Accident
The employee asserts that, on September 26, 2003, while assisting a co-worker lift a wooden pallet onto a shopping cart, she sustained an accident that arose out of and in the course of her employment with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. The employee further asserts that this incident caused her to suffer an injury to her low back and left hip. In particular, the employee asserts, the injury to the left hip involved a significant pelvic and left hip fractures, which necessitated receipt of surgeries, including a left hip replacement in October 2006.
The employer and insurer do not readily dispute that the employee sustained an accident on September 26, 2003, and this accident arose out of and in the course of her employment with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Further, the employer and insurer do not readily dispute that the September 26, 2003 accident caused the employee to sustain an injury to her low back. The employer and insurer, however, dispute that the September 26, 2003 accident caused the employee to sustain an injury to her left hip.
After consideration and review of the evidence, I find and conclude that, on September 26, 2003, theemployee sustained an injury by accident, which arose out of and in the course of her employment with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. I further find and conclude that this injury occurred while Ms. Billingslea assisted another employee lift a cedar pallet onto a shopping cart.
II.
Nature of Injury
The primary issue before the undersigned is whether the September 26, 2003 caused the employee to sustain an injury to her pelvis and left hip. Having reviewed all of the evidence, including the claimant's own testimony, the content of the medical records and the medical expert opinions, I decide this issue in favor of the employer and insurer, and the Second Injury Fund. I am persuaded that, and thus find and conclude, the September 26, 2003 accident did not cause Ms. Billingslea to suffer an injury to her pelvis and left hip.
Section 287.020, subsection 2, states in part, "An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor." Ordinary gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging shall not be compensable, except where the degeneration follows as an incident of employment. Section 287.020.3(1) RSMo.
In a workers' compensation claim, the employee has the burden of proving a causal relationship between the accident and the claimed injury. Davies v. Carter Carburator, Division ACF Industries, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 749 (Mo. 1968); Griggs v. A.B. Chance Co., 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo.App. 1973). Medical causation, not within common knowledge or experience, must be established by scientific or medical evidence showing the cause and effect relationship between the complained of condition and the asserted cause. Brundage v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.App. W.D. 1991); Matzker v. St. Joseph Minerals Corp., 740 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Mo.App. E.D. 1987). Expert testimony is required where the cause and effect relationship between a claimed injury or condition and the alleged cause is not within the realm of common knowledge. McGrath v. Satellite Sprinkler Systems, Inc. 877 S.W.2d 704, 708 (Mo.App. E.D. 1994); Brundage at 202. Where the condition presents itself as a sophisticated injury that requires surgical intervention or other highly scientific technique for diagnosis, proof of causation is not within the realm of lay understanding. Silman v. William Montgomery \& Assoc, 891 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Mo.App. E.D. 1995). Expert testimony is essential where the issue is whether a preexisting condition was aggravated by a subsequent injury. Modlin v. Sun Mark, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo.App. 1985).
Where the opinions of medical experts are in conflict, the fact-finding body determines whose opinion is the most credible. Kelly v. Banta \& Stude Construction Co., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo.App. E.D. 1999); see also, Hawkins v. Emerson Electric Co., 676 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Mo.App. 1984). Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony, which it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary evidence given by the other litigant's expert. Id., see also George v. Shop n Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 855 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo.App. E.D. 1993); Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo.App. 1992); Hutchison v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Mo.App. 1986).
In the context of the present case, the parties offer conflicting medical opinions relative to the cause of Ms. Billingslea's pelvic and left hip fractures, and subsequent surgeries that included a left hip replacement. The employee relies principally upon the medical opinions of Dr. Wester and Koprivica, who attribute the September the stress fractures and subsequent surgeries to the September 26, 2003 lifting incident. Additionally, the employee relies upon the testimony of Dr. Lennard for support. The employer and insurer, as well as the Second Injury Fund, rely principally upon Drs. Cross and Corsolini, who opine that Ms. Billingslea's stress fractures in her left hip is the result of osteoporosis caused at least in part by her radiation treatments for her anorectal cancer.
