The Workers' Compensation Law for the State of Missouri underwent substantial change on or about August 28, 2005. However, in light of the underlying workers' compensation case involving an accident occurring on May 10, 2005, the legislative changes occurring in August 2005 enjoy only limited application to this case. The legislation in effect on May 10, 2005, which is substantive in nature, and not procedural, governs the adjudication of this case. Accordingly, in this context, several familiar principles govern this case.
The fundamental purpose of The Workers' Compensation Law for the State of Missouri is to place upon industry the losses sustained by employees resulting from injuries arising out of
and in the course of employment. The law is to be broadly and liberally interpreted and is intended to extend its benefits to the largest possible class. Any question as to the right of an employee to compensation must be resolved in favor of the injured employee. Cherry v. Powdered Coatings, 897 S.W. 2d 664 (Mo.App., E.D. 1995); Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Services, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo.Banc 1983). Yet, a liberal construction cannot be applied in order to excuse an element lacking in the claim. Johnson v. City of Kirksville, 855 S.W.2d 396 (Mo.App., W.D. 1993).
The party claiming benefits under The Workers' Compensation Law for the State of Missouri bears the burden of proving all material elements of his or her claim. Duncan v. Springfield R-12 School District, 897 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo.App. S.D. 1995), citing Meilves v. Morris, 442 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Mo. 1968); Bruflat v. Mister Guy, Inc. 933 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Mo.App. W.D. 1996); and Decker v. Square D Co. 974 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo.App. W.D. 1998). Where several events, only one being compensable, contribute to the alleged disability, it is the claimant's burden to prove the nature and extent of disability attributable to the job-related injury.
Yet, the claimant need not establish the elements of the case on the basis of absolute certainty. It is sufficient if the claimant shows them to be a reasonable probability. "Probable", for the purpose of determining whether a worker's compensation claimant has shown the elements of a case by reasonable probability, means founded on reason and experience, which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room for doubt. See, Cook v. St. Mary's Hospital, 939 S.W.2d 934 (Mo.App., W.D. 1997); White v. Henderson Implement Co., 879 S.W.2d 575,577 (Mo.App., W.D. 1994); and Downing v. Williamette Industries, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 650 (Mo.App., W.D. 1995). All doubts must be resolved in favor of the employee and in favor of coverage. Johnson v. City of Kirksville, 855 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Mo.App. W.D. 1993).
In addition, in the context of this case and premised on the understanding that the workrelated accident must constitute a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability, an accident is recognized as being compensable "if it is clearly work related". In examining whether an injury is clearly work related, Section 287.020.2, RSMo. 1993, in pertinent part states:
An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
The term "injury" is defined in Section 287.020.3 RSMo., 1993. The legislation reads as follows:
3.(1) In this Chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. The injury must be incidental to and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. Ordinary, gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging shall not be compensable, except where the deterioration or degeneration follows as an incident of employment.
In this context the employee must establish a causal connection between the accident and the claimed injuries. Thorsen v. Sachs Electric Company, 52 S.W.3d 611, 618 (Mo.App. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Mo. 2003). An injury is clearly work related, "if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor." Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1999). A substantial factor does not have to be the primary or most significant causative factor. Cahall v. Cahall, 963 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Mo.App 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 226.
Notably, an accident may be both a triggering event and a substantial factor in causing an injury. Further, there is no "bright-line test or minimum percentage set out in the Workers' Compensation Law defining 'substantial factor.'" Cahall at 372.
I.
Accident \& Injury
The parties readily acknowledge that on May 10, 2005, Thomas Construction was engaged in a commercial construction project involving the construction of a motel. This job included installation of a galvanized steel laundry chute, which came in separate pieces (weighing approximately 45 to 60 pounds) and required workers to fit the pieces together similar to a stove pipe. This installation process required at least two workers to position the two pieces together, allowing the top piece to drop slowly into the bottom piece. The workers would situate themselves at different levels. One worker would be situated on the first floor, while a second worker would be situated on the floor above.
Further, the parties stipulate that on May 10, 2005, while engaged in the installation process of installing a galvanized steel laundry chute, the employee sustained an injury by accident, which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the employer. This accident occurred while Mr. Stark was working with a coworker. Mr. Stark was situated on the second floor; the coworker was situated on the first floor. As the two men were holding on to the laundry chute from different levels, the chute slipped out of the coworker's hands, resulting in Mr. Stark holding the weight of the entire piece of metal, as well as being jerked forward, downward and against a wall to the right. Mr. Stark attempted to keep the laundry chute from falling to the ground and hitting a worker below by holding on to it. As he held the chute, it pulled him to his knees, and eventually he had to let go.
This incident caused Mr. Stark to experience immediate burning pain in his lower back and down his right thigh and lower extremity. Although the parties stipulate to Mr. Stark sustaining a compensable work injury involving an injury to the low back, the parties differ as to the nature and extent of the injury.
II.
