Mr. Edwards' permanent and total disability is as a result of the physical residuals from his primary injury and his subsequent 2004 injury at home, and not a combination of his primary injury and pre-existing disabilities.
A court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 SW 3d 220, 222223 (Mo. Banc 2003)
When there are opinions of medical experts that are conflicting, the fact finding body determines whose opinion is most credible. The fact finder may reject all or part of an expert's testimony. Bennett v. Columbia Health Care 134 S.W.3d 84 (Mo.App WD 2004), citing Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co., 1 SW 3d 43, 48 (Mo. App. ED 1999).
I find that there is substantial and credible evidence to indicate employee's primary injury combined with his subsequent 2004 back injury have caused his permanent and total disability.
I find that Dr. Stuckmeyer's opinion that the June 2004 back injury while Mr. Edwards was rising from the couch at home was the "same chain of events" as the 2003 work injury (Exhibit I; page 9) lacks credibility.
Mr. Edwards admitted on cross examination that the employer refused to pay for the additional surgery that he underwent as a result of this June 2004 injury and moreover, there was no compensation paid to Mr. Edwards from the employer for this alleged "ongoing" injury to his back. (See Exhibit F, page 2 where the Stipulation expressly discusses this issue) I find that Mr. Edwards is bound to the stipulation he entered into with Honeywell (Exhibit F) under Connley v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 999 S.W. 2d 269, 274 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). In Connley the court held that a settlement approved by an ALJ is conclusive and irrevocable, and when approved a settlement of workers' compensation claim is the basis of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. Since Mr. Edwards signed, and the judge approved the stipulation for settlement (Exhibit F) he cannot, for purposes of the trial against the Second Injury Fund, now allege that his 2004 back injury was part of his 2003 work injury. Exhibit F specifically indicates the 2004 injury occurred at home rather than being work related.
Mr. Edwards was performing incredibly heavy work for Honeywell before his 2003 work injury, full time, without restriction, and without the need for medication or assistive ambulatory devices. Following his 2003 work injury and the 2004 aggravating injury at home, Mr. Edwards suffers with extreme pain, walks with a cane, requires heavy doses of narcotic pain medication, has extreme sleep disruption, cannot perform his usual activities of daily living, naps daily, and has difficulty with concentration.
With reference to Mr. Edwards' pre-existing disabilities, he was under no doctor's care, on no narcotic pain medication, was working full time, and had no restrictions imposed on him for any of his alleged prior disabilities before the 2003 work-related injury occurred. In fact, Mr. Edwards was performing extremely heavy work for Honeywell-including lifting up to 400 pounds . He was employed by Honeywell for 26 years and received good evaluations with the employer.
I find that employee is permanently and totally disabled as a result of his 2003 work injury plus the subsequent 2004 aggravation. The test for permanent total disability is the worker's ability to compete in the open labor market. ABB Power T \& D Co. v. Kempker et al. (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) citing Sutton v. Vee Jay Cement Contracting Co., 37 S.W.3d 803, 811 (Mo. App. 2000). The critical question is whether in the ordinary course of business, any employer reasonably would be expected to hire the injured worker, given his present physical condition. Id. at 4, citing Gassen v. Liebengood, 134 S.W.3d 75 (Mo.App. W.D. 2004)
Under the Missouri Worker's Compensation Act total disability is defined as the inability to return to any employment. Messex v. Sachs Elec. Co,, 989 S.W.2d. 206, 210 (Mo. App. E.D.
1999). The words "inability to return to any employment" mean that the employee is unable to perform the usual duties of the employment under consideration in the manner that such duties are customarily performed by the average person engaged in such employment." Kowalski v. MG Metals and Sale, 631 S.W.2d. 919, 922 (Mo. App. S.D. 1982). The primary determination for permanent total disability is whether the employee is able to compete in the open labor market. Messex, 989 S.W.2d. at 210. A determination of permanent total disability focuses on the ability or inability of the employee to perform the usual duties of various employments in the manner that such duties are customarily performed by the average person engaged in such employment. Gordon v. Tri-State Motor Transit, 908 S.W.2d. 849 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995). There are many factors that may be considered in this assessment including a claimant's physical and mental condition, age, education, job experience and skills in order to determine whether a claimant is permanently and totally disabled. See Tiller v. 166 Auto Auction, 941 S.W.2d. 863 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997).
Due to the 2003 work-related injury combined with the 2004 aggravating injury sustained while at home, Mr. Edwards suffered from such overwhelming pain complaints and physical restrictions that he has never returned to work in the open labor market.
I find it important to note that following his 2003 work injury, Mr. Edwards continued to work for Honeywell. Albeit an accommodated, light duty position, Mr. Edwards continued to be employed in the open labor market at that time. In Jason Rector v. Gary's Heating and Cooling and the Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 293 SW3d 143 (Mo. Ct. App. SD 2009) the employee injured himself in 2004, went back to his place of employment and performed work on a part time basis, was accommodated by the employer, and was taking high doses of narcotic pain medication during the day. The employee then injured himself again on the job in 2005. The administrative law judge found that the employee was "able to work" following the 2004 injury and the combination of the 2004 and 2005 injuries rendered the employee permanently and totally disabled. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the administrative law judge. Given the part-time, accommodated work that the employee was performing in the Rector case, the Court essentially found the employee to be employable on the open labor market prior to his 2005 work injury. Similarly, in Miller v. State Treasurer, 978 S.W. 2d 808 (Mo. App. 1998), the Court refused affirm the Commission's finding that the employee's pre-existing condition alone rendered her permanently and totally disabled as she continued to work before the primary injury occurred.
In the case at hand, it was not until the 2004 aggravation that Mr. Edwards stopped working in the open labor market. I do not find that Mr. Edwards was unemployable, thus permanently and totally disabled under Rector and Messex until after his 2004 back injury at home. That is not the responsibility of the Second Injury Fund.
Based on the foregoing, I find that Mr. Edwards is unemployable in the open labor market as a result of his 2003 work injury and his subsequent 2004 aggravation. For the reasons stated above, I find that Mr. Edwards current permanent and total disability is the result of his 2003 work-related injury combined with his 2004 injury rather than as a result of his 2003 work-
related injury in combination with any pre-existing disabilities. Thus, I find no Second Injury Fund liability.