Claimant must prove all elements of her claim to a reasonable probability. Cardwell v. Treasurer, 249 S.W.3d 902, 911 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). To recover against the Second Injury Fund, she must prove she sustained a compensable injury, referred to as "the last injury," which resulted in permanent partial
disability. § 287.220.1 RSMo. ${ }^{3}$ She also must prove that she has a preexisting permanent partial disability that (1) existed when the last injury was sustained, (2) was of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to her employment or reemployment should she become unemployed, and (3) equals a minimum of 50 weeks of compensation for injuries to the body as a whole or 15 percent for major extremities. Dunn v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 272 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). Finally, she must demonstrate that the last injury, when combined with her preexisting permanent partial disability, causes a greater overall disability than the independent sum of the disabilities. Elrod v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 138 S.W.3d 714, 717-18 (Mo. banc 2004). "Where the statute applies, the employer is liable only for the amount of disability caused by the current injury, and the fund is liable in the amount of the increase in disability caused by the synergistic effect of the two injuries." Pierson v. Treasurer of State, 126 S.W.3d 386, 389 (Mo. banc 2004), as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 24, 2004). When the facts fall within the realm of lay understanding, a Claimant's testimony may constitute substantial evidence of the nature, cause, and extent of disability. Claspill v. Fed Ex Freight E., Inc., 360 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012). Claimant has met this burden imposed by law.
The Second Injury Fund has argued that Claimant failed to sustain her burden of proof on the issue of synergism. The Fund contends that it is not enough for Dr. Volarich to opine that the combination of the disabilities is greater than their simple sum. The Fund argues that there must be evidence explaining how the preexisting and primary disabilities combine. In support of its position, the Fund provided the Administrative Law Judge with citations to the following cases. Each of these cases is distinguishable from the instant case.
In Winingear v. Treasurer, 474 S.W.3d 203 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015), the "Commission specifically did 'not find Dr. Cohen's opinion in this case as to the synergistic effect to be credible or persuasive.' " Id. at 209. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's Award denying Second Injury Fund benefits, determining it was bound by the Commission's credibility determination on expert witnesses. By contrast in this case, after a review of all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn there from, I specifically have found Dr. Volarich's opinion to be credible and persuasive on the issue of synergism.
In Brown v. Treasurer, 795 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990), the evidence was either, as stated by Brown and confirmed by Drs. Stronsky, Conrad, and Levy, that the combination of the two permanent partial disabilities resulted in permanent total disability, or as reported by Dr. Graff, the two permanent partial disabilities considered independently did not result in permanent total disability. "The only evidence that Brown was not totally and permanently disabled was the report of Dr. Graff. But despite the fact that he was retained by the Second Injury Fund, Dr. Graff did not address the effect of combining the two disabilities, he merely rated each disability separately and independently." 705 S.W.2d at 483. Thus, the appellate court determined that the Commission erred in awarding enhanced permanent and partial disability against the Second Injury Fund because there was no evidence to support such award.
Dr. Graf's report was similarly problematic in the case of Robert Dawson v. Treasurer, Injury No. 85153664 (Mo.Lab.Ind.Rel.Com. 1992), also cited by the Second Injury Fund. There, the Administrative Law Judge awarded permanent total disability against the employer, finding that the preexisting disabilities were not "industrially disabling." On appeal, the Commission modified the Administrative Law Judge's decision and awarded permanent total disability as against the Second Injury Fund. In so ruling, the Commission observed that the report of Dr. Graf (the Fund's expert) had the same deficiency
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[^0]: ${ }^{3}$ All statutory references are to the law in effect on the date of the last injury.
as the one in Brown, supra, and was not helpful in determining the Fund's liability. It bears repeating that Dr. Graf's error was that he gave no opinion on the synergistic effect of two partial disabilities.
Finally, the Fund cites the Commission decision in Jeremy Reynolds v. Treasurer, Injury No. 4410520 (Mo.Lab.Ind.Rel.Com. 2015). In that case, although Dr. Volarich opined that the preexisting and primary disabilities combined synergistically, the Administrative Law Judge simply did not find such evidence credible. "[C]laimant did not provide credible and convincing evidence that the disability from the January 2012 ankle injury ( 3 % of the left ankle/ 4.65 weeks) combined synergistically with his preexisting disabilities to create an overall greater disability than their simple sum." The Labor Commission affirmed with a separate opinion. In so doing, the Commission stated as follows:
Typically, the synergistic interaction between bilateral extremity injuries (e.g. a left ankle and a right knee) would be well within the realm of lay understanding, but here employee has failed to provide any evidence of synergy, lay or expert. As a result, we must affirm the administrative law judge's award denying benefits from the Second Injury Fund, because an award of compensation cannot rest upon mere speculation or surmise. Griggs v. A. B. Chance Co., 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo. App. 1973).
(Slip. Op. 2).
The instant case is unlike Reynolds in which the last injury was nearly insignificant, thus making expert's opinion on synergism suspect and subject to particular scrutiny. To the contrary, Ms. Satterfield's foot fracture in the instant resulted in a settlement rating of 16.5 percent at the 150 -week level. The injury left her with appreciably more pain and limitations than she had with her preexisting conditions. Dr. Volarich gave a thorough narrative of Claimant's job duties, her limitations, and need for accommodations to get through the workday, such as orthotics, braces, and additional rest periods. Claimant testified to increased pain as well as the postural and mobility problems associated with the last accident. As the Commission noted in Reynolds, the synergistic interaction between bilateral extremity injuries normally is within the realm of lay understanding. That is precisely the situation in this case. The synergistic effect between Claimant's significant disabling conditions in three extremities certainly is "within the realm of lay understanding" in this case.
Moreover, when determining a Claimant's disability, the Administrative Law Judge may consider all of the evidence, as well as the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from lay testimony. Pavia v. Smitty's Supermarket, 118 S.W.3d 228, 239 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003). Drawing reasonable inferences from the credible testimony of Claimant, it is apparent that Claimant's disability from the last accident, when combined with the preexisting hand disabilities, creates a disability much greater than the simple sum of the individual disabilities. Dr. Volarich serves to bolster Claimant's testimony. The Second Injury Fund has presented no credible evidence suggesting otherwise.
I find and conclude that the combination of the preexisting and primary disabilities is greater than their simple sum in this case. I calculate the Second Injury Fund's liability as follows:
Primary Disability (right foot):
$16.5 \% \times 150-week level =24.75 weeks
Preexisting Disability (right hand):
25.0 \% \times 175-week level =43.75 weeks
Preexisting Disability (left hand):
25.0 \% \times 175-week level =\underline{43.75} weeks
Simple Sum:
112.25 \mathrm{weeks}
Multiplied by the loading factor:
x \frac{.20}{22.45 \text { weeks }}$
Issued by MISSOURI DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Employee: Martha Satterfield
Injury No.: 13-098713
The Second Injury Fund is liable to Claimant for 22.45 at the stipulated permanent partial disability rate of $\ 446.85, for a total of $\ 10,031.78.
Attorney John Newman shall have a lien of 25 percent of this amount as a reasonable fee for necessary legal services rendered to Claimant.
Made by: $\qquad$
Victorine R. Mahon
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation