Based on a comprehensive review of the substantial and competent evidence, including the testimony of Claimant, the medical reports and records, the deposition of Dr. Stuckmeyer, the stipulations of the parties, and my personal observations of Claimant at the hearing, I make the following Rulings of Law:
- Did Claimant sustain an injury by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer, and if so, was his injury medically causally related to an accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment?
Section 287.800, RSMo ${ }^{1}$ provides in part that administrative law judges shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly and shall weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when weighing evidence and resolving factual conflicts.
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ All statutory references are to RSMo 2006 unless otherwise indicated. In a workers' compensation case, the statute in effect at the time of the injury is generally the applicable version. Chouteau v. Netco Construction, 132 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Mo.App. 2004); Tillman v. Cam's Trucking Inc., 20 S.W.3d 579, 585-86 (Mo.App. 2000). See also Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 217 S.W.3d 345 (Mo.App. 2007).
Section 287.808, RSMo provides:
The burden of establishing any affirmative defense is on the employer. The burden of proving an entitlement to compensation under this chapter is on the employee or dependent. In asserting any claim or defense based on a factual proposition, the party asserting such claim or defense must establish that such proposition is more likely to be true than not true.
Section 287.020.2, RSMo provides:
The word 'accident' as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
Section 287.020.3, RSMo provides in part:
- (1) In this chapter the term 'injury' is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. 'The prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
(3) An injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is not compensable.
(5) The terms 'injury' and 'personal injuries' shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body. . . .
Section 287.020.10, RSMo provides:
In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of 'accident', 'occupational disease', 'arising out of', and 'in the course of the employment' to include, but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care and Rehabilitation, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc 1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999) and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
Section 287.120.1, RSMo provides in part: "Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person."
Section 287.030.2, RSMo provides: "2. Any reference to the employer shall also include his or her insurer or group self-insurer."
A claimant has the burden to prove all the essential elements of his or her case, and a claim will not be validated where some essential element is lacking. Thorsen v. Sachs Electric Company, 52 S.W.3d 611, 618 (Mo.App. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Mo.banc 2003)²; Cook v. Sunnen Products Corp., 937 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo. App. 1996). The purpose of the workers' compensation act is "to place upon industry the losses sustained by employees resulting from injuries arising out of and in the course of employment." Schoemehl v. Treasurer of State, 217 S.W.3d 900, 901 (Mo. banc 2007).
The claimant in a workers' compensation proceeding has the burden of proving all elements of the claim to a reasonable probability. Cardwell v. Treasurer of State of Missouri, 249 S.W.3d 902, 912 (Mo.App. 2008); Cooper v. Medical Center of Independence, 955 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Mo.App. 1997); Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 620; Downing v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Mo.App. 1995; Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Mo.App. 1990). "Probable means
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[^0]: ${ }^{2}$ Several cases are cited herein that were among many overruled by Hampton on an unrelated issue (Id. at 224-32). Such cases do not otherwise conflict with Hampton and are cited for legal principles unaffected thereby; thus Hampton's effect thereon will not be further noted.
founded on reason and experience which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room to doubt." Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 620; Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App 1986); Fischer, 793 S.W.2d at 198. Such proof is made only by competent and substantial evidence. It may not rest on speculation. Griggs v. A. B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo.App. 1974). Expert testimony may be required where there are complicated medical issues. Goleman v. MCI Transporters, 844 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo.App. 1992). "Medical causation of injuries which are not within common knowledge or experience, must be established by scientific or medical evidence showing the cause and effect relationship between the complained of condition and the asserted cause." Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 618; Brundige v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.App 1991).
Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony which it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co. Inc., 1 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo.App. 1999); Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo.App. 1992); Hutchinson v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo.App. 1986). The Commission's decision will generally be upheld if it is consistent with either of two conflicting medical opinions. Smith v. Donco Const., 182 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Mo.App. 2006). The acceptance or rejection of medical evidence is for the Commission. Smith, 182 S.W.3d at 701; Bowers v. Hiland Dairy Co., 132 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo.App. 2004).
