(Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion)
Injury No.: 09-015564
Employee: Grant Freeman
Employer: Lilmonsta, LLC/Jackson Hewitt Tax Service
Insurer: State Farm Fire \& Casualty
This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by $\S 287.480$ RSMo. Having read the briefs, heard the parties' arguments, reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge allowing compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge by this supplemental opinion.
We offer this supplemental opinion to provide additional rationale to support our conclusion that employee's injury arose out of an in the course of his employment.
Employee fell and broke his arm a few blocks from employer's office while pursuing an intruder. During employee's regular evening shift at employer's office, an intruder entered employer's business looking for cash. After determining the business had no cash on hand, the intruder grabbed items from employee's coat and ran out the door. Employer's business had a sign in the window depicting a hand holding cash. We find it likely that it was employer's advertisement of available cash that induced the intruder to enter employer's office.
To show that his injury arose out of and in the course of employment, employee has to show that the accident was the prevailing factor in causing his injury and that his injury came from a hazard or risk related to his employment. See § 287.020.3(2) RSMo. The parties do not dispute that employee's fall caused his broken arm. The determination of this claim turns upon whether employee's injury came from a hazard or risk related to his employment. We find that it did.
Employer argues that at the time of the fall, employee was not fulfilling his work duties. Employer further argues that "[t]he moment that [employee] left Jackson Hewitt's premises, he embarked upon a personal mission unrelated to his employment that was not in furtherance of his employer's interests." Employer argues that since the intruder had only employee's personal property, employee's pursuit of the intruder was a purely personal mission. Employer urges us to find that since employee was not performing a work duty at the time of the fall and since employee was on a purely personal mission at the time of the fall, the risk of sustaining the broken arm was not a risk related to employee's employment.
The introduction of the intruder into employee's workplace created an emergency. In emergencies, workers are seldom engaged in fulfilling the regular work duties for which they are employed. For example, seldom is a worker's regular job duty to hand over
employer's property to a thief, but that is often what is required during a robbery. And it is unlikely that the activity of handing over an employer's property to a robber will further employer's business interests.
The emergency of being robbed arose out of and in the course of employee's employment. Employee's risk of encountering the emergency was clearly related to his employment. We believe employee's risk of falling while responding to the emergency was also related to the employment so long as his response to the emergency was reasonable in kind and scope. ${ }^{1}$
Employee's pursuit was designed to recover his property. Employee's pursuit was brief and ended when the intruder dropped the last item of employee's property. The pursuit covered a small distance. Employee's pursuit did not violate any explicit prohibition found in employer's policies. We find in this case that employee's response of briefly chasing the intruder in the hopes of recovering his property was reasonable in kind and scope. The risk of employee falling while responding to the robbery was related to the employment. Employee's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment as described by $\S 287.020 .3(2)$.
We affirm and adopt the award of the administrative law judge, as supplemented herein. We approve and affirm the administrative law judge's allowance of attorney's fee herein as being fair and reasonable.
Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.
The July 1, 2011, award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Paula McKeon is attached and incorporated by this reference.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $22^{\text {nd }}$ day of February 2012.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Ringer, Chairman
DISSENTING OPINION FILED
James Avery, Member
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
Secretary
[^0]
[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ See, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, § 28.01.
I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge should be reversed.
By giving chase to the intruder, employee acted contrary to employer's policy to not put himself in danger. He also violated employer's policy directing that if there is a disturbance, employee should not try to stop it. Once employee engaged in the chase contrary to employer's prohibition, he removed himself from the course of his employment. Further, employee's job duties did not require him to run so his employment certainly never exposed him to the risk of falling while running.
The risk of employee falling while running was not related to his employment. Employee's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. See § 287.020.3(2) RSMo.
I would reverse the award of the administrative law judge. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of the Commission.
James Avery, Member
Issued by DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Employee: Grant Freeman
Injury No. 09-015564