The purpose of Section 287.420 RSMo (2000) is to give the employer timely opportunity to investigate the facts pertaining to whether the accident occurred and, if so, give the employee medical attention to minimize any disability. The requirement of written notice may be circumvented if the Claimant makes a showing of good cause or the employer is not prejudiced by the lack of such notice.
A Claimant must specifically prove the employer was not prejudiced by the lack of notice. A prima facie case of no prejudice is made upon a showing that employer had actual notice. No prejudice exists where the evidence of actual notice was uncontradicted, admitted by the employer, or accepted as true by the fact-finder. Acts of the employer subsequent to the thirty day period are irrelevant to a determination of prejudice. The purpose of the thirty day period is to allow the employer opportunity for timely investigation. Actual notice after the thirty day period does not prevent the employer from being prejudiced. Willis v. Jewish Hospital, 854 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.App. 1993). Michael Soos v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Co., 19 S.W.3d 683 (Mo.App. 2000).
Here, it is undisputed Claimant did not provide Employer with written notice within thirty days of the alleged incident. Claimant asserts that he gave his supervisor actual oral notice on the day of the reported accident. Claimant's testimony about oral notice to his supervisor is cogent, reasonable and unrebutted by Employer. Most importantly, Claimant's notice to Employer was timely. Claimant reported the lifting incident and he also reported back symptoms.
Claimant finished his shift and neither investigation nor treatment ensued. While the duty to report an injury to an employer, set forth above, is imposed on the employee, a duty to report the accident to the Division is imposed on the employer. Section 287.380.1 RSMo (2000). This is typically the first step in an investigation afforded an employer under subsection 420. The record compels the conclusion that Employer received effective notice under the law.
Separately, Employer argues the unconventional pause before Claimant's first demand for treatment is a break in the causal chain of events and suggests any actual notice "expire[d]." (No citation.) Equally unconventional is Employer's failure to perform contemporaneous IMEs and undertake other risk containment procedures to limit the effects of the injury. Hindsight suggests prompt investigation, treatment and establishing MMI might facilitate a causation defense.
First treatment occurring on or about the time of lay-off is circumstantial. While unusual and perhaps suspicious, such characterization is not a rebuttal of Claimant's complaint of severe symptom onset. Claimant's injury is a case of unchanged pathology and one that is characterized by episodic symptomotology. Also, no evidence of new injury is suggested in the record which might otherwise raise doubt about the causal chain which had begun nine months earlier.
Neither party embraced statutory protections and Claimant rather casually self-treated until a more severe episode many months later. Moreover, Claimant's request was met with an IME rather than a denial. Claimant continued work for the same employer and under the same arduous demands typical of the trade. No prejudice to Employer is suggested by any acts of Claimant.