There is no dispute Fischer suffered a physical injury to his head that required immediate medical attention and suturing as a result of the accident on June 7, 2004. While the degree of injury is contested, there is little dispute that Fischer sustained back strain as a result of the accident. ${ }^{45}$ Moreover, the psychiatric experts on both sides of this case diagnosed Fischer as suffering from Conversion Disorder, a recognized psychiatric condition characterized by unconsciously produced physical neurologic symptoms which are psychological in origin. Missouri has long held that mental or psychological injuries, in addition to physical injuries, can fall under the coverage of the Law. ${ }^{46}$ The central issue here is whether Fischer's psychiatric condition constitutes a compensable injury under the Law.
According to § 287.020.2, an injury is compensable if it is clearly work related. An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. ${ }^{47} The legislature's use of the general article ' a$ ' before 'substantial factor' indicates a causative factor may be substantial even if it is not the primary or most significant factor. "There is no bright line test or minimum percentage defining "substantial factor" as that
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[^0]: ${ }^{41} Ex. 8, depo. ex. 2, p. 10 (emphasis added).
{ }^{42} Ex. 8, p. 28 ll.14-16.
{ }^{43} Id. at ll.21-23.
{ }^{44}$ Ex. H, p.2. See also Ex. A, pp. 38-41 (Dr. Bassett's testimony regarding the significance of the psychological testing "boiler plate" computer output).
${ }^{45} See opinions and records of Drs. Kondro, Miles, Cramp, and Simowitz.
{ }^{46}$ Tibbs v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 691 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Mo.App., S.D. 1985) overruled on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 231. See also, Higgins v. The Quaker Oats Co., 183 S.W.3d 264 (Mo.App., 2005); Bloss v. Plastic Enterprises, 32 S.W.3d 666 (Mo.App., W.D. 2000) (Symptom Magnification Disorder).
${ }^{47}$ A different statutory test applies when a mental injury is alleged to have resulted from work-related stress that does not arise from any disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, termination, or any similar action taken in good faith by an employer. §§ 287.120.8 \& .9 . These statutes are not implicated here.
term is used in this context."48 "[A] mental injury triggered or precipitated by a work-related accident is . . . compensable provided it can be shown that the accident was a substantial factor in causing the injury." ${ }^{49}$ While an injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor, ${ }^{50}$ the work accident may be both a precipitating factor, triggering Fischer's psychiatric disorder, as well as a substantial factor in causing the condition. ${ }^{51}$ Thus, even if Fischer was predisposed to developing Conversion Disorder and his current condition was triggered by the accident on June 7, 2004, Employer may still be liable.
Causation and work relatedness are questions of fact. ${ }^{52}$ However, medical causation of injuries which are "not within common knowledge or experience, must be established by scientific or medical evidence showing the cause and effect relationship between the complained of condition and the asserted cause." ${ }^{53}$ Therefore, whether Fischer's mental injury is compensable turns not only on the proper application of the applicable law, but also on the credibility of the parties' respective experts, particularly that of the psychiatric experts.
Both Dr. Bassett and Dr. Smith are board certified in psychiatry. Both spent a significant amount of time interviewing and evaluating Fischer. Dr. Bassett's evaluation took place in 2006 and he also interviewed Fischer's wife. Dr. Smith evaluated Fischer in 2008 shortly after Fischer was divorced and lost custody of his children. Dr. Smith also requested additional medical records dating back as far as 1990, which she reviewed several months after meeting with Fischer. ${ }^{54}$ Based upon a careful review of these experts' reports and their deposition testimony, as well as the medical records as a whole, I find Dr. Bassett's report, opinions, and testimony more credible and persuasive.
While both psychiatrists diagnose Fischer as having Conversion Disorder, Dr. Smith also concludes that Fischer is exhibiting "some deliberate symptom exaggeration" and that because she did not observe stuttering or tremors while Fischer was in her office, "[t]hese two 'symptoms' were hysterical and/or feigned illness behaviors." ${ }^{55}$ She opines that "the vast majority of his complaints are subjective/voluntary in nature." ${ }^{56}$ These conclusions seem inconsistent and are not adequately explained through her testimony. Also Dr. Smith's report contains several material mistakes that she appears to discover during the course of her deposition. In addition, her report and testimony contain a great deal of speculation and her opinions are unclear. These factors undermine her credibility. For example, on cross examination, Dr. Smith testified that if Fischer had experienced a typical day on June 7, 2004, with no physical injury at home or at work, it is unlikely he would have awakened the next morning with the symptoms that prompted his wife to take him to the hospital. ${ }^{57}$ On redirect, Dr. Smith is asked, "[I]sn't it possible that if a person was going to have some conversion behavior,
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[^0]: ${ }^{48}$ Cahall v. Cahall, 963 S.W.2d 368, 372 ((Mo.App., E.D. 1998) overruled on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 226.
