- Did Claimant sustain an injury by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer, and if so, was his injury medically
causally related to an accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment?
Section 287.800, RSMo ${ }^{1}$ provides in part that administrative law judges shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly and shall weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when weighing evidence and resolving factual conflicts.
Section 287.808, RSMo provides:
The burden of establishing any affirmative defense is on the employer. The burden of proving an entitlement to compensation under this chapter is on the employee or dependent. In asserting any claim or defense based on a factual proposition, the party asserting such claim or defense must establish that such proposition is more likely to be true than not true.
Section 287.020.2, RSMo provides:
The word 'accident' as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
Section 287.020.3, RSMo provides in part:
- (1) In this chapter the term 'injury' is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. 'The prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
${ }^{1}$ All statutory references are to RSMo 2006 unless otherwise indicated. In a workers' compensation case, the statute in effect at the time of the injury is generally the applicable version. Chouteau v. Netco Construction, 132 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Mo.App. 2004); Tillman v. Cam's Trucking Inc., 20 S.W.3d 579, 585-86 (Mo.App. 2000). See also Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 217 S.W.3d 345 (Mo.App. 2007).
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
(3) An injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is not compensable.
(5) The terms 'injury' and 'personal injuries' shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body. . . .
Section 287.020.10, RSMo provides:
In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of 'accident', 'occupational disease', 'arising out of', and 'in the course of the employment' to include, but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care and Rehabilitation, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc 1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999) and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
Occupational diseases are compensable under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Sections 287.067.1, 2, RSMo. An employee's claim for compensation due to an occupational disease is to be determined under Section 287.067.1, RSMo. It defines occupational disease as:
- In this chapter the term 'occupational disease' is hereby defined to mean, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
Section 287.067.2, RSMo provides:
- An injury by occupational disease is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The 'prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.
Section 287.067.3, RSMo provides:
An injury due to repetitive motion is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of this chapter. An occupational disease due to repetitive motion is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The 'prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.
Section 287.067.8, RSMo provides:
With regard to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, if the exposure to the repetitive motion which is found to be the cause of the injury is for a period of less than three months and the evidence demonstrates that the exposure to the repetitive motion with the immediate prior employer was the prevailing factor in causing the injury, the prior employer shall be liable for such occupational disease.
Section 287.063.1 provides:
An employee shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists, subject to the provisions relating to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, as is set forth in subsection 8 of section 287.067.
Claimant must present substantial and competent evidence that he or she has contracted an occupationally induced disease rather than an ordinary disease of life. The Courts have stated that the determinative inquiry involves two considerations: "(1) whether there was an exposure to the disease which was greater than or different from that which affects the public generally, and (2) whether there was a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort." Polavarapu v. General Motors Corp., 897 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Mo.App. 1995); Dawson v. Associated Elec., 885 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Mo.App 1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Mo.banc 2003) ${ }^{2}$; Hayes v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Mo.App 1991); Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Mo.App 1988); Sellers v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 752 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo.App 1988); Jackson v. Risby Pallet and Lumber Co., 736 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Mo.App. 1987). In proving up a work-related occupational disease, "[a] claimant's medical expert must establish the probability that the disease was caused by conditions in the work place." Smith v. Donco Const., 182 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Mo.App. 2006) (citing Brundige v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.App. 1991) (quoting Sheehan v. Springfield Seed \& Floral, Inc., 733 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo.App. 1987)); Dawson, 885 S.W.2d at 716. There must be medical evidence of a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease. Coloney v. Accurate Superior Scale Co., 952 S.W.2d 755 (Mo.App. 1997); Dawson, 885 S.W.2d at 716; Sheehan v. Springfield Seed \& Floral, Inc., 733 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo.App. 1987); Estes v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo.App. 1978). Even where the causes of the disease are indeterminate, a single medical opinion relating the disease to the job is sufficient to support a decision for the employee. Dawson, 885 S.W.2d at 716; Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Mo.App. 1988).
In claims for compensation for medical conditions associated with repetitive activities, a claimant must prove: 1) the injury arose out of and in the course of employment; 2) causation from job-related activities; and 3) nature and extent of disability. Kintz v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Mo.App. 1994). Manipulations and flexions, iterated and reiterated within a concentrated time, are unusual conditions, and if they inhere in an employment task being performed by an employee, they expose the employee who performs them to a risk not shared by the public generally and to which the employee would not have been exposed outside of employment, and thus qualify for compensation pursuant to The Law. Collins v. Neevel Luggage Manufacturing Company, 481 S.W.2d 548, 555 (Mo.App. 1972).
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[^0]: ${ }^{2}$ Several cases are cited herein that were among many overruled by Hampton on an unrelated issue (Id. at 224-32). Such cases do not otherwise conflict with Hampton and are cited for legal principles unaffected thereby; thus Hampton's effect thereon will not be further noted.