In considering the opinions of Doctors Koprivica and Wester, both acknowledge that they premise their opinions of causation more on Ms. Billingslea's subjective reporting than any objective medical evidence. Similarly, both indicate that hip fractures are very painful and it is unlikely Ms. Billingslea could have continued to work for 10 days without providing notice or receiving medical treatment.
In addition, although Dr. Wester offers an opinion of causation relative to the September 26, 2003 incident, he indicates that osteoporosis was a significant factor in Ms. Billingslea's stress fractures. Similarly, he
acknowledges that Ms. Billingslea possesses several risk factors for osteoporosis - not only her extensive radiation and chemotherapy treatments for cancer, but also the fact that she underwent a hysterectomy and oophorectomy at the age of 28 . Also, in explaining his linking of the fractures, including the left hip fracture, to the September 2003 injury, Dr. Wester testified that he made the connection primarily due to Ms. Billingslea's description and history, and not through any objective diagnostic testing or finding.
Dr. Cross, on the other hand, indicates that the stress fractures had to have occurred between the time of Ms. Billingslea's normal x-ray in December 2003 and the acute onset of excruciating left hip and lower back pain that occurred simply while walking at work on February 27, 2004. In rendering this opinion, Dr. Cross notes that the MRI in March 2004 was positive, while the x-rays in December 2003 and CT scan in January 2004 revealed no stress fractures. Admittedly, the CT scan occurred in context of addressing Ms. Billingslea cancer treatment, and not for the purpose of detecting stress fractures. Notwithstanding, the CT scan did not detect any stress fractures, and if such fractures had been detected, Dr. Menias would have alerted other health care providers.
After consideration and review of the evidence, I resolve the differences in medical opinions in favor of the testimony of Drs. Cross and Corsolini, who, in this case, I find to be more credible and persuasive. I am persuaded, and thus find and conclude, that Ms. Billingslea's pelvic and left hip fractures occurred as a result of an ordinary disease of life caused by her osteoporosis, including radiation-induced osteoporosis, and not as a result of the September 26, 2003 incident. Although the September 26, 2003 incident may have served as a triggering or precipitating event to the sustaining of the pelvic and left hip fractures, the September 26, 2003 incident was not a substantial factor in the cause of the pelvis and left hip fractures. The September 26, 2003 incident caused the employee to sustain an injury in the nature of a low back strain, but nothing more.
III.<br>Medical Care
The evidence is supportive of a finding that the September 26, 2003 injury, in the nature of a low back strain, necessitated receipt of certain medical care, which the employer and insurer provided for Ms. Billingslea. Similarly, the evidence is supportive of a finding that Ms. Billingslea completed treatment for this injury, and the additional treatment sought and obtained by Ms. Billingslea related to her pelvic and left hip fractures, and not for her low back strain. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, and having found the pelvic and left hip fractures to be not work-related, the employee's request for payment of past medical care and expenses is denied. Similarly, the employee's request for future medical care is denied.
IV.
Temporary Disability Compensation
The evidence is supportive of a finding that the September 26, 2003 injury, in the nature of a low back strain, did not cause Ms. Billingslea to miss any time from work. Notably, relative to the low back strain, the employer afforded Ms. Billingslea with accommodations that allowed her to continue working in her employment with the employer. Ms. Billingslea subsequent absence from work is not causally related to the low back strain and the September 26, 2003 accident, but rather is causally related to the pelvic and left hip fractures.
Therefore, after consideration and review of the evidence, for the reasons set forth above, the employee's request for payment of temporary disability compensation is denied.
V.
Nature \& Extent of Permanent Disability
The September 26, 2003 accident caused Ms. Billingslea to sustain an injury in the nature of a low back strain, which resulted in her suffering certain residual discomfort and pain. However, this injury does not preclude Ms. Billingslea from working or otherwise being governed by permanent work restrictions. Rather, the permanent restrictions governing Ms. Billingslea are attributable to the pelvic and left hip fractures, which are not causally related to the accident.
