(Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge)
Injury No.: 07-079319
Employee: Thomas M. Roemisch
Employer: Greene County, Missouri
Insurer: Missouri Association of Counties c/o Gallagher Bassett Services
Additional Party: Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund (Open)
The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission for review as provided by section 287.480 RSMo, which provides for review concerning the issue of liability only. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record concerning the issue of liability, the Commission finds that the award of the administrative law judge in this regard is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to section 286.090 RSMo, the Commission affirms and adopts the award and decision of the administrative law judge dated September 23, 2010.
This award is only temporary or partial, is subject to further order and the proceedings are hereby continued and kept open until a final award can be made. All parties should be aware of the provisions of section 287.510 RSMo.
The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge L. Timothy Wilson, issued September 23, 2010, is attached and incorporated by this reference.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $14^{\text {th }}$ day of April 2011.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Ringer, Chairman
DISSENTING OPINION FILED
Alice A. Bartlett, Member
John J. Hickey, Member
Attest:
Secretary
I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) should be reversed and the respondent in this case should not be considered an employee under § 287.020.1 RSMo.
Under § 287.020.1 RSMo, an employee is "every person in the service of any employer, ... express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment or election...." In no way can it be said that by abiding by the legal summons to appear for jury duty respondent became an employee.
The question of whether a potential juror is an employee of the county under Missouri Workers' Compensation Law has not been decided by Missouri Courts. However, several other jurisdictions have rejected the argument. In Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 S.O.2d 995 (Fla. 1977), the claimant was not chosen for jury duty, but was ordered to return the following day. Id. at 996. Upon return, the claimant suffered a skull fracture after being knocked down by a crowd leaving an elevator. Id. In reversing the Florida Industrial Relations Commission's award of benefits to the claimant, the Supreme Court of Florida stated, "[c]ourts have no power to extend the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to classes not clearly contemplated by it. There is no class of county employees that may be compared to a citizen called on to perform such a duty as is involved [here]." Id. The court then pointed out that this is the view in New Jersey, North Carolina, Michigan, New Mexico, Colorado, and Ohio.
In this case, the ALJ examined the definition of "employee" to determine whether or not respondent would qualify as an employee of Greene County on February 13, 2007, when he fell in the parking lot outside of the Greene County Courthouse prior to appearing/checking in for jury duty. Much focus was given to the phrase "in the service of" that is contained in the definition of employee. In interpreting said phrase, the ALJ pointed to the definition of "in the service of" contained in Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1973). In Howard, the Court defined "in the service of" as "the performance of labor for the benefit of another." Id. at 395. The ALJ pointed out that this interpretation appears to be consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word and, thus, consistent with statutory construction. The ALJ found that jurors of Greene County assume a role that benefits and provides valuable labor for Greene County and, therefore, concluded that respondent was an employee of Greene County when the accident occurred. I disagree.
Respondent provided no labor for the benefit of Greene County. On February 13, 2007, respondent did not do anything other than have his jury duty postponed until July 30, 2007. Respondent did not appear in any designated area where jurors would collectively meet prior to going through the selection process, nor was respondent subject to voir dire in February 2007. For the foregoing reasons, it is illogical to conclude that he met the definition of "in the service of" as interpreted in Howard.
The ALJ also concluded that a juror is "appointed" because they are selected from a pool of qualified voters, and summoned to appear and provide jury service for Greene County. In this case, respondent was not appointed, as contemplated by § 287.020.1 RSMo. His name was picked from a random list of qualified potential jurors. Even if he had been selected to serve jury duty, he still would not have been considered appointed because he would not have been designated to perform the duties of an office as the term "appointed" generally implies.
For the foregoing reasons, I disagree with the administrative law judge's conclusion that respondent is an employee for purposes of $\S 287.020 .1$ RSMo. As such, I would reverse the temporary or partial award of the administrative law judge.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of the Commission.
Alice A. Bartlett, Member