Based on a comprehensive review of the substantial and competent evidence and the application of the Workers' Compensation Law, I make the following Rulings of Law:
Liability of the Second Injury Fund for permanent partial disability benefits.
Section 287.808, RSMo ${ }^{2}$ provides:
The burden of establishing any affirmative defense is on the employer. The burden of proving an entitlement to compensation under this chapter is on the employee or dependent. In asserting any claim or defense based on a factual proposition, the party asserting such claim or defense must establish that such proposition is more likely to be true than not true.
Section 287.800, RSMo provides:
- Administrative law judges, associate administrative law judges, legal advisors, the labor and industrial relations commission, the division of workers' compensation, and any reviewing courts shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly.
- Administrative law judges, associate administrative law judges, legal advisors, the labor and industrial relations commission, and the division of workers' compensation shall weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when weighing evidence and resolving factual conflicts.
The claimant in a workers' compensation proceeding has the burden of proving all elements of the claim to a reasonable probability. Cardwell v. Treasurer of State of Missouri, 249 S.W.3d 902, 912 (Mo.App. 2008); Cooper v. Medical Center of Independence, 955 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Mo.App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Mo. banc 2003). ${ }^{3}$ The quantum of proof is reasonable probability. Thorsen v. Sachs Elec. Co., 52 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Mo.App.2001); Downing v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 650, 655
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[^0]: ${ }^{2}$ All statutory references are to RSMo 2006 unless otherwise indicated. In a workers' compensation case, the statute in effect at the time of the injury is generally the applicable version. Chouteau v. Netco Construction, 132 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Mo.App. 2004); Tillman v. Cam's Trucking Inc., 20 S.W.3d 579, 585-86 (Mo.App. 2000). See also Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 217 S.W.3d 345 (Mo.App. 2007).
${ }^{3}$ Several cases are cited herein that were among many overruled by Hampton on an unrelated issue (Id. at 224-32). Such cases do not otherwise conflict with Hampton and are cited for legal principles unaffected thereby; thus Hampton's effect thereon will not be further noted.
(Mo.App. 1995); Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Mo.App. 1990). "Probable means founded on reason and experience which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room to doubt." Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 620; Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App 1986); Fischer, 793 S.W.2d at 198. Such proof is made only by competent and substantial evidence. It may not rest on speculation. Griggs v. A. B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo.App. 1974). Expert testimony may be required where there are complicated medical issues. Goleman v. MCI Transporters, 844 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo.App. 1992). "Medical causation of injuries which are not within common knowledge or experience, must be established by scientific or medical evidence showing the cause and effect relationship between the complained of condition and the asserted cause." Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 618; Brundige v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.App 1991).
Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony which it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co. Inc., 1 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo.App. 1999); Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo.App. 1992); Hutchinson v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo.App. 1986). The Commission's decision will generally be upheld if it is consistent with either of two conflicting medical opinions. Smith v. Donco Const., 182 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Mo.App. 2006). The acceptance or rejection of medical evidence is for the Commission. Smith, 182 S.W.3d at 701; Bowers v. Hiland Dairy Co., 132 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo.App. 2004). The testimony of Claimant or other lay witnesses as to facts within the realm of lay understanding can constitute substantial evidence of the nature, cause, and extent of disability when taken in connection with or where supported by some medical evidence. Pruteanu v. Electro Core, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Mo.App. 1993), 29; Reiner v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 837 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo.App 1992); Fischer, 793 S.W.2d at 199. The trier of facts may also disbelieve the testimony of a witness even if no contradictory or impeaching testimony appears. Hutchinson, 721 S.W.2d at 161-2; Barrett v. Bentzinger Brothers, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo.App. 1980). The testimony of the employee may be believed or disbelieved even if uncontradicted. Weeks v. Maple Lawn Nursing Home, 848 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Mo.App. 1993).
Section 287.190, RSMo provides for permanent partial disability benefits. Section 287.190.6(2), RSMo provides:
Permanent partial disability or permanent total disability shall be demonstrated and certified by a physician. Medical opinions addressing compensability and disability shall be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. In determining compensability and disability, where inconsistent or conflicting medical opinions exist, objective medical findings shall prevail over
subjective medical findings. Objective medical findings are those findings demonstrable on physical examination or by appropriate tests or diagnostic procedures.
