.5despitetakingfewerthanthe requirednumberofcredithours.Further,becauseDaughterdidnotcomplywiththe notificationrequirementsunderSection452.340.5byprovidingFatherwithofficial transcriptsat thebeginningofeachsemester,Daughterfailedtoqualifyforcontinued support.Thus,Father'schildsupportobligationsweresatisfied.Thecourtnoted, however,thatFatherhadagreedto paythecurrentchildsupportamountuntilDaughter's twenty-firstbirthday.Thetrialcourtcalculated-pursuanttoitsownForm14--Father's childsupportobligationto be$561permonth,anddeniedMother'srequestfora retroactiveaward. AstoFather'sliabilityforcertainexpenses,thecourtdetermined(1)Fatherwas notobligatedtocontributetoDaughter'saccruedcollegeexpenses,becausethe dissolutionjudgmentdidnotprovideforpaymentofcollegeexpensesandDaughterhad notcompliedwiththenoticerequirementsofSection452.340.5;(2)Fatherwasnot 7

obligatedtocontributetoDaughter'sSylvancosts,becausethedissolutionjudgment requiredthepartiesconferwitheachotherondecisionsinvolvingspecialtutoringunless recommendedbytheschool,butMotherdidnotconferwithFatherpriortoDaughter's enrollmentandtheschooldidnotrecommendSylvan;and(3)Fatherwasnotobligatedto contributetouncovered,unreimbursedmedicalexpensesincurredafterDaughter's January2008emancipation.Last,thecourtmadenoawardofattorneys'fees, determiningthateachpartywascapableofpayinghisorherownattorney'sfees. Mothermovedfora newtrial,orin thealternative,toamendthejudgment.The courtdeniedhermotion,butamendedthejudgment,nuncprotunc,toeliminatetheword "proposed"ITomthetitle. StandardofReview Ourreviewofa trialcourt'sordergrantinga motionforemancipationand terminationofchildsupportis governedbyMurphyv.Carron,536S.W.2d30,32(Mo. banc1976),underwhichwemustaffirmthetrialcourt'sjudgmentunlessthereis no substantialevidencetosupportit,it is againsttheweightoftheevidence,orit erroneouslydeclaresorappliesthelaw.Kerrv. Kerr,100S.W.3d912,914(Mo.App. W.D.2003).Further,weviewtheevidencein a mannerfavorabletothejudgmentand disregardcontraryevidence,andwedeferto thetrialcourtevenif theevidencecould supporta differentconclusion.Wynnv. Wynn,738S.W.2d915,918(Mo.App.E.D. 1987). Wereviewforabuseofdiscretiona trialcourt'sdecisionregardingthe retroactivityofanawardofchildsupport,anda trialcourt'sdecisiontoawardattorneys' fees.Downardv. Downard,292S.W.3d345,349-50(Mo.App.E.D.2009). 8

Discussion PointI Inherfirstpointonappeal,Mothercontendsthatthetrialcourterredinfinding Daughteremancipatedbecausesubstantialuncontrovertedevidencedemonstratedthat Daughterwas"mentallyandvocationallyincapacitated"underSection452.340.4. Generally,theobligationofa parenttosupporta childendsat theageof18.Section 452.340.3(5);Lockev. Locke,901S.W.2d912,915(Mo.App.E.D.1995).Section 452.340.4,however,extendsthechildsupportobligationif thechildis mentally incapacitatedfromsupportinghimself,insolvent,andunmarried.Inthepresentcase, thereis nodisputethatDaughteris unmarriedandinsolvent,andtheonlyissueis whether Daughteris mentallyincapacitatedfromsupportingherself.Weconcludethatsheis not. TheevidenceofDaughter'slearningdisabilitypresentedat trialwasinsufficientto meet thestringentrequirementsofSection452.340.4. Theevidenceneededtosupporta findingofmentalincapacityis "substantial." Kingv. King,969S.W.2d903,905(Mo.App.WD.1998).Evidencemerelythatan adultchildhastroublelearningdoesnotsupporta detenninationofmentalincapacity. Harrisv. Rattini,855S.W.2d410,412(Mo.App.B.D.1993).Mildmentalretardation2 cansupporta findingofmentalincapacity.King,969S.W.2dat 906.TheJactshere, however,showthatDaughter'smostrecentFullScaleIQscoresindicatethatshehas ''borderlineintellectualfunctioning"ratherthanmildmentalretardation. Further,a parent'sdutyto providecontinuingchildsupportmaybetriggeredby thehelplessnessofthechild,suchaswhenthechildis unabletoearna livinginanytype of job.Masonv. Mason,873S.W.2d631,637(Mo.App.E.D.1994).Here,therewas 2Mentalretardationwasthediagnostictermusedintherecordbelowandinpriorcaselaw. 9