The court in Hager v. Syberg's Westport, 2010 WL 623685, 3 (Mo.App. E.D. 2010) states at 4 :
As part of the 2005 amendments, the Legislature 'revised [Section 287.020.3(2) ] to narrow the scope of those injuries that will be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment.' Miller v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com'n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. banc 2009). Under the current version of Section 287.020.3(2), an injury 'is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.' Johnson, 281 S.W.3d at 891; see also Missouri Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep't of Labor and Indus. Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 684 (Mo. banc 2009). Furthermore, Section 287.800 requires this Court to strictly construe Section 287.020.3. Gordon v. City of Ellisville, 268 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Mo.App.E.D.2008).
The court in Bivins v. St. John's Regional Health Center, 272 SW3d 446 (Mo.App. 2009) states at 449 :
The burden rests upon the employee to show some direct causal connection between the injury and the employment. An award of compensation may be at issue if the injury were a rational consequence of some hazard connected with the employment. However, the employment must in some way expose the employee to an unusual risk or injury from such agency which is not shared by the general public. The injury must have been a rational consequence of that hazard to which the employee has been exposed and which exists because of and is part of the employment. It is not sufficient that the employment may simply furnish an indication for an injury for some unconnected source.
See also Miller v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com'n, 287 S.W.3d 671 (Mo. 2009), where the Missouri Supreme Court states at 674: "An injury will not be deemed to arise out of employment if it merely happened to occur while working but work was not a prevailing factor. . . ."
Based on all of the evidence and the application of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I find that Claimant has met his burden to prove that he sustained a compensable injury by accident in the course of his employment for Employer on March 9, 2009, and that his accident was the prevailing factor in causing his low back injury, and the resulting disability, and the need for additional medical treatment. I find that Dr. Stuckmeyer's conclusions are credible, persuasive, and uncontroverted, and prove the probability that Claimant sustained an accident in Claimant's workplace while employed by Employer and that the accident was the prevailing factor in causing his low back injury, disability, and need for medical treatment. These findings and conclusions are supported by the following.
Claimant testified that when he struck a board with the thirty pound mallet he felt pain and a burning sensation in his chest and thought he was having a heart attack. I believe Claimant's testimony and find it to be true. Claimant testified that he discussed hitting the hammer at the hospital and also when he visited Dr. Zaman on March 12, 2009. I believe Claimant's testimony despite that history not being in the records. I find that despite the history of Claimant having pain while striking a board with a mallet not being contained in the Heartland record or Dr. Zaman's record, Claimant nevertheless sustained an injury to his back at work on March 9, 2009.
Claimant was noted on March 9, 2009 at Heartland to have been diagnosed with back pain. Dr. Zaman's March 12, 2009 record notes that Claimant had dull radiating pain that radiated anteriorly to his mid shins. Dr. Zaman assessed lower back pain on March 12, 2009.
The March 24, 2009 lumbar MRI includes impressions of small to moderately sized central disc protrusion at L3-4 without evidence of nerve root compression and moderately-sized broad-based central disc protrusion at L4-5.
Dr. Stuckmeyer concluded that Claimant sustained an accident when he was swinging a thirty pound mallet and struck a board on March 9, 2009. He stated that "As a direct, proximate, and prevailing factor of the accident of March 9, 2009, Mr. Embrey sustained a recurrent injury to his lumbar spine with a development of radicular symptoms into both the right and left lower extremity." I find Dr. Stuckmeyer's opinion to be credible.
Dr. Stuckmeyer noted that the post-injury MRI revealed evidence of disc pathology at L3-L4 and L4-L5. He testified he was aware of no MRIs showing any potential preexisting damage. He testified that the damage noted in the 2009 MRI was mechanically consistent with the mechanism of injury described by Claimant. He noted Claimant developed symptoms of lower back pain three days after March 9, 2009, and that the mechanism of Claimant's injury could easily cause pain in the thoracolumbar spine that then three days later localized down at the lower back. I find this opinion to be credible.