The determination of the degree of disability sustained by an injured employee is not strictly a medical question. Landers v. Chrysler Corp., 963 S.W.2d 275, 284 (Mo.App. 1997); Cardwell, 249 S.W.3d at 908 (Mo.App. 2008); Sellers v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 502, 505 (Mo.App. 1989). While the nature of the injury and its severity and permanence are medical questions, the impact that the injury has upon the employee's ability to work involves factors, which are both medical and nonmedical. Accordingly, the Courts have repeatedly held that the extent and percentage of disability sustained by an injured employee is a finding of fact within the special province of the Commission. Sharp v. New Mac Elec. Co-op, 92 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Mo.App. 2003); Elliott v. Kansas City, Mo., School District, 71 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Mo.App. 2002); Sellers, 776 S.W.2d at 505; Quinlan v. Incarnate Word Hospital, 714 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. App. 1985); Banner Iron Works v. Mordis, 663 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Mo.App. 1983); Barrett v. Bentzinger Bros., 595 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo.App. 1980); McAdams v. Seven-Up Bottling Works, 429 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo.App. 1968). The fact-finding body is not bound by or restricted to the specific percentages of disability suggested or stated by the medical experts. Cardwell, 249 S.W.3d at 908; Lane v. G \& M Statuary, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 498, 505 (Mo.App. 2005); Sharp, 92 S.W.3d at 354; Sullivan v. Masters Jackson Paving Co., 35 S.W.3d 879, 885 (Mo.App. 2001); Landers, 963 S.W.2d at 284; Sellers, 776 S.W.2d at 505; Quinlan, 714 S.W.2d at 238; Banner, 663 S.W.2d at 773. It may also consider the testimony of the employee and other lay witnesses and draw reasonable inferences in arriving at the percentage of disability. Cardwell, 249 S.W.3d at 908; Fogelsong v. Banquet Foods Corporation, 526 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Mo.App. 1975).
The finding of disability may exceed the percentage testified to by the medical experts. Quinlan, 714 S.W.2d at 238; McAdams, 429 S.W.2d at 289. The Commission "is free to find a disability rating higher or lower than that expressed in medical testimony." Jones v. Jefferson City School Dist., 801 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Mo.App. 1990); Sellers, 776 S.W.2d at 505. The Court in Sellers noted that "[t]his is due to the fact that determination of the degree of disability is not solely a medical question. The nature and permanence of the injury is a medical question, however, 'the impact of that injury upon the employee's ability to work involves considerations which are not exclusively medical in nature.'" Sellers, 776 S.W.2d at 505. The uncontradicted testimony of a medical expert concerning the extent of disability may even be disbelieved. Gilley v. Raskas Dairy, 903 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo.App. 1995); Jones, 801 S.W.2d at 490.
Section 287.220.1, RSMo provides in part:
All cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability shall be compensated as herein provided. Compensation shall be computed on the basis of the average earnings at the time of the last injury. If any employee who has a preexisting permanent partial disability whether from compensable injury or otherwise, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee becomes unemployed, and the preexisting permanent partial disability, if a body as a whole injury, equals a minimum of fifty weeks of compensation or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial disability, according to the medical standards that are used in determining such compensation, receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability so that the degree or percentage of disability, in an amount equal to a minimum of fifty weeks compensation, if a body as a whole injury or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial disability, caused by the combined disabilities is substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the last injury, considered alone and of itself, and if the employee is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the combined disabilities, the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability. After the compensation liability of the employer for the last injury, considered alone, has been determined by an administrative law judge or the commission, the degree or percentage of employee's disability that is attributable to all injuries or conditions existing at the time the last injury was sustained shall then be determined by that administrative law judge or by the commission and the degree or percentage of disability which existed prior to the last injury plus the disability resulting from the last injury, if any, considered alone, shall be deducted from the combined disability, and compensation for the balance, if any, shall be paid out of a special fund known as the second injury fund, hereinafter provided for.
"To create Second Injury Fund liability, the pre-existing disability must combine with the disability from the subsequent injury in one of two ways: (1) the two disabilities combined result in a greater degree of disability than the sum of the degree of disability from the pre-existing condition and the degree of disability from the subsequent injury; or (2) the pre-existing disability combines with the disability from the second injury to create
permanent total disability." Searcy v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co., 894 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Mo.App. 1995).