Therefore, after consideration and review of the evidence, and for the reasons set forth above, I find and conclude that the September 26, 2003 accident caused Ms. Billingslea to sustain a permanent partial disability of 5 percent to the body as a whole, referable to the low back strain. I further find and conclude that the accident of September 26, 2003, considered alone, does not render Ms. Billingslea permanently and totally disabled. Accordingly, the employer and insurer are ordered to pay to the employee the sum of $\ 4,546.20, which represents 20 weeks of permanent partial disability compensation payable at the applicable compensation rate of $\ 227.31.
The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish Second Injury Fund liability, which necessitates a finding of a permanent "previous disability." Leutzinger v. Treasurer of Missouri, 895 S.W.2d 591, (MoApp. E.D. 1995). Notably, this disability must exist at the time the work-related injury was sustained, and be of such seriousness to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or re-employment should the employee become unemployed. Messex v. Sachs Electric Company, 989 S.W.2d, 206 (MoApp. E.D. 1999).
In 1977, Ms. Billingslea suffered a motor vehicle accident, which resulted in her sustaining a fracture to her jaw, a laceration to the left side of her head, a fracture to her right clavicle and a dislocated left hip. This injury necessitated receipt of multiple reconstructive surgeries to repair lacerations. Yet, according to Ms. Billingslea, she recovered from all of these injuries without continuing problems or any medical restrictions, and suffered no residual permanent disability referable to this injury. Similarly, approximately 20 years later, in 1997, according to Ms. Billingslea, she injured her left knee, which resulted in her experiencing symptoms that resolved with conservative treatment.
In October 2002, Ms. Billingslea suffered an illness in the nature of anorectal cancer. Subsequent to receiving this diagnosis, Ms. Billingslea underwent 27 radiation treatments and two rounds of chemotherapy at Barnes Hospital Cancer Center in St. Louis. She completed her cancer treatment in April 2003, without having to undergo surgery for her cancer. A colonoscopy performed in July 2003 showed no evidence of Ms. Billingslea's prior cancer, and in September 2003 Ms. Billingslea returned to work at Wal-Mart. According to Ms. Billingslea, she is cancer free.
Also, at the time of the September 26, 2003 accident, Ms. Billingslea suffered from a progressive disease in the nature of osteoporosis. The progressive nature of this condition continued to worsen and cause debilitating conditions associated with pelvic and hip fractures subsequent to, and unrelated to the September 26, 2003 accident.
After consideration and review of the evidence, I find and conclude that the preexisting medical conditions, in combination with the September 26, 2003 low back injury, do not render Ms. Billingslea unemployable in the open and competitive labor market. Unfortunately, subsequent to and unrelated to the accident of September 26, 2003 the progressive nature of the osteoporosis began to cascade rapidly, resulting in several stress fractures to her pelvis and both hips, causing the progression and rapid deterioration of Ms. Billingslea's overall medical condition. It is the combination of all of Ms. Billingslea's medical conditions, including the subsequent developing medical conditions, unrelated to the accident of September 26, 2003, which rendered her permanently and totally disabled. Further, there can be no Second Injury Fund liability for permanent partial disability in light of the statutory threshold not being met.
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, there is no Second Injury Fund liability. The Claim for Compensation, as filed against the Second Injury Fund, is denied.
The award is subject to modifications as provided by law.
An attorney's fee of 25 percent of the benefits ordered to be paid is hereby approved, and shall be a lien against the proceeds until paid. Interest as provided by law is applicable.
Date: $\qquad July 3, 2007 \qquad
Made by: \qquad$
L. Timothy Wilson
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
(signed June 20, 2007)
A true copy: Attest:
Lucas Boling
Acting Director
Division of Workers' Compensation