noevidencepresentedthatDaughterwasunabletoearna livinginanytypeof job. Rather,theevidenceshowedthatDaughterhadbeenengagedin part-timeemployment forseveralyearswhilein highschoolandcollege;thewitnessesknewofnolimitation thatwouldpreventDaughterfromworkingfulltimeif shewerenotinschool;andshe intendedto workfulltimeasa teacher'sassistantordaycareteacherafterfinishingher schooling.Wefindtherewassufficientevidencetosupportthetrialcourt'sfindingthat Daughterwasnotmentallyincapacitated. Pointdenied. PointII Inhersecondpointonappeal,Motherarguesthatthecourterred,abusedits discretion,andmisappliedSection452.340.5,becausetheuncontrovertedevidence demonstratedthatDaughterhadbeendiagnosedwitha developmentaldisability,as definedinSection630.005,orhada diagnosedhealthproblemthatlimitedherabilityto carrytherequisitenumberofcredithourspersemester. Section452.340.5extendsthechildsupportobligationtoagetwenty-oneifthe childis enrolledinandattendinganinstitutionofvocationalorhighereducation;taking at leasttwelvecredithourspersemester(orninecredithoursandworkingfifteenhours perweek);andcomplieswithallotherrequirementsofthestatute,includingthe requirementthatat thebeginningofeachsemesterthechild"shallsubmit"to both parentsa transcriptorofficialdocumentlistingthecoursesthechildis enrolledinandhas completedforeachterm,thegradesandcreditsreceived,andthecourseswhichthechild is enrolledinfortheupcomingterm.If thenon-custodialparentrequestsgrades,the child"shall"producetherequireddocumentswithin30daysoftheirreceipt.Section 10

452.340.5alsoprovides,however,thatif thechildhasbeendiagnosedwitha developmentaldisability,asdefinedinSection630.005,3orhasa diagnosedhealth problemthatlimitsthechild'sabilitytocarrythenumberofcredithoursprescribedin thissubsection,thechild"shallremaineligibleforchildsupportsolongassuchchildis enrolledinandattendinganinstituteof.. . highereducation,andthechildcontinuesto meettheotherrequirementsofthissubsection."Section452.340.5. It wasestablishedat trialthatDaughterdidnotcontinuouslyenrollinand completetherequirednumberofcreditspersemester:in the 2007fallsemesterat JeffersonCollege,sheonlycompletedfivecredithours.Accordingly,thetrialcourt foundDaughtertobeemancipatedasofJanuary2008.Theissueis whetherDaughter hada developmentaldisabilityora diagnosedhealthproblemthatpreventedherfrom carryingthenumberofcredithoursprescribedin thissubsection.Thetrialcourt determinedthatshedidnothavea developmentaldisability,andfailedtoaddress whethershehada diagnosedhealthproblem. 3 A developmentaldisabilityis definedasa disability: (a)Whichis attributableto: a.Mentalretardation,. . . ora learningdisabilityrelatedtoa braindysfunction;or b.Anyothermentalorphysicalimpairment.. . ; and (b)Is manifestedbeforethepersonattainsagetwenty-two;and (c)IslikelytocontinueindefInitely;and (d)Resultsinsubstantialfunctionallimitationsintwoormoreofthefollowingareasof majorlifeactivities: a.Self-care; b.Receptiveandexpressivelanguagedevelopmentanduse; c.Learning;. d.Self-direction; e.Capacityforindependentlivingoreconomicself-sufficiency; f.Mobility;and (e)Reflectstheperson'sneedfora combinationandsequenceofspecial, interdisciplinary,orgenericcare,habilitationorotherserviceswhichmaybeof lifelongorextendeddurationandareindividuallyplannedandcoordinated[.] Section 630.005(9). 11