In order for a claimant to recover against the Second Injury Fund, he or she must prove that he or she sustained a compensable injury, referred to as "the last injury," which resulted in permanent partial disability. Section 287.220.1 RSMo. A claimant must also prove that he or she had a pre-existing permanent partial disability, whether from a compensable injury or otherwise, that: (1) existed at the time the last injury was sustained; (2) was of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to his employment or reemployment should he or she become unemployed; and (3) equals a minimum of 50 weeks of compensation for injuries to the body as a whole or 15 % for major extremities. Dunn v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 272 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo.App. 2008) (Citations omitted). In order for a claimant to be entitled to recover permanent partial disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund, he or she must prove that the last injury, combined with his or her pre-existing permanent partial disabilities, causes greater overall disability than the independent sum of the disabilities. Elrod v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 138 S.W.3d 714, 717-18 (Mo. banc 2004).
"When a claim is made against the Fund for permanent disability compensation, statutory language and case law make it mandatory that the Claimant provide evidence to support a finding, among other elements, that he had a preexisting permanent "disability." (Omitting citations). The disability, whether known or unknown, must exist at the time the work-related injury was sustained, and be of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or re-employment should the employee become unemployed." Messex v. Sachs Elec. Co., 989 S.W.2d 206, 214 (Mo.App. 1999); Luetzinger v. Treasurer of Mo., 895 S.W.2d 591 (Mo.App. 1995) (emphasis added). "The nature and the extent of the permanent-partial preexisting condition must be proven by a reasonable degree of certainty. (Omitting citation). Expert opinion evidence is necessary to prove the extent of the preexisting disability." Messex, 989 S.W.2d at 215.
Claimant must show that: (1) he or she has preexisting disability that reaches Second Injury Fund threshold, (2) he or she has additional disability from a compensable injury that qualifies for Second Injury Fund threshold, and (3) that his or her preexisting disability combines with his or her present injury to result in a greater degree of disability than the sum of either disabilities alone, ". . . that is, a synergistic enhancement in which the combined totality is greater than the sum of the independent parts." Searcy, 894 S.W.2d at 178 .
The parties stipulated, and I find that on or about July 31, 2007, Claimant sustained an injury by accident in Kansas City, Platte County, Missouri, arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer.
Claimant does not allege permanent total disability in his claim against the Second Injury Fund.
The nature and extent of any preexisting disability, and whether that disability meets the statutory threshold for Second Injury Fund liability required by Section 287.220, RSMo must be determined. Based on substantial and competent evidence, I find Claimant did not have preexisting permanent partial disability at the time of his July 31, 2007 accident that meets the statutory threshold for Second Injury Fund liability. I find Claimant's preexisting permanent partial disability at the time of his July 31, 2007 accident was 5 % of the body as a whole ( 400 week level), and that this preexisting permanent partial disability relates to Claimant's low back condition. Claimant's claim against the Second Injury Fund is therefore denied. Factors which support these findings include the following.
Dr. Poppa did not rate Claimant's diabetic condition as being part of the preexisting condition because he did not think it rose to the level that would constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment at 121 / 2 % of the body as a whole. Claimant did not offer any medical records or testimony to support a claim that he had a preexisting permanent partial disability at the time of his July 31, 2007 accident that relates to his diabetic condition. I find Claimant did not prove that he had a preexisting permanent partial disability at the time of his July 31, 2007 accident that relates to his diabetic condition.
Dr. Poppa's report concludes Claimant had preexisting 12.5\% preexisting permanent partial disability of the body as a whole "judged to be of a moderate severity with persistent lumbar pain and lower extremity radiculopathy." Dr. Poppa testified Claimant "does have a wedge deformity of T12 which is chronic and permanent and painful. He has Grade 1 retrolisthesis of L5, which is also permanent and causes chronic pain. That chronic pain, the bulging disk, the fact that - just that alone warrants a, in my opinion, a 12.5 percent disability. . . ." (Poppa deposition page 43-44.) I do not find these opinions of Dr. Poppa to be credible.
The lack of medical treatment records and employment records in evidence relating to Claimant's low back condition convinces me that Claimant's low back condition is not as severe as Dr. Poppa has found it to be. I believe if Claimant had a chronic "bad back" as described by Dr. Poppa, Claimant would have received significantly more medical treatment than he received. The records described by Dr. Poppa demonstrate three visits to a medical provider for back complaints, including treatment in 1989 and 2004. Claimant testified he went to the emergency room between six and eight times for x-rays for his back condition. I find this testimony to be true, and I find Claimant went to the emergency room between six and eight times for x-rays before
July 31, 2007 because of back pain. However, no emergency room records were provided to Dr. Poppa to review, and none were offered in evidence. The nature and extent of Claimant's complaints, the diagnoses, and the treatment recommendations set forth in the medical records relating to those emergency room visits is unknown.
