The employer is disputing that on April 13, 2005 the employee sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment and that the employee's injury was medically causally related to the alleged April 13, 2005 accident.
The employee's version of the accident at the hearing was that she helped hold up the shower chair with her left knee
under the chair while in a squatting position with her right leg pushed back up by the door to brace herself. After the resident was situated, the employee walked out of the shower room and went about four steps. At that time her right leg gave out and she fell to the floor. It was her contention that the activity in the shower room caused the injury.
There are several evidentiary problems that support a finding that the employee's version of the injury is not accurate.
The employee's testimony at the hearing is inconsistent with the other evidence.
The employee testified that she told Kim Craig, the Director of Nursing how the injury happened. The report of injury prepared by Ms. Craig listed walking down the hall as the activity the employee was performing when the injury happened. There was no equipment or object that the employee was using when the accident happened, and the work process was getting items for O 2 concentration. The "shower chair" incident was not mentioned.
Dr. Judge's records on April 13, 2005, from St. John's Mercy show that the employee was walking at work, had the acute onset of right leg pain, and she denied any other known precipitating factors. The employee testified that she did not tell Dr. Judge that. The nurse notes state that there was no know trauma that caused the employee's right groin and leg pain.
The employee testified that she was truthful and accurate with both Dr. Homan and the physical therapist at Concentra regarding how the injury happened. Dr. Homan's notes from April 14, show that the employee told him that she was walking down the hall, and her right leg gave out. A different section in the records show that the employee was walking and had her leg "go out", and then had a sharp pain in the inguinal area. The employee testified that what Dr. Homan put in the history was not correct. The April 14 therapy evaluation and history of present condition stated that the employee was walking and her leg gave out.
At the hearing, the employee testified that her left knee was under the shower chair and her right leg was against the door. The employee told Dr. Volarich that her right thigh was underneath the shower chair and her left foot was against the wall.
These inconsistencies affect the employee's credibility regarding the injury.
The medical history given by the employee to the treating health care providers does not corroborate the testimony of the employee at the hearing regarding the injury.
The medical history given by the employee to the health care providers on the day of the injury, and the day after the injury, did not mention anything about the "shower chair" incident that the employee testified to at the hearing. On the day of the injury, the employee told Dr. Judge that she was walking at work and had the acute onset of right leg pain and denied any other known precipitating factors. The nurse's notes from that visit show that the employee had right groin pain with no known trauma. On the day after the injury, the employee told Dr. Homan that she was walking in the hall and her right leg gave out. A different section in the records state that the employee was walking and her leg went out. The employee told the therapist that she was walking and her leg gave out. None of the four health care providers that the employee saw within a day of the accident put the "shower chair" incident in their medical records. The first time it was included in any medical record was in the August 27, 2007 evaluation and rating report of Dr. Volarich.
Based on a review of the evidence, I find that the employee's testimony concerning how she injured her right thigh and groin is not credible or persuasive. I find that what the employee told the emergency room personnel on the day of the accident; and what she told the health care providers and the Director of Nursing the day after the injury, has greater weight; and is credible and more persuasive than the employee's testimony as to what happened on April 13, 2005. I find that the employee's right groin and thigh condition occurred while she was walking and her right leg gave out and did not occur during the alleged "shower chair" incident.
Based on this finding, the legal issue which must be decided is whether the employee's injury to her right groin and thigh occurred as a result of an accident that arose out of and in the course of her employment and whether it was medically causally related to her work.
The general rule is that an injury "arises out of" the employment if it is a natural and reasonable incident thereof, and it is "in the course of employment" if the accident occurs within the period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be fulfilling the duties of employment. I find that the injury was in the course of employment since it occurred at Cedar Hill Manor during her work shift. The terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment are two separate tests, and both must be met before one is entitled to compensation. To have an injury arising "out of" the employment, there must be a causal connection between the nature of the employee's duties or conditions under which she is required to perform them and the resulting injury. See Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Bevel, 663 S.W. 2d 242, 245 (Mo. Banc. 1984).
The employee has the burden of proving that an accident occurred which arose out of and in the course of her employment, and that there was a medical causal relationship between the accident and the injuries for which the employee is seeking compensation. See Griggs v. A. B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. App. 1973).
Dr. Volarich's opinion on medical causation is substantially affected by the history given to him regarding how the injury occurred. I find that Dr. Volarich's opinion on medical causation is not credible since it was based on an inaccurate history of how the injury occurred. I find that the employee has failed to meet her burden of proof on the issue of medical causation.
It has long been accepted that there is a distinction between an injury alone and an accident. To receive compensation, the employee must prove that not only did she have an injury, but an injury which was caused by an accident, which arose out of and in the course of her employment. Thus, the "accident" is the cause, and the "injury" is the result. See Errante v. Fisher Body Div., General Motors Corp., 374 S.W. 2d 521 (Mo. App. 1964).
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Alexander v. D. L. Sitton Motor Lines, 851 S.W. 2d 525 (Mo. Banc. 1993) held that it is well settled that an accident arises "out of" the employment "when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury." The Court further held "that the proper test of 'causal connection', simply put, is whether the conditions of employment caused or contributed to cause the accident . . . an idiopathic injury or condition that precipitated an accident is not compensable, and without question, there is no recovery for a wholly idiopathic incident . . . that is not brought on by the conditions of employment."
The Supreme Court in Able v. Mike Russell Standard Service, 924 S.W. 2d 502 (Mo. Banc. 1996) held that the indispensable requirement of recovery is a condition of the work place that bears a causal connection to the employee's injury. The condition of the work place bears a causal connection to the injury only when the condition is unique to the work place or is a common condition that is exacerbated by the requirements of employment. The Court further held that a claimant must show that her injury arises out of and in the course of her employment as a condition precedent to recovery. It is not enough to show that the employee suffered an injury while working. The Supreme Court in Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1999) held that accidents to be compensable must be clearly work related which means that they must be "unique" to the work.
The Court of Appeals in Wheaton v. Reiser Company, 419 S.W. 2d 497 (Mo. App. 1967), Kunce v. Junge Baking Company, 432 S.W. 2d 602 (Mo. App. 1968) and Boos v. Grey Eagle Distributors, Incorporated, 745 S.W. 2d 837 (Mo. App. 1988), held that not every injury occurring at work is compensable but only injuries which arise out of employment are compensable. A causal connection between the employment and the injury must be found. See Pierce v. St. Joe Minerals, 807 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. App. 1990) where the employee's case was denied. The employee was climbing up a flight of stairs when his legs gave way underneath him. The event was insufficient to sustain a claim of a job related injury.
The mere fact that the employee's injury occurred at work is not sufficient to create a compensable workers' compensation case. The evidence does not support a finding that the employee's right groin and thigh condition had a
causal connection to the conditions of her employment. I find that her job did not cause the injury. I find that the employee's injury was clearly not work related and that her work was not a substantial factor in the cause of the employee's resulting medical condition. I find that the employee's injury was a wholly idiopathic incident that was not brought on, caused by, contributed to or exacerbated by the conditions of her employment. The evidence does not support a finding that the employee sustained a compensable accident and injury which arose out of her employment. I find that the employee has failed to satisfy her burden of proof on the issues of accident and medical causation. The employee's claim for compensation is denied.
Based on the denial of the employee's claim on the issue of accident and medical causation, the employee's claim for previously incurred medical benefits in Issue 3 and for permanent partial disability in Issue 5 for the alleged April 13, 2005 accident is denied.
Second Injury Fund Claim: Based upon the denial of the employee's claim against the employer, the employee's claim against the Second Injury Fund in Injury Number 05-049495 is denied.