${ }^{49}$ Higgins, 183 S.W.3d at 270, quoting Tangblade v. Lear Corp., 58 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Mo.App. 2001).
${ }^{50} \S 287.020 .2.
{ }^{51} Cahall at 373 .
{ }^{52} Id. at 372 .
{ }^{53}$ Brundige v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.App., W.D. 1991).
${ }^{54}$ These medical records were not offered as evidence and are not in the record.
${ }^{55} Ex. 8, depo ex. 2, p. 33.
{ }^{56} Id. (emphasis in original.)
{ }^{57}$ Ex. 8, p. 72.
or display signs of a conversion disorder, it could be prompted without any kind of injury?" Dr. Smith's response is, "True. I mean, I think - well, okay, true."
Dr. Smith emphasizes three office visits over a short period in 2003 when Fischer was complaining of abdominal problems. She focuses on the single doctor's note dated May 1, 2003, as evidence that Fischer had preexisting Somatoform Disorder. The underlying medical record is not in evidence, but Dr. Smith reports this note without quotations and adds her comment in parenthesis as follows:
More stomach complaints. Upper GI negative. Gall bladder ultrasound negative. Diagnosis functional abdominal bloating and pain. (This is important, as 'functional' means not due to an organic basis, and that a psychologic etiology is presumed. This is pre-6/7/04. ${ }^{58}$
Dr. Bassett's report reflects that he too was aware of a short-lived undiagnosed abdominal complaint in Fischer's past. The significance Dr. Smith attributes to this particular entry seems strained. Similarly, although Fischer's reported physical symptoms were generally the same in 2006 when he saw Dr. Bassett and in 2008 when he saw Dr. Smith, she attributes great significance to Fischer's 2008 marital and custody problems, suggesting they are the cause of his continued psychiatric disorder and may even have caused the condition itself. That suggestion is unpersuasive in the context of the record as a whole.
Dr. Bassett clearly and consistently opines that Fischer's Conversion Disorder was caused by the work accident. In his testimony, Dr. Bassett explains this condition, describing it as a complicated and vexing diagnosis of exclusion. He also explains how he arrived at his diagnosis in this case. When asked on cross examination whether his opinions were based entirely on Fischer's subjective complaints and the information he obtained during his interviews with Fischer and his wife, Dr. Bassett responded:
Well, their subjective information as filtered through the rules and criteria that I have to use as a Psychiatrist with the additional collateral information of the three neurologists - - two of whom were hired by the insurer - - and then with the additional information of the psychological testing which supports a Conversion Disorder diagnosis and yet doesn't show symptom amplifications or the broader somatization disorder diagnosis. ${ }^{59}$
Admitting there is no objective test that can be performed to determine whether Fischer's symptoms are consciously produced (Factitious Disorder) or not consciously produced (Conversion Disorder), Dr. Bassett emphasized,
But, remember, you know, I'm not just relying on what [Fischer] says.
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[^0]: ${ }^{58} Ex. 8, depo. ex. 2.
{ }^{59}$ Ex. A, pp.33-34.
I have collateral information from neurologists who are scratching their heads -- as I read their reports.
I have psychological testing that supports this diagnosis as well.
I know Dr. Peeples and I've seen Dr. Hogan's work. And I mean those two guys, in my experience, they are not, they will call malingering if they think something is malingering.
And they didn't here. That says something to me. ${ }^{60}$
Dr. Bassett also testified at length regarding his reasons for concluding the June 7, 2004, work accident was a substantial factor in causing Fischer's disorder. With respect to the basis for his causation opinion, Dr. Bassett first notes that Fischer was not a sickly person before the accident and had no preexisting psychiatric disorder. The record confirms Fischer's past general good health and no preexisting psychiatric disorders. While Dr. Smith suggests otherwise, even she did not characterize Fischer's Conversion Disorder as preexisting. At most, Dr. Smith seems to suggest that various events in Fischer's past and certain psychological test results predisposed Fischer to develop this condition. "[A] preexisting but non-disabling condition does not bar recovery of compensation if a job-related injury causes the condition to escalate to the level of disability." ${ }^{61}$
In his report and through his testimony, Dr. Bassett discusses the significance of Fischer's good work history, along with its corresponding economic benefits. He emphasizes the importance of the chronology of events beginning with the accident, followed by the onset of some symptoms the very next morning and the onset of most symptoms within a week. Regarding the connection between the condition and the accident itself, Dr. Bassett testified,
Well, he struck his back and/or head.
And it's not much of a reach that a person who really doesn't understand the body might think that if one of those parts of the body get hit, they're supposed to have a neurologic sequelae.