Dr. Poppa acknowledged the medical history in the records that he had from 1989 until 2007 show Claimant sought treatment only two times for his lumbar condition. Dr. Poppa agreed that in his review of the medical records, he did not see any references in the low back where Claimant was on narcotic pain medication from any doctor, where Claimant had any work restrictions regarding his lumbar back, or where Claimant said he could not perform any work because of his lumbar back, prior to July 31, 2007.
Dr. Poppa did not see in his review of the records that Claimant complained that he could not do any lifting or squatting because of his lumbar condition, or that he was having trouble climbing on ladders, bending, twisting, or turning side by side because of his lumbar condition. He did not see any complaints in the records where Claimant said he was having trouble using vibrating tools, sitting long periods, or driving long periods aggravating his lumbar condition, or that Claimant could not push or pull or was having trouble lifting certain amounts because of his lumbar condition, prior to July 31, 2007.
Dr. Poppa examined Claimant and noted Claimant's lower extremity reflexes were active and symmetrical bilaterally. Dr. Poppa made no reference to Claimant having low back fracture, muscle guarding, or lower extremity atrophy. He did not quantify the extent of Claimant's lumbar loss of motion. Dr. Poppa's report makes no reference to him having obtained or reviewed any current x-rays, MRI's, or other electrodiagnostic studies relating to Claimant's low back.
Dr. Poppa testified Claimant had problems with his back "all the time." I find that statement is not accurate. While I believe and find that Claimant has had occasional periodic episodes of low back pain before his July 31, 2007 accident, I find his pain has come and gone and has not been constant. His medical treatment has been limited. He worked in the printing industry for 25 years before his July 31, 2007 accident, loading paper and handling cases of reams weighing 40 pounds. He did not have any permanent work restrictions relating to his low back before his July 31, 2007 accident.
Claimant has not had back surgery. While Claimant has continued to have back pain every week or every two and has needed to occasionally change plans, he was not taking pain medication on a consistent basis prior to his July 31, 2007 accident. He has not had follow-up pain management treatment for his back pain. He has not had epidural shots for his back. He has not had chiropractic treatment or physical therapy for his back.
Claimant testified, and I find, that his back problems caused him to have problems at work and to miss work over twenty times before July 31, 2007. However, he offered no employment records that demonstrated he had chronic difficulties at work because of his low back. He offered no attendance records. He offered no work evaluations. He did not offer documentation showing that he was unable to do his regular job duties, that he turned down jobs, that he had any work restrictions, or that he requested or received accommodations from coworkers prior to his July 31, 2007 accident. Claimant did not offer convincing evidence that his low back condition permanently limited his ability to perform certain job functions or permanently caused him to be unable to perform certain job functions.
I find Claimant did not establish that at the time of his July 31, 2007 accident, he was unable to perform his regular job duties, that he had any permanent work restrictions, that he requested or received accommodations from coworkers, or that his low back condition permanently limited his ability to perform certain job functions or permanently caused him to be unable to perform certain job functions.
I find Claimant did not prove that at the time he had his July 31, 2007 accident, that he was having trouble climbing on ladders, bending, twisting, or turning side to side, or could not lift, squat, push or pull, or was having trouble lifting, or trouble using vibrating tools, sitting long periods, or driving long periods because of his lumbar condition.
I find Claimant's preexisting permanent partial disability at the time of his July 31, 2007 accident was 5 % of the body as a whole ( 400 week level), and that this preexisting permanent partial disability relates to Claimant's low back condition. That amounts to twenty weeks of compensation. I find Claimant did not have sufficient preexisting permanent partial disability at the time of his July 31, 2007 accident to meet the Second Injury Fund threshold of Section 287.220, RSMo, which requires an amount equal to a minimum of fifty weeks compensation, if a body as a whole injury. All other issues are moot.
Claimant's claim against the Second Injury Fund is denied. Claimant's attorney is not allowed any attorney's fee.
Made by: /s/ Robert B. Miner
Robert B. Miner
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
This award is dated and attested to this $\underline{7} th day of \underline{\text { February, } 2011 .}$
/s/ Naomi Pearson
Naomi Pearson
Division of Workers' Compensation