Even if Claimant was able to get past the notice issue, I find Claimant also fails to meet his burden of proof concerning the past medical bills, permanency and Second Injury Fund liability.
Regarding the medical bill issue, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.220.5 states, "If an employer fails to insure or self-insure as required in section 287.280, funds from the second injury fund may be withdrawn to cover the fair, reasonable, and necessary expenses to cure and relieve the effects of the injury or disability of an injured employee in the employ of an uninsured employer." Courts interpreting this section have held that the employee should only be compensated from the fund the actual expenses as a result of the injury when the employee is uninsured and further employee is not entitled to a windfall simply because the injury occurred with an uninsured employer. Mann v. Varney Construction, 23 S.W.3d 231 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000). Additionally, it would not be fair, reasonable and necessary to take funds from the Second Injury Fund if the medical bills have already been paid by a source other than the injured worker. Phillips v. Par Electrical Contractors, 92 S.W.3d 278 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003).
Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.140.1, "the employee shall receive and the employer shall provide such medical, surgical, chiropractic and hospital treatment...as may reasonably be required after the injury or disability, to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.140.3 also states, "All fees and charges under this chapter shall be fair and reasonable..." Claimant bears the burden of proving these elements of the claim.
The Supreme Court addressed the proof necessary for the claimant to meet his burden of proof on this issue. In Martin v. Mid-America Farm Lines, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. 1989), the employee testified that her visits to the hospital and various doctors were the product of her fall. She also testified that the bills she received were the result of those visits. The Court held, "when such testimony accompanies the bills, which the employee identifies as being related to and the product of her injury, and when the bills relate to the professional services rendered as shown by the medical records in evidence, a sufficient factual basis exists for the commission to award compensation." Id. at 111-112. The Court went on to further hold that, "The employer, of course, may challenge the reasonableness or fairness of these bills or may show that the medical expenses incurred were not related to the injury in question." Id. at 112.
Applying the Supreme Court's standard in Martin, Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof regarding the medical bills in this case because employee did not identify the bills or relate them to his injury, all of the bills were not properly put into evidence and there were no accompanying medical records placed in evidence.
Claimant also cannot rely solely on his rating physician, Dr. Hoffmann, to review the medical records and bills, in the absence of the records and bills themselves being in evidence. Although the physician's testimony can replace employee's testimony in terms of identifying and relating the bills, it still does not absolve Claimant of the burden of putting the medical records and the bills themselves into evidence in order to meet his burden of proof.
In an analogous situation involving the payment of medical bills under the medical fee dispute section of the workers' compensation statute, the Court held that once a health care provider presents sufficient factual basis for payment of the medical bills through testimony and evidence relating the medical bills or treatment to employee's work related injury, and places in evidence accompanying medical bills and records, the burden of going forward with evidence shifts to employer to prove that the medical bills are unreasonable and unfair. Esquivel v. Day's Inn of Branson, 959 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003). In other words, the testimony of a physician can replace the employee's testimony contemplated by the Court in the Martin case, but the physician's testimony must be accompanied by the medical bills and records in order to meet the burden of proof.
Even applying the Esquivel standard, Claimant still fails to meet his burden of proof since he did not put all of the medical bills or any of the medical records into evidence. Additionally, Dr. Hoffmann, who identified the bills for Claimant, admitted on cross-examination that some of the bills he reviewed were undoubtedly for treatment for the COPD, unrelated to the accident. He did not divide out which of the bills were unrelated to the accident and related instead to the COPD, so even Dr. Hoffmann's testimony did not clearly relate all of the bills he reviewed to the accident. This is yet another reason why Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof regarding the medical bills in this case.
Finally, even for the medical bills that Claimant did put into evidence, he still fails to meet his burden of proof by not placing the accompanying medical records into evidence as well. In Meyer v. Superior Insulating Tape, 882 S.W.2d 735 (Mo.App. E.D. 1994) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003), the Court held that the Commission properly found the employer was not responsible for the unpaid medical bills when employee failed to show the bills related to professional services because medical records were not in evidence. In that case, employee provided testimony that the bills were related to the injury and placed the bills into evidence, but did not place the medical records into evidence.
A similar situation exists in the case at bar. Claimant has offered physician testimony to relate the bills to the injury, and has also placed some of the bills into evidence, but none of the medical records. Therefore, applying the holding in Meyer, the employer (and Second Injury Fund) is not responsible for the unpaid medical bills without the medical records in evidence.
Since Claimant failed to prove that Employer and the Second Injury Fund are responsible for the payment of the medical bills, the only other question is whether Claimant has successfully proven the nature and extent of permanent partial disability, and Second Injury Fund liability for a combination of primary and pre-existing disabilities.
After a thorough review of the evidence and specifically the testimony of Dr. Hoffmann, I find that Claimant has failed to prove the nature and extent of permanent partial disability on the primary left femur and left hip replacement, and further has failed to prove his claim for permanent disability from the Second Injury Fund.
Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.190.6, "'permanent partial disability' means a disability that is permanent in nature and partial in degree..." The claimant bears the burden of proving the nature and extent of any disability by a reasonable degree of certainty. Elrod v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 138 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Mo. banc 2004). Proof is made only by competent substantial evidence and may not rest on surmise or speculation. Griggs v. A.B. Chance Co., 503 S.W.2d 697,703 (Mo.App. 1973). Expert testimony may be required when there are complicated medical issues. Id . at 704. When determining Second Injury Fund liability, nature and extent of pre-existing permanent partial disability has to be proven by expert opinion evidence by a reasonable degree of certainty. Messex v. Sachs Electric Company, 989 S.W.2d 206 (Mo.App. E.D. 1999) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003).
While Claimant seeks a finding on the nature and extent of permanent partial disability, Claimant has offered no medical records, and no specific rating of disability from his examining physician. Dr. Hoffman's first, undated report was simply based on a review of medical records
with no physical examination. He provides an opinion that Claimant is not employable in the open labor market, but does not provide a rating of disability based on the left femur fracture and hip replacement, nor any specific opinion of preexisting disability related to the COPD. Although his second report apparently came after an examination of Claimant, there are no findings from that physical examination contained in his report, nor much detail of any kind for that matter. There are still no opinions on primary or pre-existing disability.
Without any medical treatment records, any findings on a physical examination, or any specific ratings of disability from a physician, I find Claimant failed to prove the nature and extent of disability related to the primary injury.
Regarding the alleged pre-existing disability related to the COPD, it is especially important to Claimant's burden of
proof in this case, that the doctor provide an opinion on the pre-existing disability for the COPD, because Claimant testified that the COPD got quite a bit worse since the 1999 injury. In light of that testimony, Claimant needed to prove what amount of the COPD disability pre-existed the 1999 injury and what amount of that disability came from an unrelated subsequent deterioration of his COPD condition. In the absence of any proof from Dr. Hoffmann in that regard, Claimant also has failed to meet his burden of proof on his disability claim against the Second Injury Fund.