Employer offered no report or deposition of another medical expert to controvert Dr. Stuckmeyer's opinions.
I find it significant that there is no evidence in the record that Claimant received any treatment for low back complaints between January 21, 2005 and March 9, 2009. I find it also significant that Claimant worked as a frame operator for Employer for ten years prior to the March 9, 2009 incident. The records in evidence indicate that the only time that Claimant missed work because of any back injury prior to March 9, 2009 during that ten year period was for approximately one week in October 2000, and for up to approximately ten days between January 11, 2005 and January 21, 2005, when Claimant was released to full duty work.
Employer argues Claimant's injury came from a hazard or risk unrelated to his employment. Employer argues that the claim should be denied because of Claimant's long-standing lower back problems and because the treatment records of Heartland and Dr. Zaman do not include a reference to Claimant swinging the thirty pound mallet when he felt pain. I find Claimant's prior back injuries had resolved before his March 9, 2009 injury.
I find that Claimant's injury did not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to his employment. Employer sites Johnson v. Indiana Western Express, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 885 (Mo.App. 2009). I find that the Johnson case is distinguishable from the facts at hand. I
find that in the case at hand, Claimant has proven that the work accident was the prevailing factor in causing Claimant's medical condition, disability, and need for treatment. I find that Claimant has proven that there was a distinct accident that caused a need for treatment, and that his condition does not simply represent an aggravation of a preexisting condition.
I find that Claimant's employment by Employer on March 9, 2009 exposed him to an unusual risk or injury which was not shared by the general public, and that his injury was a rational consequence of a hazard to which he had been exposed and which existed because of and as part of his employment.
I find that Claimant had an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain that was identifiable by time and place of occurrence when he struck the board with a thirty pound mallet on March 9, 2009 at work, that produced at the time objective symptoms of an injury, the pain and burning sensation in his chest, which was caused by a specific event during a single work shift. I find Claimant had a compensable accident on March 9, 2009 as defined by Section 287.020.2. I further find that Claimant's accident was the prevailing factor in causing the resulting medical condition and disability, and also need for additional medical treatment.
I find that Claimant had an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment for Employer on March 9, 2009 and that Claimant's accident was the prevailing factor in causing the resulting medical condition and disability, and also the need for additional medical treatment.
Liability for temporary total disability
The burden of proving entitlement to temporary total disability benefits is on the Employee. Boyles v. USA Rebar Placement, Inc. 26 S.W.3d 418, 426 (Mo.App. 2000); Cooper v. Medical Center of Independence, 955 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Mo.App. 1997). Section 287.170.1, RSMo provides that an injured employee is entitled to be paid compensation during the continuance of temporary total disability up to a maximum of 400 weeks. Total disability is defined in Section 287.020.7, RSMo as the "inability to return to any employment and not merely . . . [the] inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident." Compensation is payable until the employee is able to find any reasonable or normal employment or until his medical condition has reached the point where further improvement is not anticipated. Cardwell v. Treasurer of State of Missouri, 249 S.W.3d 902, 909 (Mo.App. 2008); Cooper, 955 S.W.2d at 575; Vinson v. Curators of Un. of Missouri, 822 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo.App. 1991); Phelps v. Jeff Wolk Construction Co., 803 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Mo.App. 1991); Williams v. Pillsbury Co., 694 S.W.2d 488, 489 (Mo.App. 1985). An injured employee is not required, however, to be completely inactive or inert in order to be totally
disabled. Gordon v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 908 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Mo.App. 1995); Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo.App.1990).