---------- - -- - -- -- -- _u------ --- Theuncontrovertedevidenceadducedat trialwasthatDaughterhada learning disabilitythatsignificantlyaffectedherabilityto read,write,andcomprehendmaterials presentedinclass.Rzeppa,a licensedcounselor,diagnosedDaughterashaving borderlineintellectualfunctioningwithmaladaptivebehaviors,whichseriouslylimited herfunctionalcapabilitiesinthecategoryofworkskills.Further,Daughterhadbeen diagnosedin 2000withan''unspecifieddisorderofthenervoussystem"thataffectedher reading,writing,andcomprehensionabilities.BoththeStateofMissouriandJefferson CollegerecognizedDaughter'sdisabilityandprovidedherwithongoingservicesand accommodation. Wefindthetrialcourt'sdeterminationthatDaughterdidnothavea developmentaldisabilitywasagainsttheweightoftheevidenceandmisappliedthelaw. Ata minimum,Daughterhada mentalimpairmentthatmanifestedbeforetheageof22; waslikelytocontinueindefinitely;resultedinsubstantiallimitationsintheareasof receptiveandexpressivelanguagedevelopmentanduse,andlearning;andforwhichshe receivedindividuallyplannedservicesofextendedduration.Section630.005(9);Brown v. Dir.ofRevenue,164S.W.3d121,125(Mo.App.E.D.2005)("Iftheevidenceis uncontrovertedoradmittedsothattherealissueis a legaloneastothelegaleffectof the evidence,thenthereis noneedtodefertothetrialcourt'sjudgment.")(internalquotation andcitationomitted). Further,wefindthatDaughter'sdevelopmentaldisabilityora diagnosedhealth problempreventedherfromcarryingthenumberofcredithoursprescribedin this subsection.ThelegislatureintendedforthecourtstoapplySection452.340.5broadly. Thompsonv. Dalton,914S.W.2d811,813(Mo.App.W.D.1995).Wheretheevidence 12

demonstratesthatthechildintendsandhastakenthenecessarystepstocompletehis educationbutis unabletocompletesomeclassesduetoa learningdisabilityormedical condition,thenemancipationis notappropriate.Id.;seealsoPickensv. Brown,147 S.W.3d89,92-93(Mo.App.W.D.2004)(extendingparent'schildsupportobligation wherechildwasunabletocompleteclassesduetoattentiondeficithyperactivity disorder).Here,theevidencedemonstratedthatDaughterwasactivelypursuingher educationandwasingoodstandingat JeffersonCollege,butthatherlearningdisability preventedherfromcompletingallof hercourses.Thus,thecourterredindetermining thatDaughteremancipatedbecauseshefailedtotaketherequirednumberofcredits. HavingestablishedthatDaughter'slearningdisabilityextendedFather'schild supportobligationwhileshewasstillenrolledinaninstituteofvocationalorhigher education,wenextconsiderhowlongthisextensionmustlast.Section452.340.3 providesthattheobligationofa parentto makechildsupportpaymentsshallterminate whenthechildreachestheageoftwenty-one,unlesssubsectionfour(mentalorphysical incapacityfromsupportinghimself)applies.Section452.340.3(6).Becausewehave alreadydeterminedthatDaughteris notmentallyincapacitatedfromsupportingherself, wefindthatFather'schildsupportobligationendedwithhertwenty-firstbirthday,and notbefore. Therearetwopotentialerrorsstemmingfromthetrialcourt'sorderof emancipation.First,thecourt'sdeterminationthatFatherhadsatisfiedallchildsupport obligationsasofJanuary31,2008is inerror,becauseFatherwasobligatedto pay$561 permonthforDaughter'ssupportuntilhertwenty-firstbirthday.Thepartiesagreedat oralargumentsthatFathervoluntarilypaidchildsupportforDaughteruntilhertwenty- 13

