The stipulations of the parties, issues in dispute and summary of the evidence were accurately recounted in the award issued by the administrative law judge, and will not be repeated by the Commission unless special emphasis necessitates. As astutely stated by the administrative law judge, the facts are basically undisputed and the principal issue to be determined is one of law, i.e., is employee entitled to workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident precipitated by an idiopathic occurrence? In other words, due to the fact the precipitating event was an idiopathic occurrence, is the resultant injury deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment as prescribed by section 287.120 RSMo? II. Employee, who sustained injury due to a motor vehicle accident, precipitated by an idiopathic occurrence, is entitled to workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 287.120 RSMo, because the conditions of employment caused or contributed to cause the accident, resulting in the injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
Consistent with section 287.120.1 RSMo, an employee must show that his or her injury arises out of and in the course of his or her employment as a condition precedent to recovery. Abel v. Mike Russell's Standard Service, 924 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. banc 1996). In the instant case it is undisputed that the accident occurred in the course of employment. The dispute centers on whether or not the accident arose out of employment. An accident arises out of the employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Abel, supra.
There is no dispute that the precipitating cause of the motor vehicle accident was an idiopathic occurrence, i.e., attributable to employee's preexisting seizure disorder. Idiopathic is defined as "peculiar to the individual: innate." Alexander v. D.L. Sitton Motor Lines, 851 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. banc 1993).
The proper test of "causal connection," involving an idiopathic occurrence, simply put, is whether the conditions of employment caused or contributed to cause the accident. If the conditions of the workplace contributed to cause the accident, even if the precipitating cause were idiopathic, the causal connection is established. In other words, the accident would not have occurred but for the condition of the workplace. Alexander, supra.
The sine qua non of recovery under section 287.120.1 and Alexander, supra, is a condition of the workplace that bears a causal connection to the employee's injury. The condition of the workplace bears a "causal connection" to the injury only when the condition is unique to the workplace or is a common condition that is exacerbated by the requirements of employment. Abel, supra.
As the administrative law judge noted there are no reported cases in Missouri in which the resultant injury was precipitated by an idiopathic occurrence while an employee was driving a motor vehicle. The reported cases involve employees sustaining injuries precipitated by idiopathic falls from level ground or heights.
The Commission notes that the basic rule involving idiopathic occurrences is that the injuries are compensable if the employment places the employee in a position increasing the dangerous effects of the idiopathic occurrence, such as a moving vehicle. A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, Desk Edition section 9.01[1] (2004). Awards are made when the employee's idiopathic loss of his or her faculties occurs while he or she was in a moving vehicle. In those instances "it seems obvious that the obligations of their employment had put these employees in a position where the consequences of blacking out were markedly more dangerous than if they had not been so employed." A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, Desk Edition section 9.01[2] (2004).
The parties and the administrative law judge thoroughly discuss the two Missouri Supreme Court decisions previously mentioned, Alexander, supra, as well as Abel, supra. These two cases define and establish the causal connection test when an injury is precipitated by an idiopathic occurrence. The administrative law judge believes there is "tension" between the two cases as to how the causal connection test is satisfied. The Commission does not find "tension" or disagreement between the two cases as to the proper test of "causal connection," i.e., whether the conditions of employment caused or contributed to cause the accident.
As stated in the Alexander case, supra, it would be a misapplication of the "causal connection" test if focus was solely on the precipitating cause of the accident without fair regard for conditions of the workplace that contributed to cause the accident or exacerbate the injuries. In other words, the accident would not have occurred but for the condition of the workplace.
The administrative law judge found that "but for the fact claimant was in a moving vehicle when he had his seizure, he would not have suffered the injuries to the extent he did on March 7, 2000."
The administrative law judge then states that "if Alexander controls, the injuries suffered by Claimant in this case are compensable since his injuries were caused because he was in a moving vehicle. Abel, however, reverts to a greater hazard-type inquiry by requiring the condition causally connected to the injury to be 'unique to or exacerbated by the workplace."
In addition, the administrative law judge correctly noted that Alexander and Abel were both decided prior to major changes passed by the legislature in 1993 concerning the definitions of both accident and injury defined by section 287.020 RSMo. These statutory changes are applicable to the case at bar.
The administrative law judge specifically referred to section 287.020.3(2) (d) which states that injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment only if it does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment and normal non-employment life.
Combining the statutory change referenced above enacted in 1993 with the Abel case, the administrative law judge concluded the following:
"Just as Abel requires the employee to be exposed to a risk unique to work in order for the injury to arise out of employment, so too does the 1993 version of the statute require an injury to come from a hazard to which workers would not be equally exposed outside of and unrelated to work. As discussed above, the evidence establishes claimant faced the same hazards and risks as any member for the general public driving a typical sedan would have faced on that day, time and place."
The case of Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002), discusses the ramifications of the 1993 statutory enactment, and the hazards or risks employees face outside of their respective employments. The cases and injuries referenced did not involve motor vehicle accidents, rather, they concerned employees while walking, and the court stated as follows:
"The respective claimants faced these hazards, in addition to the risks inherent in the activity of walking. The claimant's were also required to face those hazards as a result of their employment. Implicit in that observation would seem to be a view that the claimants could have avoided those additional hazards outside of their respective employments."
In the instant case, employee could have avoided patrolling the premises of Lambert Airport in a motor vehicle, if he were outside of his employment.
Also, the Commission notes the Supreme Court case of Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1999), which also addressed the 1993 statutory amendments to section 287.020. In discussing the meaning of section 287.020.3(2) (d), both Alexander, supra, and Abel, supra, are cited, for their earlier propositions, and are not overruled. At page 854 the Supreme Court states:
"Among such hazards or risks are 'idiopathic' conditions, those 'peculiar to the individual: innate.' Alexander, 851 S.W.2d at 527 n. 3. Common conditions exacerbated by employment requirements are not idiopathic. ... Yet, injuries on the job, resulting from an idiopathic condition peculiar to the employee, are not covered. Abel, 924 S.W.2d at 504."
It appears to the Commission that the proper test of causal connection remains whether or not the conditions of employment caused or contributed to cause the accident, as the Commission feels both Alexander and Abel enunciated and are in agreement. Paraphrasing Larson, it seems obvious to the Commission that the obligation of the employee's employment had placed him in a position where the consequences of his blacking out precipitated by an idiopathic occurrence were markedly more dangerous than if he had not been so employed. Consequently, the Commission is of the opinion that the condition of his employment, in particular, operating a motor vehicle, caused or contributed to cause the resultant injuries, and thus, a causal connection was established between the conditions of employment and the accident. Logic and common sense dictates that in all likelihood employee would have not suffered the significant injuries he sustained had he not been driving a motor vehicle in behalf of his employer. Therefore, we conclude that employee sustained an injury due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and reverse the finding of the administrative law judge denying benefits.