But I don't want to make the implication here that he's consciously saying wow, I whacked my back and/or head and now I've got to start stuttering.
It's happening as far as we understand it on a, on a nonconscious level. ${ }^{62}$
Dr. Bassett admits he cannot connect the mechanism of injury physically with all of Fischer's symptoms. ${ }^{63}$ However, the fact that Fischer sustained a blow to his head and/or back is clearly
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[^0]: ${ }^{60} Id. at pp.22, 28, 36-37.
{ }^{61}$ Higgins, 183 S.W.3d at 271 (Mo.App., W.D. 2005) quoting Miller v. Wefelmeyer, 890 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Mo.App., E.D. 1994).
${ }^{62} Ex. A, pp.23-24.
{ }^{63}$ Id. at p. 28.
significant to Dr. Bassett given the facts of this case. Regarding Fischer's deceased half-siblings, Dr. Bassett testified, "You know, [Fischer] has this exposure to his siblings. And then he whacks his central nervous system and now he's got an impairment also. But again, it's not a rational, reasoned process that now that I've hit my back, I'm going to be like my half brother and half sister. . . . [I]t's subconscious or nonconscious." ${ }^{64}$ "The ultimate importance of the expert testimony is to be determined from the testimony as a whole and less than direct statements of reasonable medical certainty will be sufficient." ${ }^{65}
In its post hearing brief, Employer quotes \S 287.190 .6(2),{ }^{66}$ "where inconsistent or conflicting medical opinions exist, objective medical findings shall prevail over subjective medical findings." This provision, however, was enacted as part of the 2005 legislative changes to the Law and after the accident. There are two exceptions to the rule that a statute shall not be applied retrospectively - first, where the statute is only procedural and does not affect any substantive right of the parties and, second, where the legislature manifests a clear intent for retrospective application. ${ }^{67}$ Section 287.190 contains no clear manifestation for retrospective application. It does, however, add the new requirement that objective findings shall prevail over subjective findings, mandating "a biased assessment of the evidence," which in this case could "amount to a preemptive determination of whether the employee has met his or her burden of proof." ${ }^{68}$ The statutory provision relied upon by Employer is inapplicable.
Fischer has met his burden of proving a causal connection between the accident and the development of his psychiatric disorder. From the time he stopped drinking in 1991 until the day of the accident, Fischer was a hard worker who enjoyed working (as much as 60-80 hours per week), earning money, working around his house, helping his friends with work at their homes, and playing with his children. He lived in the same area most of his life. He knew the roads well and had a good memory. After the accident, in which he sustained back strain and a blow to the head that required immediate medical attention, Fischer developed Conversion Disorder. Fischer did not stutter or have speech problems before the accident. These problems began for the first time the day after the accident. Within a week after the accident, Fischer was experiencing back pain, shaking, muscle spasms, twitching in his arms, tremors, and involuntary movement of his head. He was thoroughly examined and tested and not one of the 11 specialists involved in this case accused him of malingering. Although he returned to work at the end of October 2004 and sought no medical treatment between the time he returned to work and the time Employer required him to stop working in April 2005, it is clear from the record and Mitchell's testimony that Fischer was symptomatic that entire period of time. Employer required very little from him during that period. Fischer's only responsibility was to drive. Still, he had visible physical difficulty and often could not remember where he was supposed to go or how to get there. With that information in mind, it does not follow that Fischer's past history could be construed to be the single cause of his current medical condition.
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[^0]: ${ }^{64} Id. at pp. 28, 42-43.
{ }^{65}$ Thorsen v. Sachs Electric Co., 52 S.W.3d 611 (Mo.App., W.D. 2001) overruled on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 225.
${ }^{66} RSMo Supp. 2008.
{ }^{67}$ Fletcher v. Second Injury Fund, 922 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Mo.App., W.D. 1996) overruled on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 227.
${ }^{68}$ Missouri Alliance for Retired Americans v. DOLIR, 277 S.W.3d 670, 682 (Mo banc. 2009)(Teitelman, J., dissenting).
The preponderance of the credible medical evidence supports a finding of medical causation and, specifically, attribution of Fischer's Conversion and Adjustment Disorders to the June 7, 2004, work accident. Even if Fischer had a psychological profile predisposing him to develop Conversion Disorder, he had not previously experienced such disorder and it is more probable than not that the blow to his head and back when he hit the crawler bucket was the causal event for his psychiatric disorders. Based on the evidence as a whole, and the credible expert opinions and testimony of Dr. Bassett, ${ }^{69}$ I find that Fischer's June 7, 2004, accident was a substantial factor in causing Fischer's Conversion Disorder and the Adjustment Disorder he developed as the result of experiencing conversion symptoms.