Temporary total disability benefits should be awarded only for the period before the employee can return to work. Cardwell, 249 S.W.3d at 909; Boyles, 26 S.W.3d at 424; Cooper, 955 S.W.2d at 575; Phelps, 803 S.W.2d at 645; Williams, 649 S.W.2d at 489. With respect to possible employment, the test is "whether any employer, in the usual course of business, would reasonably be expected to employ Claimant in his present physical condition." Boyles, 26 S.W.3d at 424; Cooper, 955 S.W.2d at 575; Brookman v. Henry Transp., 924 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Mo.App. 1996). A nonexclusive list of other factors relevant to a claimant's employability on the open market includes the anticipated length of time until claimant's condition has reached the point of maximum medical progress, the nature of the continuing course of treatment, and whether there is a reasonable expectation that claimant will return to his or her former employment. Cooper, 955 S.W.2d at 576. A significant factor in judging the reasonableness of the inference that a claimant would not be hired is the anticipated length of time until claimant's condition has reached the point of maximum medical progress. If the period is very short, then it would always be reasonable to infer that a claimant could not compete on the open market. If the period is quite long, then it would never be reasonable to make such an inference. Boyles, 26 S.W.3d at 425; Cooper, 955 S.W.2d at 575-76.
Claimant requests an award for past and future temporary total disability benefits. Claimant testified he returned to work after March 12, 2009, but he could not function 100 %. He stopped work on May 4, 2009 because his back was bothering him a lot. He was not under a doctor's orders to stop work on May 4, 2009. Claimant testified he still has a lot of lower back pain. He is limited in walking. He does not want to lift because he does not want to make things worse. He testified he has not worked since May 4, 2009. I find this testimony to be credible.
Claimant was not working at the time of the December 8, 2009 hearing, and had not worked from May 4, 2009 through the date of the hearing. Dr. Zaman provided work limitations for Claimant on May 20, 2009 on a Certification of Health Care Provider form. That form notes: "fax to Herm Bauer." Dr. Zaman noted it would be hard for Claimant to sit or stand for very long. I find that opinion credible. Dr. Zaman's Certification form notes he could not predict when Claimant could return to full time work, and noted neurosurgery was to decide. Claimant testified Employer did not accommodate Dr. Zaman's restrictions. No evidence was offered that Employer has offered Claimant accommodated or light duty work. I find Employer did not offer Claimant accommodated or light duty work after May 4, 2009.
Dr. Zaman has not released Claimant to return to work. Dr. Belville did not address Claimant's ability to work, or his return to work status when she saw him on
September 8, 2009. Her report does not note that she released Claimant to return to work. Employer has not brought Claimant back to work.
Based upon the foregoing, I find that Claimant has proven that as a result of his low back injury at Employer on March 9, 2009, he has not been able to return to work, has been temporarily and totally disabled, and is entitled to temporary total benefits, from May 20, 2009 up to the date of hearing on December 8, 2009, and ongoing, until he reaches maximum medical improvement, or is able to compete in the open labor market for employment, or until 400 weeks of temporary disability benefits have been paid, or until Claimant's death, whichever first occurs, pursuant to Section 287.170, RSMo. The temporary total disability payments shall be paid at the rate of $\ 666.67 per week.
I therefore order Employer/Insurer to pay Claimant temporary total disability benefits from May 20, 2009 through December 8, 2009, the date of the temporary hearing in this case, which is $286 / 7 weeks, at the rate of \ 666.67 per week, which amounts to $\ 19,238.19 for the period May 20, 2009 through December 8, 2009.
In addition, I order Employer/Insurer to pay Claimant temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $\ 666.67 per week from December 9, 2009 until Claimant has reached maximum medical improvement, or as otherwise provided in Section 287.170, RSMo.
