Claimant asserts he is entitled to PTD benefits. Employer and SIF each contend the other is liable for PTD benefits.
Permanent and total disability requires a claimant to be "unable to return to any employment, not just unable to return to the employment he was engaged in when he was injured." Muller v. Treasurer of Missouri, 87 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. App. 2002). The test is the claimant's ability to compete in the open labor market. Id. The "crucial question is whether or not an employer can reasonably be expected to hire the claimant in his present physical condition and can reasonably expect him to perform the work successfully." Id.
Missouri courts have held that "inability to return to any employment" means that the employee is unable to perform the usual duties of the employment ... in the manner that such duties are customarily performed by the average person engaged in such employment. Vogel v. Hall Implement Co., 551 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Mo.App.1977).
The inquiry begins with the Employer's liability. If a claimant's last injury in and of itself rendered the claimant permanently and totally disabled, SIF has no liability and the employer is responsible for the entire amount. Hughey v. Chrysler Corp. 34 S.W.3d 845, 847 (Mo. App. 2000).
I find credible Mr. Lalk's opinion that Claimant is unable to compete in the open labor market. Medical restrictions prevented Claimant from working as a journeyman, foreman or superintendent. Drs. Rutz, Litchtenfeld, Doll and Graham restricted Claimant to lifting no more than forty pounds. Mr. Lalk concluded Claimant was unable to work as a journeyman with those restrictions. Additionally, Dr. Doll recommended Claimant avoid repetitive bending, twisting, and squatting, which eliminated working as a foreman because they bend, twist and squat to measure ductwork.
Mr. Lalk concluded Claimant may be able to work as a superintendent. However, he did not think Claimant would be able to compete in the open labor market for superintendent positions. In thirty years, Claimant worked once as a superintendent for his brother's friend. The rest of the time, he worked out of the union hall as a journeyman and was promoted to foreman. Therefore, it was not likely he would be hired as a superintendent. Additionally, superintendents climbed and walked on uneven terrain, which violated Dr. Lichtenfeld's restrictions.
I find credible Dr. Lichtenfeld's opinion that Claimant is PTD because of conditions related to the August 2002 accident; including exacerbation and acceleration of pre-existing degenerative changes, L4-5 herniation, increased herniation at L5-S1, right L4 radiculopathy, and increased left herniation at S1.
I find Dr. Lichtenfeld's opinion is not credible that PTD is caused by the primary and pre-existing conditions. Mr. Lalk's opinion is credible that Claimant could work in a different field if he only had the above restrictions. But, Dr. Stillings restricted work to "low stress jobs which do not tax Claimant's mood or require a lot of emotional or cognitive energy, and require a low level of concentration."
I find credible Mr. Lalk's opinion that Claimant has not accepted career changes the way most people would, due to his psychiatric condition. The psychiatric disorder exacerbates pain, causing Claimant to feel useless. Mr. Lalk found the restrictions from the 2002 accident and psychological injury caused Claimant to be unable to compete in the open labor market, without considering pre-existing injuries. Mr. Lalk explained:
Question: And I think your opinion that he could not compete in the open labor market was due to a combination of all physical and psychiatric conditions?
Answer: Yes. In my opinion, yes, those two combine.
Question: And when we're talking about physical conditions, we're talking about everything that you've identified here, all injuries, all conditions, and all restrictions?
Answer: I've taken all of them into account, but it's primarily the symptoms that he's experiencing in his low back and legs and the psychiatric condition that were preventing him from working. The other conditions that he talked about could limit him to certain types of work, could limit his physical capabilities, but even with all of those other conditions, I think I could find him some type of sedentary or near sedentary type of work that he could do with all of the other restrictions that he has. It's primarily the low back that keeps him from working. If those other conditions did not exist, it would still be the low back and the psychiatric that would keep him from working. (Emphasis added)
I find credible Dr. Stillings' opinion that Claimant could not sustain employment because of major depression and pain disorder, both caused by the 2002 accident. I find not credible Dr. Stillings' opinion that Claimant had a preexisting psychiatric condition and pain disorder. Prior to the 2002 accident, Claimant was not diagnosed with a psychiatric condition, received no treatment and missed no work for a psychological condition. But even if a prior psychiatric condition existed; Dr. Stillings attributed all of the major depression to the August 2002 accident.
Similarly, even if a pain disorder existed before 2002, Dr. Stillings attributed fifty percent of the condition to the August 2002 accident. I find Claimant is unable to compete in the open labor market due to the 2002 accident. I find Employer liable for the entire amount. I find SIF has no liability.
The obligation to pay permanent disability compensation commences under Section 287.160.1 RSMo (2000) on the date claimant's permanent disability begins. Kramer v. Labor \& Indus. Rel. Com'n, 799 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Mo. App. 1990). Based on the parties' stipulation, I find Claimant achieved MMI on February 25, 2008.
I find Employer's liability for PTD should have commenced February 25, 2008. However, the parties stipulate Employer is entitled to a four day credit for TTD payments made after Claimant was no longer temporarily totally disabled. I find Employer is liable to pay Claimant the sum of $\ 649.32 per week, retroactive to March 1, 2008 for the remainder of Claimant's lifetime. Laterno v. Carnahan, 640 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Mo. App. 1982).