Missouri courts have interpreted section 287.063, RSMo to provide that an employee with an occupational disease is "injured" within the meaning of the section 287.120, RSMo when the disease causes a "compensable injury." Coloney, 952 S.W.2d at 759, citing Hinton v. National Lock Corp., 879 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo.App. 1994) (citing Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo.App. 1988)). The "injury" requirement of the Act necessitates that the employee's "injury" create a harm that tangibly affects the employee's earning ability. Coloney, 952 S.W.2d at 763; Johnson v. Denton Constr. Co., 911 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Mo. banc 1995). Requiring that the harm tangibly affect the employee's earning ability upholds the intent of the legislature in enacting the Workers' Compensation Act which was to provide indemnity for loss of earning power and disability to work and not for pain, suffering, or mere physical ailment. Coloney, 952 S.W.2d at 760.
The quantum of proof is reasonable probability. Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 620; Downing v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Mo.App. 1995), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 227; Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Mo.App. 1990). "Probable means founded on reason and experience which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room to doubt." Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 620; Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App 1986); Fischer, 793 S.W.2d at 198. Such proof is made only by competent and substantial evidence. It may not rest on speculation. Griggs v. A. B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo.App. 1974). Expert testimony may be required where there are complicated medical issues. Goleman v. MCI Transporters, 844 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo.App. 1992). "Medical causation of injuries which are not within common knowledge or experience, must be established by scientific or medical evidence showing the cause and effect relationship between the complained of condition and the asserted cause." Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 618; Brundige v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.App 1991).
Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony which it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co. Inc., 1 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo.App. 1999); Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo.App. 1992); Hutchinson v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo.App. 1986). The Commission's decision will generally be upheld if it is consistent with either of two conflicting medical opinions. Smith v. Donco Const., 182 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Mo.App. 2006). The acceptance or rejection of medical evidence is for the Commission. Smith, 182 S.W.3d at 701; Bowers v. Hiland Dairy Co., 132 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo.App. 2004).
A claimant has the burden to prove all the essential elements of his or her case, and a claim will not be validated where some essential element is lacking. Thorsen v. Sachs Electric Company, 52 S.W.3d 611, 618 (Mo.App. 2001); Cook v. Sunnen Products Corp., 937 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo. App. 1996).
Based on substantial and competent evidence, including the testimony of fact and opinion witnesses, the medical records, my credibility determinations, and the application of Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I find that Claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof that he sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer.
Factors that support the conclusion that Claimant failed to sustain his burden to prove that his repetitive work for Employer was the prevailing factor in causing his back and left leg condition and disability include the following.
Claimant did not identify any traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift which occurred at work while working for Employer. No medical records document that either. Claimant did not think any single event caused his back pain and sciatica. I find that Claimant did not prove that he sustained a compensable accident arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer.
Claimant worked full-time continuously for Employer until August 31, 2007. He generally worked at least ten hours a day. He worked occasional overtime. He performed repetitive lifting and bending. He moved product with a two-wheel dolly and a non-motorized cart. He occasionally delivered prime ribs weighing approximately 320 pounds on a two-wheel dolly. His complaints of pain did not prevent him from performing all of the duties of his job. He did not seek any medical treatment for his back or left leg while working for Employer until August 30, 2007. It was not until after Claimant spent seven to eight hours gardening, bending and using a tiller, on August 28, 2007, that he was diagnosed with a lumbosacral strain, was unable to work, and was prescribed medical treatment that included medication, an MRI, epidural steroid injections, and physical therapy.
Dr. Fish saw Claimant on September 4, 2007 and noted Claimant's pain had recently worsened. He diagnosed a lumbosacral strain. Dr. Fish's records do not document that Claimant sustained an injury while working for Employer.
The Liberty Hospital MRI lumbar spine report dated September 6, 2007 contained the impression: "Multi-level lumbar spondylosis with broad-based disk bulges and facet disease. There is some impingement on existing nerve roots. . . ."
Liberty Hospital's Self-Reporting History record dated September 13, 2007 includes the following question and Claimant's answer: "2. When did you first notice the pain for which you are now seeking treatment? August 28, 2007."
Dr. Danner treated Claimant. Her first Consultation note, which is dated September 13, 2007, recites that Claimant stated that he had had significant pain since August $28^{\text {th }}$. She completed an Attending Physician Statement on September 20, 2007. She did not note then, in response to a statement, "Check all that apply to this disability," that Claimant's condition was work-related. Further, her records do not document that Claimant reported to her that he believed his work caused his condition.
