Claimant contends Employer is barred from asserting a Statute of Limitations defense since Employer did not assert this defense in their Answer to the Claim. Compliance with the statute of limitations is "a jurisdictional matter to the extent that, while the commission has jurisdiction to determine from the facts before it whether section 39 has been complied with, once it decides the question in the negative, its jurisdiction ends." Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Product, Inc., et al., 224 Mo.App. 304, 25 S.W.2d 529, (Mo. App. 1930). Section 39 was the statute of limitations section at the time this case was decided. The Court further found the statutory limitations upon the exercise of the commission's "jurisdiction cannot be enlarged, diminished, or destroyed by express consent, or waived by acts of estoppel." Id. 535. I find Employer is not barred from asserting Statute of Limitations as a defense at trial.
§287.197.7 (RSMo 2000) provides: "No claim for compensation for occupational deafness may be filed until after six months' separation from the type of noisy work for the last employer in whose employment the employee was at any time during such employment exposed to harmful noise, and the last day of such period of separation from the type of noisy work shall be the date of disability."
§287.430 provides "...no proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless a claim therefore is filed with the division within two years after the date of injury or death, or the last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death, except that if the report of the injury or the death is not filed by the employer as required by section 287.380 , the claim for compensation may be filed within three years after the date of injury, death, or last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death."
Claimant testified she worked in a noisy environment while working in the first floor offices from approximately 1980 through 1982. This is when she began to notice hearing problems. In 1984 she was moved to a fairly normal office environment with a significant reduction in the noise level. Claimant worked several weekends as a plant foreman in the mid 1990's, and she testified this was the last time she was exposed to a noise level of ten. She testified she worked from 1984 through her retirement, with the exception of her weekends as a plant foreman, in a typical office environment with little to any noise. Throughout this time period, Claimant was occasionally, but not often, in noisy areas when she went to get information from plant foremen.
I find this case analogous to Baltz v. Frontier Airlines, 842 S.W.2d 547, (Mo. App. E.D. 1992). In Baltz, an airline worker was transferred from an outside job where he was frequently exposed to loud aircraft noise to an inside job with less noise but occasional exposure to airplane noise outside. The Court held "separation from the type of noisy work" means a change in the type of duties with an accompanying change in the type or level of noise, not the complete segregation of all noise. The Court found the transfer to an inside job was sufficient separation from the previous type of noisy work to trigger the requisite six month "separation from the type of noisy work".
I find Claimant's move to the $8^{\text {th }}$ floor office in 1984 was a "separation from the type of noisy work" and sufficient change in noise level to trigger the six month separation period. As such, Claimant's statute of limitations began in late 1984, and her 2004 Claim for Compensation was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
I need not address the remaining issues as my finding on the first issue is dispositive.
Date: $\qquad Made by: \qquad$
KATHLEEN M. HART
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
A true copy: Attest:
Naomi Pearson
Division of Workers' Compensation