Under § 287.220.1 RSMo, when an employee is permanently and totally disabled by a combination of the primary injury and pre-existing disabilities, the employer is responsible for only the disability benefits attributable to the primary injury and the remainder of the disability benefits are the responsibility of the Second Injury Fund. Hughey v. Chrysler Corp., 34 S.W.3d 845, 847 (Mo. App. 2000).
First, both parties agree that the November 16, 2007, accident resulted in permanent disability to employee's body as a whole. Second, they also agree that employee is now permanently totally disabled, as defined by $\S 287.020 .6$ RSMo. Therefore, the primary issues to be determined are: 1) At the time of the November 16, 2007, accident, did employee suffer from pre-existing disabilities that posed a hindrance and obstacle to his employment or reemployment?; and 2) If employee suffered from such pre-existing disabilities, did the November 16, 2007, accidental injury, considered alone, result in employee's permanent total disability, or was employee rendered permanently totally disabled as a result of the primary injury combining with employee's pre-existing disabilities?
With regard to the first issue, although Dr. Carr provided ratings for employee's preexisting disabilities, Mr. Eldred is the only expert that provided an opinion with regard to whether the pre-existing conditions constituted a hindrance or obstacle to his employment. After personally examining employee and reviewing his medical history, records of past
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medical treatment, and the results of the examination by Dr. Carr, Mr. Eldred concluded that employee's impairments prior to November 16, 2007, were, in fact, vocationally disabling and constituted a hindrance or obstacle to his employment.
Based on Mr. Eldred's uncontradicted opinion, we find that, at the time of the November 16, 2007, accident, employee suffered from pre-existing disabilities that posed a hindrance and obstacle to his employment. Having come to this conclusion, we must now turn to precedent for guidance in evaluating cases involving pre-existing disabilities.
The court in *Kizior v. Trans World Airlines*, 5 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. App. 1999), overruled on other grounds, *Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection*, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003) set out a step-by-step test for determining Second Injury Fund liability in cases involving pre-existing disabilities:
Section 287.220.1 contains four distinct steps in calculating the compensation due an employee, and from what source, in cases involving permanent disability: (1) the employer's liability is considered in isolation – 'the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability'; (2) Next, the degree or percentage of the employee's disability attributable to all injuries existing at the time of the accident is considered; (3) The degree or percentage of disability existing prior to the last injury, combined with the disability resulting from the last injury, considered alone, is deducted from the combined disability; and (4) The balance becomes the responsibility of the Second Injury Fund.
*Kizior v. Trans World Airlines*, 5 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999).
In considering employer's liability in isolation, we are not bound by employee and employer's Stipulation for Compromise Settlement in which employee agreed to settle his claim against employer for 28% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole attributable to the November 16, 2007, back injury. However, said agreement does serve as relevant evidence of the nature and extent of the employee's permanent disability attributable to the primary injury. *Totten v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri*, as *Custodian of the Second Injury Fund*, 116 S.W.3d 624, 628 (Mo. App. 2003).
When the administrative law judge considered employer's liability in isolation, he came to the conclusion that the primary injury is solely responsible for employee's permanent total disability. In arriving at said conclusion, the administrative law judge relied heavily on his unsupported finding that employee's restrictions on standing, walking, sitting, and use of narcotic medication are all solely the result of employee's primary injury. Based on Mr. Eldred's testimony, we disagree with the administrative law judge.
Mr. Eldred specifically testified that it is a combination of both employee's back problems and knee problems that contribute to employee's restrictions on standing and
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sitting. In addition, Mr. Eldred testified that employee should not "work in extreme hot or cold, specifically based on [the] knee replacement." Mr. Eldred went on to state that employee should not work "around vi