Claimant testified he told Mr. Woodford in late June or early July 2007 that he had sciatica in his left leg and that he got it from bending and lifting and that his job duties caused the pain. Mr. Woodford denied that. I find that this testimony of Claimant's is not credible. I find that if Claimant had reported that he had injured himself on the job, Mr. Woodford would have processed an incident report and offered Claimant medical treatment.
I believe Claimant's testimony that he had occasional complaints of pain in his back and left leg in the summer of 2007. Mr. Woodford and Mr. Roberts substantiated that. But Claimant having complaints does not necessarily prove that his work was the prevailing factor in causing his condition.
The Court notes that Claimant provided different accounts to Prudential of the cause of his complaints. Claimant's second application to Prudential was approved after he reported to Prudential that he was not sure if his disability was work-related. He agreed to reimburse Prudential if his workers' compensation case was compensable.
Dr. Poppa's opinions that Claimant sustained "an injury from an accident arising out of the course and scope of his employment from repetitively lifting supplies up to 100 pounds and pushing and pulling carts weighing up to 250 pounds each day and every day he worked through August 31, 2007" and that Claimant's "employment of work duties at Harrah's Entertainment was the direct, proximate and prevailing factor in the cause of his resulting medical condition and disability" are conclusory, and the basis of his opinions is not explained. No deposition of Dr. Poppa was offered in evidence in this case. His report does not address what effect Claimant having spent seven to eight hours working in a garden, bending and using a tiller, on August 28, 2007, may have had on his condition. I find that Dr. Poppa did not review Dr. Strathman's chiropractic records that noted: "How did it originally occur? gardening 7/8 hrs.-bending." Dr. Strathman noted constant pain that was sharp and throbbing. The history provided to Dr. Poppa was
incomplete and inaccurate because it did not include the history of Claimant's significant complaints and chiropractic treatment after gardening on August 28, 2007.
Dr. Pazell testified with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that his diagnosis of Claimant was a lumbar spondylosis based on the findings of the MRI scan and history. He could not come up with a cause. He could not pin down a specific injury other than age related. He was not able to determine any pathological change in Claimant's low back that could relate to any period of time during which Claimant worked at Employer from March 2005 and though August of 2007. He testified that he could not arrive at an opinion whether any of Claimant's work at Employer was the prevailing factor in causing any of the medical conditions which he diagnosed and which were imaged in the MRI. He testified that the labor performed by Claimant at Employer was not the prevailing factor in causing the medical condition that he diagnosed. He could not find any objective evidence of any specific acute or repetitive injury to Claimant's lumbar spine. I find these opinions of Dr. Pazell to be credible.
Dr. Pazell's report noted his diagnosis was that Claimant has lumbar spondylosis. He noted there is no documentation or proof in any shape or manner that Claimant was injured at work. He noted the MRI revealed degenerative changes in the lumbar spine. That occurs as a result of time and activity. The MRI of the lumbar spine also indicated multi-level lumbar spondyloses. Spondyloses was described to mean disease of the joints that join the vertebrae together and increase bone formation in those areas that can cause encroachment on the nerve roots. He stated the degenerative changes occur over a period of time. Dr. Pazell stated that the MRI findings related to Claimant were consistent with a male of his age even without any history of acute or repetitive trauma to the lumbar spine and the changes in Claimant's MRI done in September 2007 of the lumbar spine were consistent with ordinary degeneration caused by aging.
I find Dr. Pazell's conclusions are more credible and persuasive than Dr. Poppa's. Dr. Pazell is a board certified orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Poppa is not. Dr. Pazell reviewed Dr. Strathman's August 30, 2007 records. Dr. Poppa did not. Dr. Pazell explained the basis of his opinion that Claimant's condition was degenerative spondylosis, and that he could not identify that his work for Employer was the prevailing factor in causing his condition. Dr. Poppa did not explain the basis of his opinions.
In conclusion, based upon substantial and competent evidence and the application of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I find in favor of the Employer/Insurer and deny Claimant's request for benefits. I find that Claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof that he sustained an injury by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the scope and course of his employment for Employer. Claimant failed to show that work was the prevailing factor in the cause of his alleged occupational injury and the resulting medical condition. Because I have found that Claimant failed to sustain his
burden of proof that he sustained an injury by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the scope and course of his employment for Employer, Claimant's claim against the Second Injury Fund must also be denied. Section 287.220, RSMo. Claimant's entire claim for benefits, including his claim against Employer/Insurer and The Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, is denied, and all other issues are moot.
Based on the stipulation of the parties, alleged Employer, Harrah's Enter Promus Co, and alleged Insurer, Zurich American Insurance Co. should be dismissed from this case, and they are herby dismissed with prejudice.
Date: April 6, 2009
Made by: /s/ Robert B. Miner
Robert B. Miner
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
A true copy: Attest:
/s/ Naomi Pearson
Naomi Pearson
Division of Workers' Compensation