| FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) |
| Injury No.: 07-026920 |
| Employee: | Dustin Elsworth |
| Employer: | Wayne County, Missouri |
| Insurer: | Missouri Association of Counties |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence, read the parties'briefs, and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge allowing compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge with this supplemental opinion. |
| Discussion Safety penalty under § 287.120.5 RSMo |
| The parties asked the administrative law judge to determine whether employee’s compensation shall be reduced for failure to obey a safety rule of the employer, pursuant to § 287.120.5 RSMo, which provides as follows:Where the injury is caused by the failure of the employee to use safety devices where provided by the employer, or from the employee's failure to obey any reasonable rule adopted by the employer for the safety of employees, the compensation and death benefit provided for herein shall be reduced at least twenty-five but not more than fifty percent; provided, that it is shown that the employee had actual knowledge of the rule so adopted by the employer; and provided, further, that the employer had, prior to the injury, made a reasonable effort to cause his or her employees to use the safety device or devices and to obey or follow the rule so adopted for the safety of the employees. |
| At the outset, we acknowledge employer’s brief, which urges us to find that employee was distracted by Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and/or his action of sending text messages while driving employer’s dump truck, and that this caused the motor vehicle accident of March 30, 2007, to occur. Notably, though, employer does not claim that it had safety rules regarding employees having a diagnosis of ADHD, or against employees sending text messages while driving; consequently, it would appear that employer’s sole purpose in urging these findings is to advance an argument that employee’s negligence caused the accident. |
| But, as our courts have recently made clear, the statutory penalty under § 287.120.5 is not an invitation to inject issues of negligence into workers’ compensation proceedings. Specifically, in rejecting an employer’s request for a safety penalty where it was alleged a worker’s fatal motor vehicle accident resulted from his (purportedly) negligent or careless driving, the court instructed as follows: |
First, we must note that the first sentence of section 287.120 provides that: "Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for . . . death of the employee by accident . . . arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment." Missouri courts have long held that in workers' compensation cases, negligence is immaterial, and the accident for which compensation is sought may be with or without human fault. Contributory negligence, even gross negligence by an employee, is no bar to compensation in a workers' compensation proceeding.
Hadley v. Beco Concrete Prods., 505 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. App. 2016)(citations omitted).
Accordingly, we must conclude that ADHD, texting, or employee's purported negligence are wholly irrelevant with regard to whether a safety penalty is appropriate in this case. Instead, as correctly noted by the administrative law judge in his award, the safety penalty under $\S 287.120 .5$ can only be applied where the employer is able to prove the following four elements:
- [T]hat the employer adopted a reasonable rule for the safety of employees;
- that the injury was caused by the failure of the employee to obey the safety rule;
- that the employee had actual knowledge of the rule; and
- that prior to the injury the employer had made a reasonable effort to cause his or her employees to obey the safety rule.
Carver v. Delta Innovative Servs., 379 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo. App. 2012).
Employer claims it had safety rules (1) prohibiting speeding and (2) requiring employees to wear seatbelts at all times; that employee broke these rules despite employer's reasonable effort to cause employees to obey them; that employee had actual knowledge of these rules; and that employee's violation of these rules caused his accident and/or injury. The administrative law judge found that even if employee was speeding or not wearing a seatbelt, employer failed to meet its burden of proving a reasonable effort to cause employees to obey such rules, because employee was only 18 years old at the time of his accident, had no CDL, had never driven a dump truck in prior employments, and employer provided no training to employee apart from having him ride along on several occasions with senior employees. The administrative law judge additionally reasoned that employer had not actually adopted the rules in question at the time of the accident, because employer provided no evidence of written rules, and the available evidence instead suggested a generalized, orally-conveyed "obey all laws" rule that was simply too broad and vague to constitute a reasonable rule for the safety of employees for purposes of the statutory analysis.
We do not disagree with the administrative law judge's findings, analysis, or conclusions as summarized above. However, we write this supplemental decision to provide additional affirmative findings with regard to the critical factual questions whether employee was (1) speeding, or (2) not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident.
Employee presented testimony from William Hampton, a crash reconstructionist and safety consultant for the trucking industry. Mr. Hampton pointed out that employer's accident reconstructionist, Henry Vega, inappropriately referred to the yaw marks found at the accident scene as if they were "skid marks" in attempting to estimate employee's speed at the time of the accident; Mr. Hampton further explained that speed calculations simply cannot be made from yaw marks. After careful consideration, we find Mr. Hampton's testimony most credible with regard to this issue. We find that employer has failed to meet its burden of proving employee was speeding. We find, instead, that employee was not speeding at the time of the accident.
With regard to the seatbelt issue, employer takes it for granted, in its brief, that the evidence conclusively or overwhelmingly demonstrates employee was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident. The evidence, however, is in stark conflict with regard to this issue. Although it appears from the Missouri State Highway Patrol report that employee was found, after the accident, without the seatbelt engaged, both of employer's experts, Dr. Lisa Gwin and Mr. Vega, admitted that seatbelts may spontaneously release during rollover accidents; we so find. Mr. Hampton credibly testified that in his experience, more likely than not, unbelted persons are thrown from the vehicle during a rollover crash; it is uncontested that employee remained in the cab during the entire course of the accident. Finally, we note that all of the evidence available suggests (and we so find) that it was employee's habit and practice to wear his seatbelt at all times.
In light of the foregoing, we find that employer has failed to meet its burden of proving employee was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident. Instead, we find that employee was wearing his seatbelt, consistent with his habit and practice, at the time of the accident, but that the seatbelt spontaneously released at some point during the rollover crash.
In sum, we find that employer has failed to meet its burden of proving that employee was speeding and/or not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident. In light of our additional findings, and our adoption herein of the administrative law judge's findings, analysis, and conclusions with respect to this issue, we affirm the conclusion that employer's defense under § 287.120.5 fails.