Liability for additional medical aid
Claimant is requesting an award of additional medical aid. Section 287.140, RSMo requires that the employer/insurer provide "such medical, surgical, chiropractic, and hospital treatment $\ldots as may reasonably be required \ldots$ to cure and relieve [the employee] from the effects of the injury." Medical aid is a component of the compensation due an injured worker under section 287.140.1, RSMo. Mathia v. Contract Freighters, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 271, 277 (Mo.App. 1996). Claimant needs to prove that work was the prevailing factor in causing his injury and disability. Gordon v. City of Ellisville, 268 S.W.3d 454 (Mo.App. 2008).
While Employer has the right to name the treating physician, he or she may waive that right by failing or neglecting to provide necessary medical aid. Herring v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 816, 822 (Mo.App. 1995); Emert v. Ford Motor Company, 863 S.W.2d 629, 631(Mo.App. 1993); Hawkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 676 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo.App. 1984). Where the employer with notice of an injury refuses or neglects to provide necessary medical care, Claimant may make his own selection and have the cost assessed against the employer. Herring, 914 S.W2d at 822.
I have previously found that Claimant sustained an injury to his low back arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer which resulted from an accident, and that the accident was the prevailing factor in causing his injury, and his resulting disability.
Claimant continues to have pain in his low back and lower extremities. Claimant testified he is asking the Administrative Law Judge for a pain management referral. Dr. Stuckmeyer recommended referral to a pain management group for consideration of epidural injections. Claimant has not had a pain management referral recommended by Dr. Stuckmeyer. Dr. Belville noted on September 8, 2009 that Claimant complained of pain in his low back going to his thighs, and numbness and tingling. She noted his pain was worse with bending. She recommended conservative treatment first and gave a prescription for physical therapy. She discussed epidural steroid injections, but her report does not indicate they were provided. Claimant had physical therapy on September 22, 2009. Claimant reported pain of $6 / 10$ and tingling down both legs when he had physical therapy on September 22, 2009.
No evidence was offered that epidurals have been provided or that Claimant has been referred to a pain management group. I find the opinion of Dr. Stuckmeyer that Claimant be referred to a pain management group for consideration of epidural injections to be credible. I find that Claimant's accident at work on May 9, 2009 is the prevailing factor in the need for that additional medical treatment for Claimant.
Based upon the foregoing, I find that Claimant continues to suffer from pain in his low back, and pain and numbness in his lower extremities as a result of his March 9, 2009 work injury. I find that Claimant is in need of further medical treatment to cure and relieve his symptoms resulting from that injury. I also find Employer/Insurer has failed to provide necessary medical care to Claimant and has waived the right to select the treating physician. Claimant may select the treating physician and have the cost assessed against Employer/Insurer. Herring, 914 S.W.2d at 822.
Employer/Insurer is directed to authorize and furnish additional medical treatment to cure and relieve Claimant from the effects of his March 9, 2009 work injury, including the treatment recommended by Dr. James Stuckmeyer, in accordance with Section 287.140, RSMo.
Attorney's fees.
Claimant's attorney is entitled to a fair and reasonable fee in accordance with Section 287.260, RSMo. An attorney's fee may be based on all parts of an award, including the award of medical expenses. Page v. Green, 758 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo.App. 1988). Claimant's attorney did not offer a written fee agreement in evidence at the
hearing. However, during the hearing, and in Claimant's presence, Claimant's attorney requested a fee of 25 % of all benefits to be awarded. Claimant did not object to that request. I find Claimant's attorney, Michael H. Stang, is entitled to and is awarded an attorney's fee of 25 % of all amounts awarded for necessary legal services rendered to Claimant. The compensation awarded to Claimant shall be subject to a lien in the amount of 25 % of all payments hereunder in favor of the following attorney for necessary legal services rendered to Claimant: Michael H. Stang.
This award is temporary or partial in nature, is subject to further order, and the proceedings are hereby continued and kept open until a final award can be made.
Made by: /s/ Robert B. Miner<br>Robert B. Miner<br>Administrative Law Judge<br>Division of Workers' Compensation
This award is dated and attested to this $\underline{9} th day of \underline{\text { March, } 2010 .}$