I hereby adopt and incorporate as if fully set forth herein all previous Rulings of Law to the extent they do not conflict with the rulings herein. Based upon the previous and the above Findings of Fact, the testimony, the
competent and substantial evidence presented, the applicable law, and having given careful consideration to the entire record, I find the following:
Injury No: 98-103055
- Claimant's back injury is medically and causally related to her work injury.
Employer argues in his proposed award that Claimant's back condition is not medically and causally related to her knee injuries. Judge Vacca previously ruled on this issue and found Claimant's back was injured due to her altered gait from her knee injuries. He found Claimant's work accident was a substantial factor in producing her back injury.
The initial medical causation of Claimant's back condition was not identified as an issue at the second trial. At the beginning of the second trial, the parties stipulated the issues to be tried were future medical, TTD, PPD, PTD, and SIF liability. The question of the scope of an award was addressed by our appellate courts in Boyer v. National Express Company, 49 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001). The Boyer court stated as follows:
"...the administrative law judge should confine the evidence during the hearing to the stated contested issues. ...Stipulations are controlling and conclusive, and the courts are bound to enforce them. ...A stipulation should be interpreted in view of the result, which the parties were attempting to accomplish. ...In Lawson, our colleagues in the Southern District concluded that the Commission acted in excess of its powers in making its award on grounds not in issue. Lawson v. Emerson Electric Company, 809 S.W.2d at 126."
While the court in Jennings v. Station Casino St. Charles, 196 S.W.3d 552, 558 (Mo.App. E.D. 2006) found that "findings and conclusions made by an ALJ in a temporary award are not binding on any subsequent proceeding", the court also found that in order "to modify a temporary award, the ALJ in the final award must find there was "additional significant evidence" not before the ALJ at the temporary award." Id. 558
At this hearing for a final award, no significant new evidence was produced to show Claimant's back injury was not related to her work injury as was determined at the temporary award hearing. Therefore, consistent with Jennings and Boyer, and the stipulations of the parties, I have no jurisdiction, no significant evidence, and no good reason to alter that finding or ruling.
- Claimant is entitled to ongoing medical care for her knees and her back.
Section 287.140.1 "entitles the worker to medical treatment as may reasonably be required to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury." Ford v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., 155 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Mo.App. E.D. 2005) (citations omitted). It is sufficient to award future medical benefits if the claimant shows by reasonable probability that he is in need of additional medical treatment by reason of his work-related accident. Bock v. Broadway Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 427, 437 (Mo.App. E.D. 2001).
Claimant testified, and the medical records corroborate, she continues to receive medical attention for her back and her knees. She has annual appointments for her knees. She has an injection every few months and takes prescription medications to relieve her pain. She may need a fusion surgery when and if the back pain becomes intolerable. Employer is hereby ordered to provide open medical treatment to continue to cure and relieve Claimant of the effects of her injuries to her right knee, her left knee, and her low back.
- Claimant is permanently and totally disabled as a result of her work injury alone, and she is entitled to PTD payments beginning March 30, 2005.
Claimant alleges she is permanently totally disabled. Chatmon v. St. Charles County Ambulance District, 55 S.W.3d
"Total disability" means inability to return to any employment and not merely... inability to return to the employment in which employee was engaged at the time of the accident." §287.020.7 (RSMo 2000). "The test for permanent total disability is a worker's ability to compete in the open labor market in that it measures the worker's potential for returning to employment." Sutton v. Vee Jay Cement Contracting Co., 37 S.W.3d 803, 811 (Mo.App. 2000). "The critical question then becomes whether any employer in the usual course of employment would reasonably be expected to hire this employee in his or her present physical condition." Reese v. Gary and Roger Link, Inc., 5 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Mo.App. 1999).
Dr. Morrow, Dr. Poetz, Dr. Metzler and Dr. Haupt each imposed significant restrictions on Claimant as a result of her knee injuries. Dr. Lauter found Claimant had an "overall inability to function normally." Dr. Williams is the only doctor to testify Claimant's knees are better than before their surgeries and she has no restrictions at all.
Employer's vocational expert, Michael Brethauer, found Claimant was employable. However, he did not personally interview or observe Claimant before coming to this conclusion. He also did not consider Claimant's self-reported complaints or the medical opinion of her expert. He testified he only considered what the medical practitioners believe she can or cannot do. He did agree that if in fact Claimant does have to lay down every few hours to relieve her pain, she would not be employable in the open labor market. The only credible testimony on this issue was Claimant's. She testified she must rest and elevate her legs for half the day to relieve pain and swelling in her legs.
Claimant's vocational expert, Jim England, found Claimant was unable to compete in the open labor market in January 2003 due to her work restrictions and her need to frequently elevate her legs.
Injury No: 98-103055
Based on the substantial and competent evidence, I find Claimant is unemployable in the open labor market and is permanently and totally disabled. The evidence shows she suffers chronic pain that will inevitably return even with treatment and that this pain prevents her from sustaining employment. I next must determine whether the total disability is the result of Claimant's work injury alone or is due to a combination of her injuries. In Hughey v. Chrysler Corp., 34 S.W.3d 845 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000), the court held that:
"In deciding whether the Second Injury Fund has any liability, the first determination is the degree of disability from the last injury. Until that disability is determined, it is not known whether the second injury fund has any liability. Accordingly, a claimant's preexisting disabilities are irrelevant until employer's liability for the last injury is determined. If a claimant's last injury in and of itself rendered the claimant permanently and totally disabled, then the Second Injury Fund has no liability and employer is responsible for the entire amount."
Id at 847 (citations omitted)
I find Claimant's permanent and total disability is a result of her work injury alone. Claimant worked more than full time before her injury. She has not been able to work for several years due to her constant pain and her significant restrictions as a result of the last injury. While Claimant did have some pre-existing conditions, these were significantly worsened after her work injury, and I find her restrictions resulting from her work injury are substantial enough considered alone to render her totally disabled. This finding is corroborated by the deposition testimony of Dr. Poetz, Jim England and Michael Brethauer.
I find Claimant's disability become permanent when she was released from treatment for her knees and determined to be at maximum medical improvement in March 2005. Employer paid temporary disability benefits through March 29, 2005. Employee is hereby awarded PTD benefits from Employer beginning March 30, 2005, at the stipulated rate of $\$ 333.33 /$ week, and the benefits continue for as long as Claimant lives.
- The Second Injury Fund has no liability and is hereby dismissed.
Based on the findings of fact and rulings of law heretofore made, the SIF has no liability and is dismissed.
Date: $\qquad$ Made by:
KATHLEEN M. HART
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
A true copy: Attest:
Patricia "Pat" Secrest
Director
Division of Workers' Compensation
Nancy Lieble v. Le Lu Injury No: 98-103055