Nature \& Extent of Permanent Disability
The employee, relying principally upon the medical opinion of Dr. Koprivica, argues that the work injury caused Mr. Stark to suffer an aggravation of a preexisting and asymptomatic condition (central and foraminal stenosis of the lumbar spine, from L2-L3 through L4-L5), resulting in Mr. Stark suffering an injury in the nature of lumbar radicular syndrome. The employer and insurer, relying principally upon the medical opinion of Dr. Lennard, argue that Mr. Stark presents with two medical conditions - (1) underlying L4-L5 stenosis and widespread degenerative changes; and (2) lumbar strain. The employer and insurer contend that only the lumbar strain is compensable and relates to the work injury.
Notably, in explaining his opinion and diagnosis, Dr. Volarich testified that while the stenosis was pre-existing, this condition is "very tolerable until there is an injury." However, he opined that once there is an injury,
[T]he degenerative conditions are now inflamed, aggravated, and made worse because they are causing inflammation around the nerve roots, around the spinal cord, and there's now swelling that's putting pressure on those nerves. There's some minor instability because of this jerking type of injury that he had. And all of these combined are what's causing him to now have the symptoms that he has.
Although Dr. Lennard apportions and separates the preexisting condition from the work injury, he offers medical opinion strikingly similar to Dr. Koprivica. When questioned about the relationship of the work injury to Mr. Stark's presenting symptoms, Dr. Lennard indicated that he did not have any reason to believe Mr. Stark was exaggerating his symptoms and found he was using maximal effort. Additionally, Dr. Lennard agreed that Mr. Stark's loss of range of motion, and a 20 percent reduction in flexion and extension were due not only to his age and degenerative changes, but also to the work injury. Similarly, he found nerve damage in the lower extremities, which he believed was coming from the nerve root at L4-L5. He found this to be "primarily" but not exclusively due to the stenosis.
Further, Dr. Lennard agreed that the work strain, or the stretching of the ligaments, can lead to inflammation around the nerve root, and can "aggravate that structure beyond the nerve root." And Dr. Lennard agreed that Mr. Stark had no radicular symptoms until after the injury of May, 2005.
The adjudication of the nature and extent of this low back work injury requires consideration of the governing law, as it existed under the statute in effect on May 10, 2005. In this context several principles bear reprise.
A pre-existing but non-disabling condition does not bar recovery of compensation if a job-related injury causes the condition to escalate to the level of disability. Conrad v. Jack Cooper Transport Co., 273 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Mo.App. W.D. 2008); Higgins v. Quaker Oats Co., 183 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Mo.App. 2005). See, also, Atkinson v. Peterson, 962 S.W.2d 912, 917 where the court noted:
If substantial evidence exists from which the Commission could determine that the claimant's pre-existing condition did not constitute an impediment to performance of claimant's duties, there is sufficient competent evidence to
warrant a finding that the claimant's condition was aggravated by a work-related injury.
The "disability sustained by the aggravation of a preexisting nondisabling condition or disease caused by a work-related accident is compensable even though the accident would not have produced the injury in a person not having the condition." Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co., 1 S.W.3d 43, 38 (Mo.App E.D.1999). An employer is liable for any aggravation of a preexisting asymptomatic condition caused by the primary injury. Weinbauer v. Grey Eagle Distributors, 661 S.W.2d 652 (Mo.App. 1983).
Further, it is sufficient to show only that the performance of usual and customary duties led to a breakdown or change in pathology. Winsor v. Lee Johnson Const. Co., 950 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Mo.App. 1997). The worsening of a preexisting condition, i.e., an increase in the severity of the condition, or an intensification or aggravation thereof, is a "change in pathology." Id. at 509. "If substantial evidence exists from which the Commission could determine that the Claimant's preexisting condition did not constitute an impediment to performance of Claimant's duties, there is sufficient competent evidence to warrant a finding that the Claimant's condition was aggravated by a work-related injury." Id.
In the present case, prior to May 10, 2005, Mr. Stark presented with a preexisting condition involving central and foraminal stenosis of the lumbar spine, from L2-L3 through L4L5. Yet, prior to the work injury this condition was not symptomatic and was not an impediment to Mr. Stark's ability to perform his job and engage in heavy physical labor. Similarly, prior to May 10, 2005, this preexisting stenosis or degenerative disease did not cause Mr. Stark to present with a level of disability. The work injury of May 10, 2005, however, caused the asymptomatic condition to become symptomatic, and despite receipt of extensive conservative medical treatment, Mr. Stark continues to suffer residual and severe lumbar and lower extremity pain.
Accordingly, after consideration and review of the evidence, and in light of applicable law, I find and conclude that the accident of May 10, 2005, caused a physical breakdown and change in pathology to Mr. Stark's low back. I further find and conclude that the accident of May 10, 2005, exacerbated the preexisting condition stenosis or degenerative disease, causing an acceleration of the deterioration of the preexisting degenerative disc disease, and further causing an asymptomatic low back condition to become symptomatic and painful with radicular pain. The work injury of May 10, 2005, caused Mr. Stark to suffer an injury in the nature of lumbar radicular syndrome and further caused Mr. Stark to suffer permanent disability.