FINAL AWARD DENYING COMPENSATION
(Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge)
Injury No.: 06-110840
Employee: Allen Alcorn
Employer: Tap Enterprises, Inc.
Insurer: Travelers Insurance
Date of Accident: Alleged April 14, 2006
Place and County of Accident: Alleged Howell County, Missouri
The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by section 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record, the Commission finds that the award of the administrative law judge is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Pursuant to section 286.090 RSMo, the Commission affirms the award and decision of the administrative law judge dated September 12, 2007, and awards no compensation in the abovecaptioned case.
The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Margaret Ellis Holden, issued September 12, 2007, is attached and incorporated by this reference.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 25th day of July 2008.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Ringer, Chairman
Alice A. Bartlett, Member
DISSENTING OPINION FILED
John J. Hickey, Member
Attest:
Secretary
I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge should be reversed.
Effective August 28, 2005, the legislature changed two portions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law applicable to the case at hand. Those provisions read in pertinent part as follows:
Section 287.420. No proceedings for compensation for any occupational disease or repetitive trauma under this chapter shall be maintained unless written notice of the time, place, and nature of the injury, has been given to the employer no later than thirty days after the diagnosis of the condition unless the employee can prove the employer was not prejudiced by failure to receive the notice.
Section 287.800.1. Administrative law judges, associate administrative law judges, legal advisors, the labor and industrial relations commission, the division of workers' compensation, and any reviewing courts shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly.
The decision in this matter hinges on whether we are to apply these changes retroactively to the facts of this case. Employee began working for employer on January 31, 2004. Employee was young and had not suffered from any substantial back ailments prior to this time. His job for employer entailed lots of repetitive heavy lifting and moving.
Employee began experiencing back pain within weeks after beginning his work for employer. He first sought medical help on approximately February 17, 2004. Employee told the physicians at that time that the pain had been occurring for a couple of weeks. He had "no knowledge of injury to [his] back but has been doing a lot of heavy lifting with his new job as a truck driver" for employer.
As early as May 2004, employee learned from an MRI that his pain was due to herniated disks in his back. Under the new version of $\S 287.420$, employee would have been required to give employer notice of his occupational injury not later than 30 days after receiving this diagnosis. The new law did not exist, though, until August 2005. Thus, the question is whether it should be retroactively applied to employee's claim and, consequently, allowed to extinguish his right to proceed with his claim (since he did not provide timely notice and since the strict construction change would place the burden on employee to show no prejudice to employer).
The general rule is that "[p]rospective application of a statute is presumed unless the legislature evidences a clear intent to apply the amended statute retroactively, or where the statute is procedural in nature." Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 217 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). Case law shows that the applicable statutory changes are not merely procedural -- they are substantive. Those rights which are substantive and cannot be applied retroactively are generally defined as laws that "take away or impair rights acquired under existing laws, or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past." Smart v. Mo. State Treasurer, 916 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Mo.App. S.D. 1996) (citations omitted).
As evidenced in the case at hand, employee had already sustained a repetitive motion injury as early as 2004. Under the law in existence at that time, his occupational injury did not have to be reported to employer. See Endicott v. Display Technologies, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. 2002). The application of amended $\S 287.420$ to this case would require employee to do something (report to employer) he did not know and was not required to do at the time. Thus, it created new obligations and duties. Application of
amended $\S 287.420, as well as \S 287.800 .1$, to this case would cause employee to forfeit a right to claim compensation that he had under the old law. Thus, it took away his established rights. Clearly, then, the change is more than merely procedural and should not be applied retroactively.
I find this case analogous to Great Southern Savings and Loan Association v. Payne, 771 S.W.2d 940 (Mo.App. S.D. 1989). In that case, a couple named Payne had acquired real estate sold by the county collector to pay for delinquent taxes. After acquiring that property at public sale, the law was changed to require such purchasers to send written notice to certain parties within a specified period of time. Failure to do so under the new law resulted in the loss of the purchaser's rights to the property. In ruling that this new law was substantive and could not be applied retroactively, the court stated, "Laws . . . which provide for penalties and forfeitures in case of noncompliance, are always given prospective application. Id. at 943.
Similarly, in the case at hand, employee's failure to comply with the new notice provision resulted in the forfeiture of his rights. Thus, as indicated in the above decision, such law should be given prospective application only.
Under the law that existed as of the time that employee's injuries first arose, employee established that he had a work-related occupational injury and was entitled to compensation. He should not be foreclosed from asserting his rights to compensation because of laws enacted after-the-fact. Since the majority's decision holds otherwise, I must respectfully dissent from that decision.
John J. Hickey, Member