Section 287.020.7 RSMo. (2000) defines total disability as the "inability to return to any employment and not merely . . . [the] inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident." The words "inability to return to any employment" means "that the employee is unable to perform the usual duties of the employment under consideration in the manner that such duties are customarily performed by the average person engaged in such employment." Kowalski v. M-G Metals and Sales, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Mo. App. 1982). The words "any employment" mean "any reasonable or normal employment or occupation; it is not necessary that the employee be completely inactive or inert in order to meet this statutory definition." Id. at 922; Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. App. 1990). The primary determination for permanent total disability is whether the claimant is able to compete in the open labor market given his physical condition and situation. Messex v. Sachs Elec. Co., 989 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Mo.App. E.D. 1999).
Claimant has presented a prima facie case regarding permanent total disability. He suffered a work injury; he presented medical and psychiatric evidence that he is in fact permanently and totally disabled. The defense in this case is based on the fact that while Claimant is not able to return to his former type of work, he is able to perform work of a lighter
nature, so the evidence of permanent total disability is not credible. Employer has presented evidence and argument on a number of facts in order to advance this position.
Section 287 RSMo. underwent significant changes through legislative amendments which took effect August 28, 2005. Therefore, it must be determined which law applies to injuries sustained prior to August 28, 2005. Article I, §13 of the Missouri Constitution provides: That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities can be enacted.
There are two exceptions to the rule that a statute shall not be applied retrospectively. First, where the statute is only procedural and does not affect any substantive right of the parties and, second, where the legislature manifests a clear intent for retrospective application. Gershman Investment Corp. v. Duckett Creek Sewer Dist., 851 S.W.2d 765 (Mo.App.1993). Section 287, as amended, does not contain a manifestation of legislative intent for retroactive application. Therefore, for any provision of $\S 287$ to apply retroactively, it must only be procedural in scope, as the retroactive application of statutory provisions which affects substantive rights violates the constitution. Fletcher v. Second Injury Fund, 922 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Mo.App.1996).
The distinction between substantive and procedural law is that substantive law relates to the rights and duties giving rise to the cause of action, while procedural law is the machinery used to effect the suit. Wilkes v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com'n, 762 S.W.2d 27, (Mo. banc 1988). Substantive statutes take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing law, or create a new obligation or impose a new duty. Brennecka v. Director of Revenue, 855 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo.App.1993).
Prior to the 2005 amendments, $\S 287.800$ stated "All of the provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare, and a substantial compliance therewith shall be sufficient to give effect to rules, regulations, requirements, awards, orders or decisions of the division and the commission, and they shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void for any omission of a technical nature in respect thereto." The appellate courts have construed this to mean all doubts be resolved in favor of a claimant. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the employee and in favor of coverage. Johnson v. City of Kirksville, 855 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993). All provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed; accordingly we resolve all doubts in favor of employee. § 287.800 RSMo. Hall v. Wagner Division-McGraw-Edison, 755 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Mo.App.1988); Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis-Cardinal Ritter Institute, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo.App.1990). Yet, a liberal construction cannot be applied in order to excuse an element lacking in the claim. Johnson at 398 .
A statutory provision which requires that doubts be resolved in favor of a particular party is a substantive statute, as the claim vests when the injury occurs. Applying the 2005 revision of $\S 287.800 would impair the cause of action itself; therefore, \S 287.800$ as it existed at the time of Claimant's injury applies to this case.
As stated previously, Claimant has established a prima facie case, in that he is not lacking evidence on any essential element. There is little evidence contradicting Claimant's credibility, with information such as the functional capacity evaluation stressing his effort, consistency and reliability.
A. Analysis: Physical Disability
- Spine
It is undisputed that Claimant suffered work-related injuries on May 27, 2004. The injury to his back resulted in a vertebrae being fractured to the extent that it lost 50 % of its height. Surgery was discussed to correct this, but by the time Claimant was sent to a specialist, too much time had passed to allow for a successful surgery attempt. Several doctors commented upon Claimant's ability to work. The work restrictions of Dr. Cantrell render Claimant unable to return to his former employment, though they would not prevent him from performing lighter work. ${ }^{1}$ Another physician chosen by Employer/Insurer was Dr. Dunteman, who also recommended restrictions which prevent Claimant from returning to his former work. Dr. Dunteman in fact stated that "Mr. Null is completely disabled from his employment". And Employer's company physician, Dr. Davis, stated on October 14, 2005:
based on the specialty consultations, his disability evaluation, and my close observation of him while he was employed in this building, and his documented pathology, he needs to be limited to four hours of work a day, no lifting greater than twenty pounds at most, and he should not sit is a car for more than ten to fifteen minutes at a time. Any of this will result in significant pain and disability.
A few months later Dr. Davis said "Mr. Null's work-related injuries have rendered him 100\% disabled in a permanent and irrevocable way". (Exhibit F). He said "in my professional opinion of Mr. Null, there is no gray area; he is clearly and permanently disabled and should be viewed as such". These opinions alone are enough to find that Claimant is unemployable in the open labor market.
Claimant submitted the testimony of Dr. Volarich, whose restrictions limit Claimant to sedentary work. Among his restrictions was the recommendation that Claimant change positions frequently to maximize comfort and rest when needed, including resting in a recumbent fashion. Claimant confirmed that he requires such a restriction to make it through a normal day, especially if he has tried to be more active than usual. The vocational experts testified that if this is the case, then Claimant is unemployable in the open labor market, and the findings from the
[^0]
[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ It is noted, as pointed out by vocational consultant Dolan, that Dr. Cantrell's restrictions were significantly different from the restrictions recommended by the functional capacity evaluation he relied upon. (Depo p. 25-26). Dr. Cantrell limited Claimant by advising no lifting more than 35 pounds from the floor level occasionally, no lifting more than 25 pounds from the waist level, no lifting more than 30 pounds overhead, and no repetitive bending. On the other hand, the functional capacity evaluation was more restrictive, finding that Claimant has numerous "positional deficits" which include decreased tolerance for sitting, walking, stairs and ladder climbing, repetitive and sustained stooping, pushing and pulling, getting to and from the floor, trunk twisting, and crouching. (Exhibit 7). The evaluation also indicated that Claimant cannot lift or carry frequently. And it stated that Claimant was negative in every Waddell test. (Exhibit 7).
functional capacity evaluation seem to support such a conclusion. For instance, the FCE showed that Claimant's heart rate exceeded 85 % of his maximum heart rate when he attempted to walk on a treadmill at 2.5 miles per hour, such that the testing had to be stopped. (Exhibit 7). And when he performed the lifting test he had to frequently rest so that his heart rate would drop below his threshold. (Exhibit 7). When he tried to crouch, "he began to shake after 10 seconds and when he attempted to get up, he could not and lost his balance". (Exhibit 7). He walked flexed and bent to the right; he could not arise without using his hands; and he complained of pain increasing to the point that all testing had to be stopped. (Exhibit 7). Afterwards, the therapist stated "Mr. Null gave consistent and maximal effort throughout the evaluation today and this appears to be a true representation of his current physical abilities". (Exhibit 7).