The only issue before the Commission is the liability of the Second Injury Fund for permanent total disability benefits. Section 287.220.1 RSMo creates the Second Injury Fund and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
If the previous disability or disabilities, whether from compensable injury or otherwise, and the last injury together result in total and permanent disability, ... the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the disability resulting from the last injury considered alone and of itself;
Enployee: Danny L. Mackey
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except that if the compensation for which the employer at the time of the last injury is liable is less than the compensation provided in this chapter for permanent total disability, then in addition to the compensation for which the employer is liable and after the completion of payment of the compensation by the employer, the employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for permanent total disability under section 287.200 out of a special fund known as the "Second Injury Fund" ...
The administrative law judge failed to apply the analysis mandated by the foregoing language in that she did not resolve the extent of employer's liability for the last injury considered alone and of itself before she considered employee's preexisting disabling conditions. Instead, she recited Dr. Stuckmeyer's opinion, noted the settlement of the primary injury with employer, and found the Second Injury Fund liable for permanent total disability benefits.
The evidence certainly demonstrates (and we have found) that employee suffered from a significant preexisting shoulder injury that left him with some chronic pain and limitations. But the Missouri cases consistently instruct that employee's preexisting conditions are irrelevant until we determine the extent of employer's liability for the primary injury considered alone and in isolation:
When determining whether the Fund has any liability, the Commission must first determine the degree of disability from the last injury considered alone. Preexisting disabilities are irrelevant until this determination is made. If the last injury in and of itself rendered the claimant permanently and totally disabled, then the Fund has no liability and the employer is responsible for all compensation.
Mihalevich Concrete Constr. v. Davidson, 233 S.W.3d 747, 754 (Mo. App. 2007) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
We have found Dr. Stuckmeyer and Mary Titterington's ultimate opinions as to the reason for employee's permanent total disability lacking in credibility. We reached this determination after a careful weighing and consideration of the testimony from both experts, including the significant concessions obtained by the Second Injury Fund on cross-examination. It appears to us that both experts failed to consider the effects of the work injury in isolation when they rendered their ultimate opinions. We have also carefully weighed and considered employee's own testimony, in which he emphasized the effects of the primary low back injury as the dominant factor in restricting his physical activities.
The test for permanent total disability is the worker's ability to compete in the open labor market in that it measures the worker's potential for returning to employment. The primary inquiry is whether an employer can reasonably be expected to hire the claimant, given his present physical condition, and reasonably expect the claimant to successfully perform the work.
Dunn v. Treasurer of Mo. As Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 272 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo. App. 2008) (citations omitted).
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In light of our findings as to the effects of the work injury and our determination that Dr. Stuckmeyer and Ms. Titterington's ultimate opinions lack credibility, we conclude that the effects of the primary injury, considered alone and in isolation, render employee permanently and totally disabled.
It follows that the Second Injury Fund has no liability. ABB Power T \& D Co. v. Kempker, 236 S.W.3d 43, 50 (Mo. App. 2007). Accordingly, we must deny employee's claim against the Second Injury Fund.