firstbirthday;therefore,wecangrantnoreliefonappealandtheerroris moot.See PromotionalConsultants,Inc.v.Logsdon,25S.W.3d501,506(Mo.App.E.D.2000). Second,becauseDaughterdidnotemancipateuntilhertwenty-firstbirthday,Father wouldbeobligatedto payforqualifyingmedicalexpensesincurredbetweenthetrial court'sstatedemancipationdateofJanuary31,2008andApril6, 2009,suchastheJune 2008doctor'sbill,co-paymentsandbillsforDaughter'sMay2008treatmentat St. Anthony's,andmedicationco-paymentsincurredin2008.Thusweremandforthetrial courttodetermineFather'sobligationforamountsowinginaccordancewiththe dissolutionjudgment. Pointgranted. PointIII Inherthirdpointonappeal,Motherassertsthatthecourtimproperlyreliedon excludedevidenceandmisappliedSection452.340.5in thatthefailuretocomplywith noticerequirementsdoesnotemancipatea minorchild.Weneednotaddressthese assertions,becauseourearlierdeterminationoferrorlikewisedisposesofthispoint. Pointdenied. PointIV Inherfourthpointonappeal,Mothercontendsthatthecourterredindenyingher requestfora retroactivemodificationofthechildsupportamount.Thecourthas significantdiscretionin makinganawardofchildsupportretroactiveto thedateoffiling. "Wewillnotdisturbthatjudgmentabsentanabuseofdiscretionsuchthatthechoiceof effectivedateis clearlyagainstthelogicofthecircumstancesandis soarbitraryand capriciousastoshockthesenseof justiceandindicatea lackofcarefulconsideration." 14

Downard,292S.W.3dat 349.Here,thecourtfoundthatFatherhadbeenpayingchild supportforbothchildrenuntilthedateofthe2008trial,despiteSon'semancipationin 2003;andthatthepresumedchildsupportamountcalculatedpursuantto theGuidelines waslessthanwhatFatherhadbeenpayingsincetheoriginaldissolutionjudgment. Underthecircumstances,thecourt'schoicewasnotagainstthelogicofthe circumstances,andwaswellwithinitsdiscretion. Motherhasnotassertederrorin thetrialcourt'scalculationofthechildsupport amount;thus,wewillnotaddresstheissue.Similarly,Mother'sassertion-firstraisedin theargumentsectionandnotincludedin herpointsreliedon-thatthetrialcourterredin denyingherrequestforreimbursementforSylvancostsis notproperlybeforethiscourt. DayexreI.Finnernv. Day,256S.W.3d600,602(Mo.App.E.D.2008)(issuesfirst raisedinargumentportionofbriefandthatarenotencompassedbypointreliedonare notpreservedforreviewonappeal). Pointdenied. PointV Inherfifthpointonappeal,MotherchallengesthetrialcoUrt'sdecisiontodeny herrequestforattorney'sfees.Thetrialcourthasbroaddiscretionin theawardof attorney'sfeesandis consideredanexpertin thearea;wewillnotdisturbthecourt's decisionabsentanabuseofdiscretion.Downard,292S.W.3dat 350.Wefindnoabuse ofdiscretionhere. Pointdenied. 15

Conclusion Thejudgmentis affinnedin partandreversedin part. KurtS. Odenwald,P.J. concursinseparateopinion. GeorgeW.DraperIII,J. concurs. 16

]ntbe;ffmissouri<!Courtof~ppeaIs ~astern11Bistrict DIVISIONFOUR Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No.ED92849 SUSANASULLINS, Appellant, AppealfromtheCircuitCourt ofJeffersonCounty CaseNumber23CV194-5603v. JOHNR.KNIERIM, HonorableMarkT.Stoll

toaddresstheconsequencesofSection452.340.5onchildrenwhoneedadditionalhelpin their educationduetoa developmentaldisabilityordiagnosedhealthproblem,andthedilemma presentedbyrequiringtheterminationofchildsupportat agetwenty-oneforsuchchildren. Althoughtheparentalobligationforchildsupportgenerallyterminatesat ageeighteen, Section452.340.5extendstheparentalsupportobligationtoagetwenty-oneif thechildis enrolledinandattendinganinstitutionofvocationalorhighereducationandtakingat least twelvecredithourspersemester(orninecredithoursandworkingfifteenhoursperweek).The legislaturehasrecognizedtheneedtoaddresstheeducationalcircumstancesofchildrenwith specialeducationalrequirements.Childrendiagnosedwitha developmentaldisability,as definedinSection630.005,orwhohavea diagnosedhealthproblemthatlimitstheirabilityto

carrythenumberofcredithoursprescribedinthissubsection,remain"eligibleforchildsupport solongassuchchildis enrolledinandattendinganinstituteof.. . highereducation,andthe childcontinuestomeettheotherrequirementsofthissubsection."Section452.340.5.The minimumcredithourrequirementpersemestermaybewaivedforchildrenhavinga developmentaldisabilityordiagnosedhealthproblem. Waivingtheminimumhourrequirementforchildrenwithspecialeducationalneedsis necessaryandjust,butmayrequireadditionaltimeforsuchstudentstocompletethecoursework fortheirdegree.Thisdelayreasonablymayrequirestudentswithdevelopmentaldisabilitiesor diagnosedhealthproblemstocontinuetheireducationbeyondtheageoftwenty-one.However, Section452.340.5doesnotmandatea continuationoftheparentalsupportobligationbeyondthe ageoftwenty-oneforchildrenwhoarelegitimatelypursuingtheireducationunderthecredit hourwaiverprovisionofthisstatute.WhileSection452.340.5accommodateschildrenwith specialeducationalneedsbyallowingthemtoscheduleclassesbaseduponindividualabilityand needs,a childwhois unabletoaccomplishhisorhereducationalgoalsbytheageoftwenty-one is seeminglypenalizedbecausethatsamestatutedoesnotconsideroraccommodatethe additionaltimeneededbeyondtheageoftwenty-oneforsuchchildrentocompletetheir education. I agreewiththemajoritythatthetrialcourt'sfindingthatDaughterdidnothavea developmentaldisabilitywasagainsttheweightoftheevidenceandmisappliedthelaw. However,reversingthetrialcourt'sfindingdoesnothingtorequirethecontinuationofthe parentalsupportobligationforDaughterassheattemptstocompletehereducationbecause Daughteralreadyhasreachedtheageoftwenty-one.Hence,wearepresentedwitha practical dilemmanotaddressedbySection452.340.5.Underthelaw,Daughteris entitledtocarrya 2

reducedworkloadeachsemester.But,doingsowillnecessarilyextendthetimerequiredfor Daughtertocompletehereducation.Theevidenceis undisputedthatDaughterwasenrolledina communitycollegeprogramwitha vocationalgoalofworkingasa teacher'sassistantordaycare teacher.Thedisabilityservicescoordinatorat thecommunitycollegeconfirmedDaughter's needforaccommodationsdueto herdisability.Testimonyfroma professionalcounselor employedbytheMissouriDepartmentofElementaryandSecondaryEducation,Departmentof VocationalRehabilitationconfirmedthatDaughterneededuntilapproximatelyMay2011,to achievehervocationalgoals,longpastDaughter'stwenty-firstbirthday. BecauseFather'sparentalsupportobligationterminatedwithDaughter'stwenty-first birthdayandFatheris unwillingto voluntarilyprovideDaughterwithfinancialsupport, Daughtermaybeforcedtoabandonherreasonableandlegitimateeducationalandvocational goalsinorderto provideforherbasiclivingneeds.I questionwhetherthelegislatureintended thisconsequence.JustasSection452.340.4allowsa courttoextendtheparentalsupport obligationundercertaincircumstances,thelegislaturemaydeemit appropriatetoconsiderunder whatconditions,if any,a courtmayordertheparentsupportobligationtocontinuebeyondthe ageoftwenty-oneunderSection452.340.5. L~/4-U:/'--~- KiurtS.Odenwald,Judge 3